Mission command, also referred to as mission-type tactics, is a style of military command, which is derived from the Prussian-pioneered mission-type tactics doctrine, combines centralized intent with decentralized execution subsidiarity, and promotes freedom and speed of action, and initiative within defined constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions, and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason that it needs to be achieved. Subordinates then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Orders focus on providing intent, control measures, and objectives and allow for greater freedom of action by subordinate commanders. [1] Mission command is closely related to civilian management concept of workplace empowerment, and its use in business has been explored by writers such as Bungay (2011) and Tozer (1995, 2012). It is advocated but not always used [2] by the militaries of the United States, [3] [4] Canada, [5] Netherlands, Australia and the United Kingdom. [6] Mission command is compatible with modern military net-centric concepts, [7] and less centralized approaches to command and control (C2) in general. [8]
Originating from the Napoleonic corps concept, increasingly larger armies prevented movement en bloc . Commanders often separated by miles, communicating through horse-carried dispatches, were expected to maneuver in concert with one another. [9] Beginning as early as 1807, the Prussian high command began to emphasize a battle philosophy that Moltke would later describe as:
A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient [10]
Continued focus on tactical initiative at the lowest levels developed within the German army through the First World War and formally became Auftragstaktik during the Second World War. Despite the exceptional performance of the Wehrmacht at the tactical level, mission command was not adopted by NATO commanders until the 1970s. [9]
The break up of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s drew in contingents from several modern militaries to United Nations or two stabilization forces (IFOR and SFOR). One was NORDBAT 2, consisting of a reinforced Swedish-Danish-Norwegian mechanized battalion in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The infantry were Swedish volunteers, tanks from a Danish Leopard company, and a Norwegian helicopter detachment, under Swedish command. Coming from a nation that had not experienced war for almost 200 years, the Swedish leaders faced an unresponsive UN bureaucracy, an unclear mandate, and conflicting UN-imposed rules of engagement. Not unexpectedly, the Swedes turned to their culture of mission command which had grown and developed over decades preparing for expected invasions. [11] Mission command turned out to be a force multiplier and an effective strategic asset. When facing ethical and practical challenges to its clear orders to protect the civilian population, commanders realized they had no choice but to disregard orders that conflicted with the purpose of the mission. Mission command gave permission to every level of command to interpret orders that could be disobeyed and rules could be broken as long as the mission was successful.
In a sudden or unexpected tactical situation, personnel on alert may have to react on their best initiative. In 2023 when HAMAS breached the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, a CH-53 helicopter squadron commander called his friend a paratroop battalion commander to volunteer support to move alert-ready troops. IDF Command did not have a clear tactical picture. The squadron commander reported on Israeli television he was ordered to (in translation from Hebrew), "Carry out the mission to the best of your understanding." [12]
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia are the military forces organized for the defense of the Republic of Croatia and its allies by military means and for other forms of use and use in accordance with the domestic and international law. The Croatian Armed Forces protect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia and defend its territorial integrity.
Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. A military doctrine outlines what military means should be used, how forces should be structured, where forces should be deployed, and the modes of cooperation between types of forces. "Joint doctrine" refers to the doctrines shared and aligned by multinational forces or joint service operations.
The German General Staff, originally the Prussian General Staff and officially the Great General Staff, was a full-time body at the head of the Prussian Army and later, the German Army, responsible for the continuous study of all aspects of war, and for drawing up and reviewing plans for mobilization or campaign. It existed unofficially from 1806, and was formally established by law in 1814, the first general staff in existence. It was distinguished by the formal selection of its officers by intelligence and proven merit rather than patronage or wealth, and by the exhaustive and rigorously structured training which its staff officers undertook.
In military tactics, close air support (CAS) is defined as aerial warfare actions—often air-to-ground actions such as strafes or airstrikes—by military aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces. A form of fire support, CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of all forces involved. CAS may be conducted using aerial bombs, glide bombs, missiles, rockets, autocannons, machine guns, and even directed-energy weapons such as lasers.
The Iceland Defense Force was a military sub-unified command of the United States Department of Defense. It existed from 1951 to 2006. It came into existence when the United States agreed to provide for the defense of Iceland, which has only limited defense forces.
AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces. AirLand Battle replaced 1976's "Active Defense" doctrine, and was itself replaced by "Full Spectrum Operations" in 2001.
Network-centric warfare, also called network-centric operations or net-centric warfare, is a military doctrine or theory of war that aims to translate an information advantage, enabled partly by information technology, into a competitive advantage through the computer networking of dispersed forces. It was pioneered by the United States Department of Defense in the 1990s.
The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) is an inactive United States Department of Defense Joint Task Force. It was first envisioned as a three-division force in 1979 as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a highly mobile rapid deployment force that could be rapidly moved to locations outside the normal overseas deployments in Europe and Korea. Its charter was expanded and greatly strengthened in 1980 as the RDJTF. It was inactivated in 1983, and re-organized as the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).
Mission-type tactics is a method of command and delegation where the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly-defined objective, high-level details such as a timeframe, and the forces needed to accomplish that objective. The subordinate leaders are given planning initiative and freedom of execution: they decide on the methods to achieve the objective independently. This allows a high degree of flexibility at the operational and tactical levels of command, which allows for faster decision-making on the ground and frees the higher leadership from managing the tactical details to concentrate on the strategic picture. This may be contrasted with "Befehlstaktik" or command-type tactics.
Principles of war are rules and guidelines that represent truths in the practice of war and military operations.
The Agranat Commission was a National Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate failings in the Israel Defense Forces in the prelude to the Yom Kippur War when Israel was found unprepared for the Egyptian attack against the Bar Lev Line and a simultaneous attack by Syria in the Golan—the first phase in a war in which 2,812 Israeli soldiers were killed.
Deep operation, also known as Soviet deep battle, was a military theory developed by the Soviet Union for its armed forces during the 1920s and 1930s. It was a tenet that emphasized destroying, suppressing or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact but also throughout the depth of the battlefield.
The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC) is located at Fort Leavenworth and provides leadership and supervision for leader development and professional military and civilian education; institutional and collective training; functional training; training support; battle command; doctrine; lessons learned and specified areas the Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designates in order to serve as a catalyst for change and to support developing relevant and ready expeditionary land formations with campaign qualities in support of the joint force commander.
Military organization (AE) or military organisation (BE) is the structuring of the armed forces of a state so as to offer such military capability as a national defense policy may require. Formal military organization tends to use hierarchical forms.
Command and control is a "set of organizational and technical attributes and processes ... [that] employs human, physical, and information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions" to achieve the goals of an organization or enterprise, according to a 2015 definition by military scientists Marius Vassiliou, David S. Alberts, and Jonathan R. Agre. The term often refers to a military system.
Effects-based operations (EBO) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. An effects-based approach to operations was first applied in modern times in the design and execution of the Desert Storm air campaign of 1991. The principal author of the daily attack plans—then Lt Colonel, now retired Lt General David A. Deptula—used an effects-based approach in building the actual Desert Storm air campaign targeting plan. Deptula describes the background, rationale, and provides an example of how an effects-based approach to targeting was conducted in Desert Storm in the publication, "Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare." The doctrine was developed with an aim of putting desired strategic effects first and then planning from the desired strategic objective back to the possible tactical level actions that could be taken to achieve the desired effect. Contrary to conventional military approaches of force-on-force application that focused on attrition and annihilation, EBO focused on desired outcomes attempting to use a minimum of force. The approach was enabled by advancements in weaponry—particularly stealth and precision weapons—in conjunction with a planning approach based on specific effects rather than absolute destruction. Deptula, speaking at the Gulf War Air Campaign Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, on 17 January 2001 on One Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, defined the goal of EBO; "If we focus on effects, the end of strategy, rather than force-on-force the traditional means to achieve it militarily, that enables us to consider different and perhaps more effective ways to accomplish the same goal quicker than in the past, with fewer resources and most importantly with fewer casualties." Others have postulated that EBO could be interpreted as an emerging understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.
Truppenführung was a German Army field-manual published in two parts as Heeresdienstvorschrift 300: Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934.
The reconnaissance mission within the United States Marine Corps is divided into two distinct but complementary aspects; Marine Division Recon and Force Reconnaissance.
For military strategy, intent is the desired outcome of a military operation. It is a key concept in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates' initiative and collaboration and cooperation amongst team members in joint operations.
Project Manager Mission Command is a component of the Program Executive Office Command, Control, and Communications-Tactical within the United States Army. PM MC is responsible for the development, deployment, and maintenance of integrated Mission Command software capabilities for the Army and Joint forces. The project manager ensures efficient fielding, effective training, and professional support for tactical and other unit types. PM MC’s product lines cover the areas of maneuver, fires, sustainment, and infrastructure.