Owen v. City of Independence

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Owen v. City of Independence
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 8, 1980
Decided April 16, 1980
Full case nameOwen v. City of Independence, Missouri, et al.
Citations445 U.S. 622 ( more )
100 S. Ct. 1398; 63 L. Ed. 2d 673; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 14
Case history
SubsequentPetition for rehearing denied June 2, 1980
Holding
A municipality has no immunity from liability under Section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityBrennan, joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
DissentPowell, joined by Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court, in which the court held that a municipality has no immunity from liability under Section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability.

Contents

Background

The city council voted to fire the city's chief of police and in doing so, violated his procedural due process rights to a pre-termination hearing. Plaintiff named the city and city council in the suit.

Opinion of the Court

In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that a municipality has no immunity from liability under Section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability.


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