Kruger v Coetzee [1] is an important case in South African law, in particular in the law of delict and on the question of negligence.
In an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, culpa arises, for the purposes of liability, only if a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant not only would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or property and causing him patrimonial loss, but would also have taken reasonable steps to guard against such an occurrence, and if the defendant failed to take such steps.
Whether a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the person concerned would take any guarding steps at all, and, if so, what steps would be reasonable, must always depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.
Where the defendant has foreseen the possibility and taken certain steps, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that there were further steps which he could and should have taken.
The decision in the Eastern Cape Division, in Coetzee v Kruger, [2] was by this reasoning reversed.
Negligence is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances. The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances. The core concept of negligence is that people should exercise reasonable care in their actions, by taking account of the potential harm that they might foreseeably cause to other people or property.
Delict is a term in civil law jurisdictions for a civil wrong consisting of an intentional or negligent breach of duty of care that inflicts loss or harm and which triggers legal liability for the wrongdoer; however, its meaning varies from one jurisdiction to another. Other civil wrongs include breach of contract and breach of trust. Liability is imposed on the basis of moral responsibility, i.e. a duty of care or to act, and fault (culpa) is the main element of liability. The term is used in mixed legal systems such as Scotland, South Africa, Louisiana and the Philippines, but tort is the equivalent legal term used in common law jurisdictions.
In criminal law, criminal negligence is a surrogate mens rea required to constitute a conventional as opposed to strict liability offense. It is not, strictly speaking, a mens rea because it refers to an objective standard of behaviour expected of the defendant and does not refer to their mental state.
Bolton v. Stone[1951] AC 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078 is a leading House of Lords case in the tort of negligence, establishing that a defendant is not negligent if the damage to the plaintiff was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his conduct. The plaintiff was hit by a cricket ball which had been hit out of the ground; the defendants were members of the club committee.
Delict in Scots Law is the area of law concerned with those civil wrongs which are actionable before the Scottish courts. The Scots use of the term 'delict' is consistent with the jurisdiction's connection with Civilian jurisprudence; Scots private law has a 'mixed' character, blending together elements borrowed from Civil law and Common law, as well as indigenous Scottish developments. The term tort law, or 'law of torts', is used in Anglo-American jurisdictions to describe the area of law in those systems. Unlike in a system of torts, the Scots law of delict operates on broad principles of liability for wrongdoing: 'there is no such thing as an exhaustive list of named delicts in the law of Scotland. If the conduct complained of appears to be wrongful, the law of Scotland will afford a remedy even if there has not been any previous instance of a remedy being given in similar circumstances'. While some terms such as assault and defamation are used in systems of tort law, their technical meanings differ in Scottish delict.
Causation is the "causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and end result". In other words, causation provides a means of connecting conduct with a resulting effect, typically an injury. In criminal law, it is defined as the actus reus from which the specific injury or other effect arose and is combined with mens rea to comprise the elements of guilt. Causation only applies where a result has been achieved and therefore is immaterial with regard to inchoate offenses.
In criminal law and in the law of tort, recklessness may be defined as the state of mind where a person deliberately and unjustifiably pursues a course of action while consciously disregarding any risks flowing from such action. Recklessness is less culpable than malice, but is more blameworthy than carelessness.
In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.
The South African law of delict engages primarily with ‘the circumstances in which one person can claim compensation from another for harm that has been suffered’. JC Van der Walt and Rob Midgley define a delict ‘in general terms [...] as a civil wrong’, and more narrowly as ‘wrongful and blameworthy conduct which causes harm to a person’. Importantly, however, the civil wrong must be an actionable one, resulting in liability on the part of the wrongdoer or tortfeasor.
Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton is an important case in South African law, in particular the law of delict, but with implications also for criminal law. It was heard before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) on 21 August 2003, with judgment handed down on 26 September.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
Smit v Abrahams is an important case in South African law. It was heard in the Appellate Division on March 15, 1994, with judgment handed down on May 16. Botha AR, EM Grosskopf AR, Kumleben AR, Van Den Heever AR and Mahomed Wn AR were the judges.
Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and Another is an important case in South African law, particularly in the area of delict and on the question of negligence.
Van Wyk v Lewis is an important case in South African law, particularly in the area of delict and on the question of negligence.
General Accident Insurance Co South Africa Ltd v Xhego and Others is an important case in the South African law of delict, particularly the area of compensation for motor vehicle accidents. The case was heard in the Appellate Division, by Joubert JA, Van Heerden JA, Smalberger JA, F H Grosskopf JA and Van Coller AJA, on November 18, 1991, with judgment handed down on November 29. The appellant, whose attorneys were Silberbauers, Cape Town, and Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein, was represented by BM Griesel. The respondents, whose attorneys were Coulter, Van Gend & Kotze, Claremont, and Webbers, Bloemfontein, were represented by BJR Whitehead.
In S v Fernandez, an important case in South African criminal law, heard on February 17, 1966, the court held that the appellant had been negligent in mending a cage from which a baboon had subsequently escaped, which subsequently bit a child, who subsequently died. The appellant must have foreseen the likelihood of an attack in the event of the baboon's escaping; he was, the court held, therefore rightly convicted of culpable homicide. The case was an appeal from a decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division by Galgut J and Clayden J, who had dismissed an appeal from a conviction in a magistrate's court.
In S v Russell, an important case in South African criminal law, heard on July 12, 1967, the accused had been warned of the danger of operating a crane under a live electric wire, but had failed to pass on the warning to his co-employees. This omission, constituting negligence, led to the death of one of them. He was convicted of culpable homicide.
In Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v De Valence, an important case in South African law, the Supreme Court of Appeal once more affirmed that a duty cast upon a defendant might be such that it is discharged only if reasonable precautions to avoid the harm are actually taken, and that the defendant who appoints another to take those steps, and fails to do so, will be liable for the failure, although it was careful to emphasise that Stratford ACJ did not purport to say that “there might be liability as an invariable rule whenever the work entails danger to the public.” Goldstone AJA said that “the correct approach to the liability of an employer for the negligence of an independent contractor is to apply the fundamental rule that obliges a person to exercise that degree of care which the circumstances demand.”
In Dukes v Marthinusen, the Supreme Court of Appeal held it to be consistent with principles of the law of delictual liability that a duty cast upon a defendant might be such that it is discharged only if reasonable precautions to avoid harm are actually taken, and that the defendant who appoints another to take those steps, and fails to do, will be liable for the failure. In casu, the defendant had employed an independent contractor to demolish certain buildings. In a claim for damages arising from the negligent performance of the work, Stratford ACJ said the following after considering various cases in South Africa and in England:
The English law on the subject as I have stated it to be is in complete accord with our own, both systems rest the rule as to the liability of an employer for any damage caused by work he authorises another to do upon the law of negligence. It follows from the law as I have stated it to be that the first and crucial question in this case is to ascertain on the facts of the case whether there was a duty on the employer who authorised the demolition of these buildings to take precautions to protect the public using the highway from possible injury. If there was such duty it could not be delegated and the employment of an independent contractor is an irrelevant consideration.
In Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin, an important case in South African law, the issue concerned the liability of the employer of an independent contractor for damages arising from the death of a third party who was injured in consequence of the dangerous operations being performed by the contractor. In the course of his judgment, in terms of which the employer's liability was confirmed, Holmes JA said,
Negligence is the breach of a duty of care. In general, the law allows me to mind my own business. Thus, if I happen to see someone else's child about to drown in a pool, ordinarily I do not owe a legal duty to anyone to try to save it. But sometimes the law requires me to be my brother's keeper. This happens, for example, when the circumstances are such that I owe him a duty of care; and I am negligent if I breach it. I owe him such a duty if a diligens paterfamilias, that notional epitome of reasonable prudence, in the position in which I am in [sic], would—
(a) foresee the possibility of harm occurring to him; and
(b) take steps to guard against its occurrence.
Foreseeability of harm to a person, whether he be a specific individual or one of a category, is usually not a difficult question, but when ought I to guard against it? It depends upon the circumstances in each particular case, and it is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a formulation which would cover all cases. For the purposes of the present case it is sufficient to say, by way of general approach, that if I launch a potentially dangerous undertaking involving the foreseeable possibility of harm to another, the circumstances may be such that I cannot reasonably shrug my shoulders in unconcern but have certain responsibilities in the matter—the duty of care.