People v. Chevalier

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People v. Chevalier
Seal of the Supreme Court of Illinois.svg
Court Supreme Court of Illinois
Full case nameThe People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Maurice Chevalier, Appellee. — The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Esteban Flores, Appellee.
DecidedSeptember 20, 1989 (1989-09-20)
Citation(s)544 N.E.2d 942; 131 Ill.2d 66
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting Howard C. Ryan, Thomas J. Moran, William G. Clark, Benjamin K. Miller, John J. Stamos, Horace L. Calvo
Case opinions
Decision byStamos
Keywords

People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill.2d 66, 544 N.E.2d 942 (1989), was a 1989 Illinois Supreme Court decision that affirmed murder convictions in two consolidated appeals, holding that mere words or verbal admission of infidelity was not sufficient provocation for a manslaughter.

Contents

Background

The revised Illinois homicide statute of 1986 replaced the crimes of murder and manslaughter with first and second degree homicide, but courts continued to apply case law that was decided under the old statute. The rule at the time was that adultery with the defendant's spouse was adequate provocation to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. In the Chevalier decision, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned previous intermediate appellate cases like People v. Ambro and People v. Carr, holding that mere words or verbal communication could not be adequate provocation to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. [1] [2] [3]

Procedural posture

This case was consolidated with People v. Flores, 168 Ill.App.3d. In both cases the defendants' had been convicted of murder for shooting and killing their wives after a verbal admission of infidelity. [4] The murder convictions were affirmed based on the traditional categorical approach for adequate provocation. [5]

Facts

During an argument, Chevalier shot and killed his wife after she made disparaging remarks about his sexual prowess and verbally admitted to infidelity. [6]

Issue

Whether a verbal admission of infidelity is adequate provocation for a manslaughter instruction. [6]

Court's decision

The court held that a verbal admission of infidelity was not sufficient provocation to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. [7] The court wrote:

In Illinois, adultery with a spouse as provocation has been limited to those instances where the parties are discovered in the act of adultery or immediately before or after such an act, and the killing immediately follows such discovery. [8] [9]

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References

  1. Thomas E. Leggans, Survey of Illinois Law - Criminal , 14 S. Ill. U. L.J. 813 (1990).
  2. Lee, Cynthia (2007-10-01). Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom. NYU Press. ISBN   978-0-8147-6514-2.
  3. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and Provocation , 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997).
  4. Carper, Donald; McKinsey, John; West, Bill (2007-06-15). Understanding the Law. Cengage Learning. ISBN   978-0-324-37512-1.
  5. Pillsbury, Samuel H. (2000-07-01). Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter. NYU Press. ISBN   978-0-8147-6875-4.
  6. 1 2 Casenotes; Johnson; Publishers, Aspen (2002-11-07). Criminal Law. Aspen Publishers Online. ISBN   978-0-7355-3575-6.
  7. Casenotes; Briefs, Casenote Legal (2010). Casenote Legal Briefs: Criminal Law Keyed to Boyce, Dripps & Perkin's. Aspen Publishers Online. ISBN   978-0-7355-9908-6.
  8. People v.Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 131 Ill.2d 66
  9. Markel, Dan; Collins, Jennifer M.; Leib, Ethan J. (2009-04-20). Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-974512-8.

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