Lord Cranstown v Johnston

Last updated

Lord Cranstown v Johnston
Cuba canna da zucchero.jpg
The dispute centred around a plantation in the Caribbean
Court High Court
Decided5 July 1796
Citation(s)(1796) 3 Ves 170
30 ER 952
Transcript(s) CommonLII
Court membership
Judge sitting Sir Richard Arden MR
Keywords
  • abuse of process
  • conflict of laws
  • mortgages
  • in personam jurisdiction

Lord Cranstown v Johnson (1796) 3 Ves 170, 30 ER 952 is a judicial decision of the English courts relating to the conflict of laws and the ability of the court to exercise personal (or, in personam ) jurisdiction over the litigants to compel them to deal with land which is located outside of the jurisdiction of the court. [1] [2] [3] [4]

Contents

Lord Cranstown [5] owed money to Johnson, although there was a disagreement between them as to how much was owed. Although the parties were discussing the matter, whilst the discussions were ongoing Johnson started proceedings on the island of St Kitts [6] to seek an order of the court for the sale of a valuable estate belonging to Lord Cranston. Under the laws in St Kitts it was permissible to commence such an action by substituted service by nailing the writ to the courthouse door. Lord Cranston was not aware of the proceedings, and so the court proceeded to make an order for the sale of the estate, which Johnson purchased (as the only bidder) for a fraction of its true worth. When he discovered what had happened, Lord Cranstown sued Johnson in the English courts, and sought an order that Johnson return his estates to him.

Even though the land in question was located outside of the jurisdiction of the court, it nonetheless ordered Johnson to reconvey the estate to Lord Cranstown, holding "this Court cannot act upon the [foreign] land directly, but acts upon the conscience of the person living here." [7]

Facts

Lord Cranstown was the owner of a plantation on the island of St Kitts in the Caribbean. He owed the defendant Johnston a little over £2,500. The pair had been in discussions in England in relation to the debt. Whilst the discussion were ongoing, Johnston issued proceedings in St Kitts suing for the debt. Under the laws of St Kitts it was permitted to serve proceedings on a defendant by way of substituted service by nailing the writ on a post and upon the door of the court. Lord Cranstown received no notice of the proceedings, and judgment was given in favour of Johnson by default. Lord Cranstown's estate in St Kitts was put up for auction to satisfy the judgment, and at the auction Johnston was the only bidder. He purchased the plantation for £2,000 by way of credit bid. This was considerably less than the true value of the estate, which the court held could not be worth less than £20,000 at a minimum. [8] When he discovered what had happened Lord Cranstown brought suit in England to recover the estate. [3] [9]

High Court

The case came before the Master of the Rolls, Sir Richard Arden.

The Master of the Rolls held that, even though Johnston had made no false representation to anyone, and he had not violated any law of St Kitts, and nor did he owe any contractual obligations to Lord Cranstown, nonetheless he did know that he was going behind Lord Cranstown's back and in doing so was contriving to get the estate for a fraction of its true worth. He could not question the jurisdiction of the foreign court to deal with land in St Kitts, or the regularity of its proceedings. However he was satisfied that it was a fraud all the same according to English rules of equity, and that because Johnson was within the jurisdiction of the court he was able to order him to restore the estate upon being repaid the original debt and expenses owed by Lord Cranstoun.

He accepted this general principle: [7]

this Court cannot act upon the land directly, but acts upon the conscience of the person living here. [cites cases] Those cases clearly shew, that with regard to any contract made or equity between persons in this country respecting lands in a foreign country, particularly in the British dominions, this Court will hold the same jurisdiction as if they were situated in England. ...
Therefore without affecting the jurisdiction of the Courts there, or questioning the regularity of the proceedings in a Court of law, or saying that this sale would have been set aside either in law or equity there ... neither the law of this nor of any other country would permit...

He held: [10]

I will lay down a rule as broad as this: this Court will not permit him to avail himself of the law of any other country to do what would be a gross injustice.

Commentary

The case has been cited with approval in numerous cases, both in England and abroad. It was cited with approval by the English courts in British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd [1910] 2 Ch 502, Deschamps v Miller [1908] 1 Ch 856, Mercantile Investment Co v River Plate Trust Co [1892] 2 Ch 303, Re Courtney, ex p Pollard (1840) Mont & Ch 239, [1835-42] All ER Rep 415 and Norris v Chambers (1861) 29 Beav 246, 54 ER 621, and by the House of Lords in British South Africa Company v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602.

It was recently cited by the High Court in R Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2004] EWHC 1088(Ch).

The leading textbooks on the English conflict of laws treat it as authoritative with respect to the fact the court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a litigant with respect to land situated abroad, even though it cannot make an order in relation to the land itself. [1] [2]

It has also been cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Duke v Adler [1932] 4 DLR 529.

Notes

Lord Cranstoun himself died within a few months of the decision, and his widow died a few months after that. There appears to be no extant record of whether he did ever discharge the debt to Johnson, and so whether Johnson did reconvey the estate to his widow or heirs.

Footnotes

  1. 1 2 Dicey Morris & Collins (15th ed.). Sweet & Maxwell. 2012. p. 1323. ISBN   978-0-414-02453-3.
  2. 1 2 Paul Torremans (2017). Cheshire North & Fawcett: Private International Law (15th ed.). OUP. p. 488. ISBN   978-0-19-967898-3.
  3. 1 2 "Cranstown v Johnson 1796". swarb.co.uk. Retrieved 3 November 2021.
  4. Charles Levin (1 May 1934). "Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery". Notre Dame Law Review. Retrieved 3 November 2021.
  5. Technically the plaintiff's name was Lord Cranstoun, but the case reports and academic commentary all refer to the anglicised form: "Cranstown".
  6. The case reports use the older form of the island's name: St Christopher.
  7. 1 2 (1796) 3 Ves 170 at 182
  8. (1796) 3 Ves 170 at 177. The slaves and stock were valued at a further £8,000.
  9. R Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2004] EWHC 1088(Ch) at [104].
  10. (1796) 3 Ves 170 at 183

Related Research Articles

Personal jurisdiction is a court's jurisdiction over the parties, as determined by the facts in evidence, which bind the parties to a lawsuit, as opposed to subject-matter jurisdiction, which is jurisdiction over the law involved in the suit. Without personal jurisdiction over a party, a court's rulings or decrees cannot be enforced upon that party, except by comity; i.e., to the extent that the sovereign which has jurisdiction over the party allows the court to enforce them upon that party. A court that has personal jurisdiction has both the authority to rule on the law and facts of a suit and the power to enforce its decision upon a party to the suit. In some cases, territorial jurisdiction may also constrain a court's reach, such as preventing hearing of a case concerning events occurring on foreign territory between two citizens of the home jurisdiction. A similar principle is that of standing or locus standi, which is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.

A mortgage is a legal instrument of the common law which is used to create a security interest in real property held by a lender as a security for a debt, usually a mortgage loan. Hypothec is the corresponding term in civil law jurisdictions, albeit with a wider sense, as it also covers non-possessory lien.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Court of equity</span> Court authorized to apply principles of equity to cases

A court of equity, also known as an equity court or chancery court, is a court authorized to apply principles of equity rather than principles of law to cases brought before it. These courts originated from petitions to the Lord Chancellor of England and primarily heard claims for relief other than damages, such as specific performance and extraordinary writs. Over time, most equity courts merged with courts of law, and the adoption of various Acts granted courts combined jurisdiction to administer common law and equity concurrently. Courts of equity are now recognized for complementing the common law by addressing its shortcomings and promoting justice.

The equity of redemption refers to the right of a mortgagor to redeem his or her property once the debt secured by the mortgage has been discharged.

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), was a United States Supreme Court case that exemplified the bizarre types of jurisdiction state courts could assert through quasi in rem actions before International Shoe's (1945) "minimum contacts" test replaced Pennoyer's (1878) principles of "power and notice".

Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 537 (1885), was a suit instituted in equity ancillary to a principal action brought for the possession of a mining claim. The object of the suit was to restrain the commission of waste by the defendants pending the outcome of the main action.

Constructive trusts in English law are a form of trust created by the English law courts primarily where the defendant has dealt with property in an "unconscionable manner"—but also in other circumstances. The property is held in "constructive trust" for the harmed party, obliging the defendant to look after it. The main factors that lead to a constructive trust are unconscionable dealings with property, profits from unlawful acts, and unauthorised profits by a fiduciary. Where the owner of a property deals with it in a way that denies or impedes the rights of some other person over that property, the courts may order that owner to hold it in constructive trust. Where someone profits from unlawful acts, such as murder, fraud, or bribery, these profits may also be held in constructive trust. The most common of these is bribery, which requires that the person be in a fiduciary office. Certain offices, such as those of trustee and company director, are always fiduciary offices. Courts may recognise others where the circumstances demand it. Where someone in a fiduciary office makes profits from their duties without the authorisation of that office's beneficiaries, a constructive trust may be imposed on those profits; there is a defence where the beneficiaries have authorised such profits. The justification here is that a person in such an office must avoid conflicts of interest, and be held to account should he fail to do so.

<i>Tulk v Moxhay</i>

Tulk v Moxhay is a landmark English land law case which decided that in certain cases a restrictive covenant can "run with the land" in equity. It is the reason that Leicester Square exists today.

<i>Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd</i>

Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 is an English land law and English contract law case, concerning the measure and availability of damages for breach of negative covenant in circumstances where the court has confirmed that a covenant is legally enforceable and refused, as unconscionable, to issue an order for specific performance or an injunction.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Doctrine of marshalling</span>

Marshalling is an equitable doctrine applied in the context of lending. It was described by Lord Hoffmann as:

[A] principle for doing equity between two or more creditors, each of whom are owed debts by the same debtor, but one of whom can enforce his claim against more than one security or fund and the other can resort to only one. It gives the latter an equity to require that the first creditor satisfy himself so far as possible out of the security or fund to which the latter has no claim.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">English land law</span> Law of real property in England and Wales

English land law is the law of real property in England and Wales. Because of its heavy historical and social significance, land is usually seen as the most important part of English property law. Ownership of land has its roots in the feudal system established by William the Conqueror after 1066, but is now mostly registered and sold on the real estate market. The modern law's sources derive from the old courts of common law and equity, and legislation such as the Law of Property Act 1925, the Settled Land Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1972, the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 and the Land Registration Act 2002. At its core, English land law involves the acquisition, content and priority of rights and obligations among people with interests in land. Having a property right in land, as opposed to a contractual or some other personal right, matters because it creates priority over other people's claims, particularly if the land is sold on, the possessor goes insolvent, or when claiming various remedies, like specific performance, in court.

Morice v Bishop of Durham [1805] EWHC Ch J80 is an English trusts law case, concerning the policy of the beneficiary principle.

<i>FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC</i> UK legal case

FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC[2014] UKSC 45 is a landmark decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court which holds that a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on trust for his principal. In so ruling, the Court partially overruled Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd in favour of The Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid (UKPC), a ruling from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand.

Cross-border insolvency regulates the treatment of financially distressed debtors where such debtors have assets or creditors in more than one country. Typically, cross-border insolvency is more concerned with the insolvency of companies that operate in more than one country rather than bankruptcy of individuals. Like traditional conflict of laws rules, cross-border insolvency focuses upon three areas: choice of law rules, jurisdiction rules and enforcement of judgment rules. However, in relation to insolvency, the principal focus tends to be the recognition of foreign insolvency officials and their powers.

Provisional liquidation is a process which exists as part of the corporate insolvency laws of a number of common law jurisdictions whereby after the lodging of a petition for the winding-up of a company by the court, but before the court hears and determines the petition, the court may appoint a liquidator on a "provisional" basis. Unlike a conventional liquidator, a provisional liquidator does not assess claims against the company or try to distribute the company's assets to creditors, as the power to realise the assets comes after the court orders a liquidation.

<i>Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys</i>

Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys[2014] UKPC 41 was a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the British Virgin Islands relating to an anti-suit injunction in connection with an insolvent liquidation being conducted by the British Virgin Islands courts.

<i>Akers v Samba Financial Group</i>

Akers v Samba Financial Group[2017] UKSC 6, [2017] AC 424 is a judicial decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom relating to the conflict of laws, trust law and insolvency law.

<i>Penn v Lord Baltimore</i> Judicial decision of Lord Hardwicke LC

Penn v Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444 was a judicial decision of Lord Hardwicke LC in relation to the long-running Penn–Calvert boundary dispute.

<i>Santley v Wilde</i>

Santley v Wilde [1899] 2 Ch 474 is a decision of the English Court of Appeal in relation to the legal nature of a mortgage, and to what extent a provision in a mortgage may be struck down as a fetter or "clog" on the equity of redemption.

<i>British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd</i>

British South Africa Company v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd [1910] 2 Ch 502 is a judicial decision of the English Court of Appeal relating to the conflict of laws, and clogs upon the equity of redemption.