Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration

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The Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration was Medicare's first physician pay-for-performance (P4P) initiative. The demonstration established incentives for quality improvement and cost efficiency. Ten large physician groups participated in the demonstration, which started on April 1, 2005, and ran for 5 years. Previous funding arrangements, like the volume performance standard (VPS) and the sustainable growth rate (SGR) did not provide incentives to slow the growth of services. [1] The Medicare PGP demonstration was intended to overcome that limitation in previous funding arrangements.

Contents

Introduction

Section 412 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 established the Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration, a project designed to create incentives for physicians to improve both the cost efficiency and quality of the care they provide to Medicare beneficiaries. [2] The Demonstration is a prime example of the shared savings model of payment reform [3] and represents Medicare's first physician Pay-for-Performance initiative. [4] The three main goals of the PGP Demonstration are:

The demonstration spanned five years, beginning on April 1, 2005, and ending on March 31, 2010. [5]

Demonstration design

Selection criteria

Participants in the PGP Demonstration were selected based on a wide variety of criteria, including but not limited to organizational structure, operational feasibility, geographic location, and proposed implementation strategy, with preference given to multispecialty groups with highly developed clinical and management information systems. Participating organizations were required to include 200 or more physicians. [6]

Participating physician groups

10 large multispecialty groups representing approximately 5,000 physicians and 220,000 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries participated in the Demonstration. The participating groups included:

ParticipantOrganizational StructurePart of Integrated Delivery System?Includes Academic Medical Center?Service Area
Dartmouth-Hitchcock ClinicFaculty/Community Group PracticeYesYesNew Hampshire/Eastern Vermont
Billings ClinicGroup PracticeYesNoSouth-Central Montana/Northwestern Wyoming
Geisinger ClinicGroup PracticeYesNoCentral-Northeast Pennsylvania
Middlesex Health SystemNetwork ModelYesNoSouth-Central Connecticut
Marshfield ClinicGroup PracticeNoNoNorth-Central Wisconsin
Forsyth Medical GroupGroup PracticeYesNoNorthwest North Carolina
Park Nicollet ClinicGroup PracticeYesNoSouth-Central Minnesota
St. John's ClinicGroup PracticeYesNoSouth-Central Missouri/Northwest Arkansas
Everett ClinicGroup PracticeNoNoWest-Central Washington
University of Michigan Faculty Group PracticeFaculty PracticeYesYesSoutheastern Michigan

Source: Kautter, J., Pope, G.C., Trisollini, M., RTI International, and Grund, S., Iowa Foundation for Medical Care. [8]

Beneficiary assignment

For each performance year of the demonstration Medicare beneficiaries were retrospectively assigned to each PGP group if the majority of the patient's office or other outpatient services were provided by the PGP group.[ citation needed ]

Spending growth rate

An assigned beneficiary growth rate was calculated at the end of each performance year by comparing the total Medicare Part A and Part B per capita expenditures to a base year period. PGPs that were able to attain a spending growth rate of more than 2% lower than their comparison populations were eligible for shared savings. Each PGP's local market area served as the basis for comparison populations.

Risk adjustment

Medicare Part A and Part B expenditures were risk adjusted according to the CMS-HCC concurrent risk adjustment model. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) HCC (Risk Adjustment and Hierarchical Condition Category) is a payment model mandated in 1997 by CMS to estimate future costs for patients. [9] The CMS-HCC concurrent risk adjustment model uses current year diagnoses to adjust current year expenditures to account for changes in case-mix or the health status of assigned beneficiaries in a PGP group.

Regular payment mechanism

Under the PGP Demonstration physicians continued to be paid for Part A and Part B services provided to Medicare beneficiaries according to regular Medicare fee-for-service fee schedules.

Performance payments

Performance payments were separated into two metrics: cost efficiency and quality.

Quality measures

The quality measures used in the Demonstration were developed by CMS in collaboration with the American Medical Association's Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement and the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and were reviewed by the National Quality Forum. [10] Quality measures were phased in such that Year 1 included only measures related to diabetes mellitus, Year 2 added measures related to congestive heart failure and coronary artery disease, and Year 3 added preventive care measures related to hypertension and cancer screening. [11]

Diabetes MellitusCongestive Heart FailureCoronary Artery DiseasePreventive Care
HbA1c ManagementLeft Ventricular Function AssessmentAntiplatelet TherapyBlood Pressure Screening
HbA1c ControlLeft Ventricular Ejection Fraction TestingDrug Therapy for Lowering LDL CholesterolBlood Pressure Control
Blood Pressure ManagementWeight MeasurementBeta-Blocker Therapy – Prior MIBlood Pressure Control Plan of Care
Lipid MeasurementBlood Pressure ScreeningBlood Pressure Breast Cancer Screening
LDL Cholesterol LevelPatient EducationLipid ProfileColorectal Cancer Screening
Urine Protein TestingBeta-Blocker TherapyLDL Cholesterol Level
Eye ExamAce Inhibitor TherapyAce Inhibitor Therapy
Foot ExamWarfarin Therapy for Patients HF
Influenza VaccinationInfluenza Vaccination
Pneumonia VaccinationPneumonia Vaccination

Source: Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011. [12]

Performance results

Year 1Year 2Year 3Year 4Year 5
Quality MeasuresAll 10 PGPs improve clinical management of diabetes by attaining specified goals on at least 7 out of 10 diabetes clinical quality measures. Forsyth Medical Group and St. John's Health System achieve benchmark performance on all 10 measures.All 10 PGPs improve quality of care for chronically ill patients by attaining specified goals on at least 25 out of 27 quality measures for patients with diabetes, coronary artery disease, and congestive heart failure. Forsyth Medical Group, Geisinger Clinic, Marshfield Clinic, St. John's Health System, and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice achieve benchmark performance on all 27 measures.All 10 PGPs improve quality of care for patients with chronic illness or who require preventive care by attaining specified goals on at least 28 out of 32 quality measures for patients with diabetes, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, hypertension, and cancer screening. Geisinger Clinic and Park Nicollet Health Services achieve benchmark performance on all 32 measures.All 10 PGPs achieve benchmark performance on at least 29 of the 32 measures. Geisinger Clinic, Marshfield Clinic, and Park Nicollet Health Services achieve benchmark performance on all 32 measures. All 10 PGPs achieve benchmark performance on the 10 heart failure and 7 coronary artery disease measures.All 10 PGPs achieve benchmark performance on at least 30 of the 32 measures. Billings Clinic, Everett Clinic, Forsyth Medical Group, Geisinger Health System, Middlesex Health System, Park Nicollet Health Services, and St. John's Health System achieve benchmark performance on all 32 measures. All 10 PGPs achieve benchmark performance on the 10 heart failure, 7 coronary artery disease, and 2 preventive care measures.
Cost Efficiency2 PGPs (Marshfield Clinic and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice) qualify for shared savings payments4 PGPs (Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, Everett Clinic, Marshfield Clinic, and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice) qualify for shared savings payments5 PGPs (Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, Geisinger Clinic, Marshfield Clinic, St. John's Health System, and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice) qualify for shared savings payments5 PGPs (Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, Geisinger Clinic, Marshfield Clinic, St. John's Health System, and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice) qualify for shared savings payments4 PGPs (Marshfield Clinic, Park Nicolette Health Services, St. John's Health System, and the University of Michigan Faculty Group Practice) qualify for shared savings payments
Performance Payments$7.3 million in performance payments of $9.5 million total in Medicare savings$13.8 million in performance payments of $17.4 million total in Medicare savings$25.3 million in performance payments of $32.3 million total in Medicare savings$31.7 million in performance payments of $38.7 million total in Medicare savings$29.4 million in performance payments of $36.2 million total in Medicare savings [13]

Lessons

Return on investment

In the first year of participation, PGPs invested $1.7 million on average. [14] Some additional funding was provided by CMS to offset the high start-up costs faced by PGPs. [15] Research indicates that the time frame in which PGPs can expect a reasonable return on initial investment is five years or more. [16]

Successes

Those PGPs that were able to attain shared savings payments attributed their success to a variety of factors including but not limited to organizational structure, care process redesign, investment in care management programs, improved diagnostic coding, and market conditions.

Of the PGPs that were able to attain shared savings, Marshfield Clinic earned approximately half of these payments. Michigan, Dartmouth, and St. John's each earned approximately 15%, while Geisinger attained approximately 5%. [17]

Theodore Praxel of Marshfield Clinic attributes the PGP's success to "an aggressive acceleration of multiple initiatives… including health information technology (point of care reminders, being completely chartless), care management programs, and education and feedback to providers regarding populations of patients with a given condition."

The four PGPs that qualified for performance payments in Year 2 were all either independent provider groups (Everett and Marshfield) or had close ties with an academic medical center (Dartmouth-Hitchcock and University of Michigan). [18]

According to David Abelson, CEO of Park Nicollet Health Services, "[these] results provide compelling evidence that paying for outcomes, rather than volume, helps our patients, helps make health care more affordable and saves money for taxpayers." [19]

Challenges

Several design issues were identified as being potential barriers to attaining higher cost efficiency and performance on quality measures. These identified barriers include comparator group construction, patient assignment and attribution, the risk adjustment mechanism employed, and the lack of timely data provided by CMS to participating PGPs regarding attribution. [20] In addition, because the PGP demonstration relied on the fee-for-service model, PGPs had little control over where attributed patients chose to seek care. This proved problematic because under the demonstration the PGP was responsible for all costs of care that the patient incurred regardless of care setting, making it difficult to control costs.

Across all PGP demonstration sites the majority of savings achieved were in outpatient, rather than inpatient, services. RTI International, the research institute charged with evaluating the demonstration, hypothesized that the inclusion of a hospital in a PGP may be a "potential deterrent to achieving savings… [as] these systems may be unable to reduce avoidable admissions or use lower cost care substitutes without affecting their inpatient revenue." Similarly, none of the 5 PGPs that are part of integrated healthcare delivery systems (but not affiliated with an academic medical center), along with Middlesex Health System (a physician network sponsored by a hospital affiliate) were able to attain shared savings in Year 5. [21]

Aftermath

All 10 of the provider groups that participated in the original PGP Demonstration are currently[ as of? ] participating in the demonstration's successor program, the PGP Transition Demonstration (PGP TD). [22] This 2-year demonstration has been modified from the original demonstration in several ways:

PGPs have the option of transitioning to Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program. [24]

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References

  1. ↑ Kautter, J.; Pope, G. C.; Trisolini, M.; Grund, S. (2007). "Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration Design: Quality and Efficiency Pay-for-Performance". Health Care Financing Review. 29 (1): 15–29. PMC   4195009 . PMID   18624077.
  2. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011
  3. ↑ Rosenthal, M.B., Beyond Pay for Performance – Emerging Models of Provider-Payment Reform, The New England Journal of Medicine, September 2008.
  4. ↑ Kautter, J., Pope, C., Trisolini, M., et al., Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration Design: Quality and Efficiency Pay-for-Performance, Health Care Financing Review, 2007. Volume 29, No. 1.
  5. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011
  6. ↑ Medicare Physician Payment: Care Coordination Programs Used in Demonstration Show Promise, but Wider Use of Payment Approach May Be Limited, United States Government Accountability Office, February 2008.
  7. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011.
  8. ↑ Kautter, J., Pope, C., Trisolini, M., et al., Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration Design: Quality and Efficiency Pay-for-Performance, Health Care Financing Review, 2007. Volume 29, No. 1.
  9. ↑ https://reportingmd.com/hcc-coding-why-its-so-important
  10. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011.
  11. ↑ Trisolini, M., Aggarwal, J., Leung, M., et al., The Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Lessons Learned on Improving Quality and Efficiency in Health Care, The Commonwealth Fund, February 2008. Volume 84.
  12. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011.
  13. ↑ Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, July 2011.
  14. ↑ Haywood, T.T., Kosel, K.C., The ACO Model – A Three-Year Financial Loss?, The New England Journal of Medicine, March 2011.
  15. ↑ Goozner, M., Mixed Signals on Medicare Pilot Savings Projects, Kaiser Health News, October 2010.
  16. ↑ Haywood, T.T., Kosel, K.C., The ACO Model – A Three-Year Financial Loss?, The New England Journal of Medicine, March 2011.
  17. ↑ Wilensky, G.R., Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration – A Sobering Reflection, The New England Journal of Medicine, September 2011.
  18. ↑ Iglehart, J.K., Assessing an ACO Prototype – Medicare's Physician Group Practice Demonstration, The New England Journal of Medicine, December 2010.
  19. ↑ Abelson, R., Medicare Extends Experiment in Paying Doctors, The New York Times, August 2011.
  20. ↑ Wilensky, G.R., Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration – A Sobering Reflection, The New England Journal of Medicine, September 2011.
  21. ↑ Iglehart, J.K., Assessing an ACO Prototype – Medicare's Physician Group Practice Demonstration, The New England Journal of Medicine, December 2010.
  22. ↑ Physician Group Practice Demonstration Succeeds in Improving Quality and Reducing Costs, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, August 2011.
  23. ↑ Wilensky, G.R., Lessons from the Physician Group Practice Demonstration – A Sobering Reflection, The New England Journal of Medicine, September 2011.
  24. ↑ Physician Group Practice Demonstration Succeeds in Improving Quality and Reducing Costs, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Department of Health & Human Services, August 2011.
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