This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page . (Learn how and when to remove these template messages)
|
OTPW is a one-time password system developed for authentication in Unix-like operating systems by Markus Kuhn. [1] A user's real password is not directly transmitted across the network. Rather, a series of one-time passwords is created from a short set of characters (constant secret) and a set of one-time tokens. As each single-use password can only be used once, passwords intercepted by a password sniffer or key logger are not useful to an attacker.
OTPW is supported in Unix and Linux (via pluggable authentication modules), OpenBSD, NetBSD, and FreeBSD, and a generic open source implementation can be used to enable its use on other systems.
OTPW, like the other one-time password systems, is sensitive to a man in the middle attack if used by itself. This could for example be solved by putting SSL, SPKM or similar security protocol "under it" which authenticates the server and gives point-to-point security between the client and server.
Unlike S/KEY, OTPW is not based on the Lamport's scheme in which every one-time password is the one-way hash value of its successor. Password lists based on the Lamport's scheme have the problem that if the attacker can see one of the last passwords on the list, then all previous passwords can be calculated from it. It also does not store the encrypted passwords as suggested by Aviel D. Rubin in Independent One-Time Passwords, in order to keep the host free of files with secrets.
In OTPW a one-way hash value of every single password is stored in a potentially widely readable file in the user’s home directory. For instance, hash values of 300 passwords (a typical A4 page) require only a four kilobyte long .otpw file, a typically negligible amount of storage space.
The passwords are carefully generated random numbers. The random number generator is based on the RIPEMD-160 secure hash function, and it is seeded by hashing together the output of various shell commands. These provide unpredictability in the form of a system random number seed, access times of important system files, usage history of the host, and more. The random state is the 160-bit output of the hash function. The random state is iterated after each use by concatenating the old state with the current high-resolution timer output and hashing the result again. The first 72 bits of the hash output are encoded with a modified base64 scheme to produce readable passwords, while the remaining 88 bits represent the undisclosed internal state of the random number generator.
In many fonts, the characters 0 and O or 1 and l and I are difficult to distinguish, therefore the modified base64 encoding replaces the three characters 01l by corresponding :, = and %. If for instance a zero is confused with a capital O by the user, the password verification routine will automatically correct for this. S/KEY uses sequences of short English words as passwords. OTPW uses by default a base64 encoding instead, because that allows more passwords to be printed on a single page, with the same password entropy. In addition, an average human spy needs over 30 seconds to write a 12-character random string into short-term memory, which provides a good protection against brief looks that an attacker might have on a password list. Lists of short words on the other hand are much faster to memorize. OTPW can handle arbitrary password generation algorithms, as long as the length of the password is fixed. In the current version, the otpw-gen program can generate both base-64 encoded (option -p) and 4-letter-word encoded (option -p1) passwords with a user-specified entropy (option -e).
The prefix password ensures that neither stealing the password list nor eavesdropping the line alone can provide unauthorized access. Admittedly, the security obtained by OTPW is not comparable with that of a challenge–response system in which the user has a PIN-protected special calculator that generates the response. On the other hand, a piece of paper is much more portable, much more robust, and much cheaper than a special calculator. OTPW was designed for the large user base, for which an extra battery-powered device is inconvenient or not cost effective and who therefore still use normal Unix passwords everywhere.
In contrast to the suggestion made in RFC 1938, OTPW does not lock more than one one-time password at a time. If it did this, an attacker could easily exhaust its list of unlocked passwords and force it to either not login at all or use the normal Unix login password. Therefore, OTPW locks only one single password and for all further logins a triple-challenge is issued. If more than 100 unused passwords remain available, then there are over a million different challenges and an attacker has very little chance to perform a successful race attack while the authorized user finishes password entry.
One-time password authentication with the OTPW package is accomplished via a file .otpw located in the user’s home directory. No state is kept in any system-wide files, therefore OTPW does not introduce any new setuid root programs. As long as a user does not have .otpw in his home directory, the one-time-password facility has not been activated for him.
A user who wants to set up the one-time-password capability just executes the otpw-gen program. The program will ask for a prefix password and it will then write a password list to standard output. The chosen prefix password should be memorized and the password list can be formatted and printed.
Where one-time-password authentication is used, the password prompt will be followed by a 3-digit password number. Enter first the prefix password that was given to otpw-gen, followed directly (without hitting return between) by the password with the requested number from the printed password list:
login: kuhn Password 019: geHeimOdAkH62c
In this example, geHeim was the prefix password.
A clever attacker might observe the password being entered and might try to use the fact that computers can send data much faster than users can finish entering passwords. In the several hundred milliseconds that the user needs to press the return key after the last character, an attacker could on a parallel connection to the same machine send the code of the return key faster than the user.
To prevent such a race-for-the-last-key attack, any login attempt that is taking place concurrently with another attempt will require three one-time passwords to be entered, neither of which will ever be the password which is locked by the concurrent authentication attempt.
login: kuhn Password 022/000/004: geHeimQ=XK4I7wIZdBbqyHA5z9japt
A password, sometimes called a passcode, is secret data, typically a string of characters, usually used to confirm a user's identity. Traditionally, passwords were expected to be memorized, but the large number of password-protected services that a typical individual accesses can make memorization of unique passwords for each service impractical. Using the terminology of the NIST Digital Identity Guidelines, the secret is held by a party called the claimant while the party verifying the identity of the claimant is called the verifier. When the claimant successfully demonstrates knowledge of the password to the verifier through an established authentication protocol, the verifier is able to infer the claimant's identity.
A passphrase is a sequence of words or other text used to control access to a computer system, program or data. It is similar to a password in usage, but a passphrase is generally longer for added security. Passphrases are often used to control both access to, and the operation of, cryptographic programs and systems, especially those that derive an encryption key from a passphrase. The origin of the term is by analogy with password. The modern concept of passphrases is believed to have been invented by Sigmund N. Porter in 1982.
Unix security refers to the means of securing a Unix or Unix-like operating system. A secure environment is achieved not only by the design concepts of these operating systems, but also through vigilant user and administrative practices.
In cryptography, a key derivation function (KDF) is a cryptographic algorithm that derives one or more secret keys from a secret value such as a master key, a password, or a passphrase using a pseudorandom function. KDFs can be used to stretch keys into longer keys or to obtain keys of a required format, such as converting a group element that is the result of a Diffie–Hellman key exchange into a symmetric key for use with AES. Keyed cryptographic hash functions are popular examples of pseudorandom functions used for key derivation.
passwd is a command on Unix, Plan 9, Inferno, and most Unix-like operating systems used to change a user's password. The password entered by the user is run through a key derivation function to create a hashed version of the new password, which is saved. Only the hashed version is stored; the entered password is not saved for security reasons.
S/KEY is a one-time password system developed for authentication to Unix-like operating systems, especially from dumb terminals or untrusted public computers on which one does not want to type a long-term password. A user's real password is combined in an offline device with a short set of characters and a decrementing counter to form a single-use password. Because each password is only used once, they are useless to password sniffers.
In cryptography, a salt is random data fed as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes data, a password or passphrase. Salting helps defend against attacks that use precomputed tables, by vastly growing the size of table needed for a successful attack. It also helps protect passwords that occur multiple times in a database, as a new salt is used for each password instance. Additionally, salting does not place any burden on users.
The Berkeley r-commands are a suite of computer programs designed to enable users of one Unix system to log in or issue commands to another Unix computer via TCP/IP computer network. The r-commands were developed in 1982 by the Computer Systems Research Group at the University of California, Berkeley, based on an early implementation of TCP/IP.
A one-time password (OTP), also known as a one-time PIN, one-time authorization code (OTAC) or dynamic password, is a password that is valid for only one login session or transaction, on a computer system or other digital device. OTPs avoid several shortcomings that are associated with traditional (static) password-based authentication; a number of implementations also incorporate two-factor authentication by ensuring that the one-time password requires access to something a person has as well as something a person knows.
In the context of an HTTP transaction, basic access authentication is a method for an HTTP user agent to provide a user name and password when making a request. In basic HTTP authentication, a request contains a header field in the form of Authorization: Basic <credentials>
, where credentials is the Base64 encoding of ID and password joined by a single colon :
.
Digest access authentication is one of the agreed-upon methods a web server can use to negotiate credentials, such as username or password, with a user's web browser. This can be used to confirm the identity of a user before sending sensitive information, such as online banking transaction history. It applies a hash function to the username and password before sending them over the network. In contrast, basic access authentication uses the easily reversible Base64 encoding instead of hashing, making it non-secure unless used in conjunction with TLS.
In the X Window System, an X display manager is a graphical login manager which starts a login session on an X server from the same or another computer.
A rainbow table is a precomputed table for caching the outputs of a cryptographic hash function, usually for cracking password hashes. Passwords are typically stored not in plain text form, but as hash values. If such a database of hashed passwords falls into the hands of an attacker, they can use a precomputed rainbow table to recover the plaintext passwords. A common defense against this attack is to compute the hashes using a key derivation function that adds a "salt" to each password before hashing it, with different passwords receiving different salts, which are stored in plain text along with the hash.
In cryptography, CRAM-MD5 is a challenge–response authentication mechanism (CRAM) based on the HMAC-MD5 algorithm. As one of the mechanisms supported by the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), it is often used in email software as part of SMTP Authentication and for the authentication of POP and IMAP users, as well as in applications implementing LDAP, XMPP, BEEP, and other protocols.
In cryptography, key stretching techniques are used to make a possibly weak key, typically a password or passphrase, more secure against a brute-force attack by increasing the resources it takes to test each possible key. Passwords or passphrases created by humans are often short or predictable enough to allow password cracking, and key stretching is intended to make such attacks more difficult by complicating a basic step of trying a single password candidate. Key stretching also improves security in some real-world applications where the key length has been constrained, by mimicking a longer key length from the perspective of a brute-force attacker.
Toybox is a free and open-source software implementation of over 200 Unix command line utilities such as ls, cp, and mv. The Toybox project was started in 2006, and became a 0BSD licensed BusyBox alternative. Toybox is used for most of Android's command-line tools in all currently supported Android versions, and is also used to build Android on Linux and macOS. All of the tools are tested on Linux, and many of them also work on BSD and macOS.
bcrypt is a password-hashing function designed by Niels Provos and David Mazières, based on the Blowfish cipher and presented at USENIX in 1999. Besides incorporating a salt to protect against rainbow table attacks, bcrypt is an adaptive function: over time, the iteration count can be increased to make it slower, so it remains resistant to brute-force search attacks even with increasing computation power.
Google Authenticator is a software-based authenticator by Google. It implements multi-factor authentication services using the time-based one-time password and HMAC-based one-time password, for authenticating users of software applications.
crypt is a POSIX C library function. It is typically used to compute the hash of user account passwords. The function outputs a text string which also encodes the salt, and identifies the hash algorithm used. This output string forms a password record, which is usually stored in a text file.
In cryptography, the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) is a family of modern, password-based challenge–response authentication mechanisms providing authentication of a user to a server. As it is specified for Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), it can be used for password-based logins to services like SMTP and IMAP (e-mail), XMPP (chat), or MongoDB and PostgreSQL (databases). For XMPP, supporting it is mandatory.