Paul W. Blackstock

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Paul W. Blackstock (???? - 1979) was a former US Army Intelligence officer who, after leaving service wrote many books and articles on counterintelligence. [1] [2]

Contents

Career

Blackstock worked for US Army Intelligence and specialized in psychological warfare. He then became an associate professor at the University of South Carolina. [1] [3]

As of January 1973, Blackstock had published four books and 20 articles. [2]

A book review by the New York Times of The Strategy of Subversion (1965) said that author could have "written a briefer, modern handbook along the lines of Machiavelli's The Prince" instead of the "somewhat discursive" and "redundantly" (long) text." The book criticizes the CIA for its role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. [3]

A book review by the CIA stated that The Secret Road to World War Two (1969) had "grave defects" resulting from the author's being "insufficiently grounded in intelligence, or insufficiently critical, to make discriminating judgments about his sources." [4]

Death

Paul W. Blackstock died in 1979. [1]

Selected works

Books authored

Books co-authored

Books edited

Books translated

Articles

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References

  1. 1 2 3 "Paul W. Blackstock". Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. 1970. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  2. 1 2 "Professor Paul W. Blackstock to Lecture at the University of Dayton". University of Dayton. 29 January 1973. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  3. 1 2 Jack Raymond (17 January 1965). "Undercover Operations". New York Times. p. 117. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  4. (anonymous). "Book review of The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939 by Paul W. Blackstock" (PDF). Studies in Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  5. Paul W. Blackstock (1966). Agents of Deceit. Quadrangle. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  6. Paul W. Blackstock (1969). Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939. Quadrangle. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  7. William J. Barnds; Paul W. Blackstock; Wilson Carey McWilliams; Daniel C. Maguire (1969). The Right to Know, to Withhold & to Lie. Council on Religion and International Affairs. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  8. Paul W. Blackstock; Frank L. Schaf Jr. (1978). Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources. Gale Research. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  9. Paul W. Blackstock; Bert F. Hoselitz (1953). The Russian Menace to Europe: a collection of articles, speeches letters, and news despatches [by] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Allen and Unwin. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  10. Alexander I Solzhenitsyn (1963). "translation by Paul W. Blackstock". "We never make mistakes"; two short novels, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. University of South Carolina Press. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  11. Paul W. Blackstock (1966). "'Books for Idiots': False Soviet 'Memoirs'". The Russian Review: 285–296. Retrieved 7 April 2023.
  12. Paul W. Blackstock (April 1969). "The Tukhachevsky Affair". The Russian Review: 171–190.
  13. Paul W. Blackstock (1 May 1970). "On the Moral Implications of Torture and Exemplary Assassination". Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Retrieved 7 April 2023.

External sources