In court proceedings, a defendant is a person or object who is the party either accused of committing a crime in criminal prosecution or against whom some type of civil relief is being sought in a civil case.
Champerty and maintenance are doctrines in common law jurisdictions that aim to preclude frivolous litigation:
An abuse of process is the unjustified or unreasonable use of legal proceedings or process to further a cause of action by an applicant or plaintiff in an action. Traditionally, It is a claim made by the respondent or defendant that the other party is misusing or perverting regularly issued court process not justified by the underlying legal action. In common law it is classified as a tort distinct from the intentional tort of malicious prosecution. It is a tort that involves misuse of the public right of access to the courts. In the United States it may be described as a legal process being commenced to gain an unfair litigation advantage.
Malicious prosecution is a common law intentional tort. Like the tort of abuse of process, its elements include (1) intentionally instituting and pursuing a legal action that is (2) brought without probable cause and (3) dismissed in favor of the victim of the malicious prosecution. In some jurisdictions, the term "malicious prosecution" denotes the wrongful initiation of criminal proceedings, while the term "malicious use of process" denotes the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.
Tort reform refers to changes in the civil justice system in common law countries that aim to reduce the ability of plaintiffs to bring tort litigation or to reduce damages they can receive. Such changes are generally justified under the grounds that litigation is an inefficient means to compensate plaintiffs; that tort law permits frivolous or otherwise undesirable litigation to crowd the court system; or that the fear of litigation can serve to curtail innovation, raise the cost of consumer goods or insurance premiums for suppliers of services, and increase legal costs for businesses. Tort reform has primarily been prominent in common law jurisdictions, where criticism of judge-made rules regarding tort actions manifests in calls for statutory reform by the legislature.
Legal financing is the mechanism or process through which litigants can finance their litigation or other legal costs through a third party funding company.
A case bond is an investment in a legal claim. More specifically, it is a non-recourse purchase of an assignment interest in a legal cause of action. A case bond provides a litigant with money prior to a monetary recovery. In return, the case bond accrues fees until there is a recovery which triggers the satisfaction of the assignment interest. If there is no recovery in the underlying claim or lawsuit the case bond self terminates and the obligation to satisfy its terms expire. Typically, case bonds are used by litigants to cover the costs of daily living expenses, medical bills and litigation costs.
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), is a 6-to-3 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of three barratry, champerty, and maintenance laws in the state of Virginia until state courts had had a reasonable chance to construe them.
Irish Life and Permanent plc v Dunne, [2015] IESC 46, [2016] 1 IR 92, was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court clarified the impact of a lender failing to comply with the Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears 2010 on that lender's right to obtain an order of possession of mortgaged property.
Tracey, T/A Engineering Design & Management v Burton, [2016] IESC 16, was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court considered the Irish courts' ability to limit the right of access to the courts and, in extreme cases, to dismiss proceedings.
Gilroy v Flynn [2004] IESC 98; [2005] 1 ILRM 290, was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court made it clear that excessive delays in the delivery of a statement of claim were unacceptable and could justify dismissing a case. While the Court allowed the appeal against the High Court central to this case to proceed, it effectively reversed the previous "assumption that even grave delay will not lead to the dismissal of an action" even where the fault of the delay lay with a legal adviser rather than the plaintiff.
De Róiste v Minister for Defence, [2001] 1 IR190, [2001] IESC 4; [2001] 2 ILRM 241, was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the extended delay in bringing forward an action was grounds for dismissal of charges.
H v H,[2015] IESC 85, also known as JMH v KH, is an Irish Supreme Court case in which the husband was found to have vexatiously abused the court process by repeatedly pursuing legal action against his former wife. An Isaac Wunder order was made by the court against the husband which states that any legal proceedings against his wife and children will be halted. However, the court did not suspend all legal action from the husband; rather it ruled that further legal action would require a decision by a relevant court. This decision is significant because the Court established guidelines for when common law principles could be reinterpreted.
Comcast Int. Holdings v Minister for Public Enterprise & ors and Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise & ors [2012] IESC 50 is an Irish Supreme Court case which originated from the controversial decision of Michael Lowry, then Minister for Public Enterprise, to grant the second state mobile phone license to ESAT Digiphone. It has been described as "an absolutely unique case without any precedent in the ninety year history of the state."
Bank of Ireland v O'Donnell & ors[2015] IESC 90 is an Irish Supreme Court case that centred around whether the appellants had any right or capacity to bring a motion before the court. They wanted to seek an order of a stay on Mr Justice McGovern's order dated 24 July 2014. In their appeal, they referred to the principle of objective bias and Mr Justice McGovern's refusal to recuse himself. The Supreme Court rejected the application for a stay and held that the law regarding objective bias was clearly stated in the lower court.
Wansboro v. DPP and anor, [2017] IESCDET 115 is an Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that granting 'leapfrog' leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the High Court under Art. 34.5.4 of the Constitution of Ireland may be appropriate where the (intermediate) Court of Appeal has already clearly taken a view on the issues raised by the applicant.
Ryan v Governor of Midlands Prison [2014] IESC 54 was a case in which the Irish supreme court ruled that, ordinarily, a Court order detaining a convicted individual that is not prima facie invalid should only be challenged through an appeal of the conviction or an application for judicial review rather than through an application for release under the constitutional principle of habeas corpus.
Dunne v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, [2007] IESC 60; [2008] 2 IR 775, is an Irish Supreme Court case concerning costs in public interest challenges. The Court allowed an appeal against the order for costs made in the High Court and also granted costs against the appellant for the unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court.
F.X. v The Clinical Director of Central Mental Hospital and Another[2014] IESC 1; [2014] 1 IR 280 is a reported Irish Supreme Court case in which the court "clarified two important points about the habeas corpus jurisdiction":
- that the High Court's jurisdiction does lie in respect of detention orders made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction; and
- although the Constitution does not allow for stays to be placed on orders of habeas corpus, "orders can be made for controlling the release of persons who are incapable of protecting themselves."
Bula Ltd v Tara Mines Ltd [2000] IESC 15; [2000] 4 IR 412 is a reported Irish Supreme Court case in which the court considered the test for objective bias in Ireland. During this case the Supreme Court considered:
- whether Supreme Court has jurisdiction to set aside its own previous order;
- whether an appellant must show real likelihood of bias or whether reasonable apprehension of bias suffices; and
- whether a prior relationship of legal advisor and client would disqualify a judge.
