Proportional cake-cutting with different entitlements

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In the fair cake-cutting problem, the partners often have different entitlements. For example, the resource may belong to two shareholders such that Alice holds 8/13 and George holds 5/13. This leads to the criterion of weighted proportionality (WPR): there are several weights that sum up to 1, and every partner should receive at least a fraction of the resource by their own valuation.

Contents

In contrast, in the simpler proportional cake-cutting setting, the weights are equal: for all

Several algorithms can be used to find a WPR division.

Cloning

Suppose all the weights are rational numbers, with common denominator . So the weights are , with . For each player , create clones with the same value-measure. The total number of clones is . Find a proportional cake allocation among them. Finally, give each partner the pieces of his clones.

Robertson and Webb [1] :36 show a simpler procedure for two partners: Alice cuts the cake into pieces equal in her eyes; George selects the most valuable pieces in his eyes, and Alice takes the remaining pieces.

This simple procedure requires cuts, which may be very large. For example, if Alice is entitled to 8/13 and George is entitled to 5/13, then 13-1=12 cuts are needed in the initial partition.

The number of required queries is

Ramsey partitions

Suppose a cake has to be divided among Alice and George, Alice is entitled to 8/13 and George is entitled to 5/13. The cake can be divided as follows.

Now there are two "good" cases - cases in which we can use these pieces to attain a weighted-proportional division respecting the different entitlements:

Case 1: There is a subset of the marked pieces whose sum is 5. E.g., if George marks the 3-piece and the three 1-pieces. Then, this subset is given to George and the remainder is given to Alice. George now has at least 5/13 and Alice has exactly 8/13.

Case 2: There is a subset of the unmarked pieces whose sum is 8. E.g., if George marks the 3-piece and only one 1-piece. Then, this subset is given to Alice and the remainder is given to George. Alice now has exactly 8 and George has given up a sum of less than 8, so he has at least 5/13.

It is possible to prove that the good cases are the only possible cases. I.e, every subset of 5:3:2:1:1:1, EITHER has a subset that sums to 5, OR its complement has a subset that sums to 8. Hence, the above algorithm always finds a WPR allocation with the given ratios. The number of cuts used is only 5.

McAvaney, Robertson and Webb [1] :36–41 [2] generalize this idea using the concept of Ramsey partitions (named after the Ramsey theory).

Formally: if and are positive integers, a partition of is called a Ramsey partition for the pair , if for any sub-list , either there is a sublist of which sums to , or there is a sublist of which sums to .

In the example above, and and the partition is 5:3:2:1:1:1, which is a Ramsey partition. Moreover, this is the shortest Ramsey partition in this case, so it allows us to use a small number of cuts.

Ramsey partitions always exist. Moreover, there is always a unique shortest Ramsey partition. It can be found using a simple variant of the Euclidean algorithm. The algorithm is based on the following lemma: [1] :143–144

If , and is a partition of , and , then is a partition of . Moreover, is a minimal Ramsey partition for the pair if-and-only-if is a minimal Ramsey partition for the pair .

This lemma leads to the following recursive algorithm.

:

  1. Order the inputs such that .
  2. Push .
  3. If , then push and finish.
  4. If , then .

Once a minimal Ramsey partition is found, it can be used to find a WPR division respecting the entitlements.

The algorithm needs at least cuts, where is the golden ratio. In most cases, this number is better than making cuts. But if , then cuts are needed, since the only Ramsey partition of the pair is a sequence with ones.

Cut-near-halves

Suppose again that Alice is entitled to 8/13 and George is entitled to 5/13. The cake can be divided as follows.

The general idea is similar to the Even-Paz protocol: [1] :42–44:

  1. Order the inputs such that . Suppose Alice is entitled to and George is entitled to .
  2. Ask George to cut the cake to near-halves, i.e.:
    • if is even then George cuts the cake to two pieces equal in his eyes;
    • if is odd then George cuts the cake to two pieces whose valuation-ratio is in his eyes.
  3. At least one of the pieces is worth for Alice at least the value declared by George; give this piece to Alice.
  4. Suppose the piece taken by Alice is the piece with value , where . Call .

The cut-near-halves algorithm needs at most cuts, so it is always more efficient than the Ramsey-partitions algorithm.

The cut-near-halves algorithm is not always optimal. For example, suppose the ratio is 7:3.

It is an open question how to find the best initial cut for each entitlement ratio.

The algorithm can be generalized to n agents; the number of required queries is

Cseh and Fleiner [3] presented an algorithm for dividing a multi-dimensional cake among any number of agents with any entitlements (including irrational entitlements), in a finite number of queries. Their algorithm requires queries in the Robertson–Webb query model; thus it is more efficient than agent-cloning and cut-near-halves. They prove that this runtime complexity is optimal.

Algorithms for irrational entitlements

When the entitlements are not rational numbers, methods based on cloning cannot be used since the denominator is infinite. Shishido and Zeng presented an algorithm called mark-cut-choose, that can also handle irrational entitlements, but with an unbounded number of cuts. [4]

The algorithm of Cseh and Fleiner can also be adapted to work with irrational entitlements in a finite number of queries. [5]

Number of required cuts

Besides the number of required queries, it is also interesting to minimize the number of required cuts, so that the division is not too much fractioned. The Shishido-Zeng algorithms yield a fair division with at most cuts, and a strongly-fair division with at most cuts. [4]

In the worst case, at least cuts might be required. Brams, Jones and Klamler [6] show an example for n=2. A cake made of four consecutive regions has to be divided between Alice and George, whose valuations are as follows:

Alice's value2222
George's value1331

Note that the total cake value is 8 for both partners. If , then Alice is entitled to a value of at least 6. To give Alice her due share in a connected piece, we must give her either the three leftmost slices or the three rightmost slices. In both cases George receives a piece with a value of only 1, which is less than his due share of 2. To achieve a WPR division in this case, we must give George his due share in the center of the cake, where his value is relatively large, but then Alice will get two disconnected pieces. [7]

Segal-Halevi [8] shows that, if the cake is circular (i.e. the two endpoints are identified) then a connected WPR division for two people is always possible; this follows from the Stromquist–Woodall theorem. By recursively applying this theorem to find exact divisions, it is possible to get a WPR division using at most cuts when n is a power of 2, and a similar number when n is general.

Crew, Narayanan and Spirkle [9] improved this upper bound to 3n-4 using the following protocol:

The exact number of required cuts remains an open question. The simplest open case is when there are 3 agents and the weights are 1/7, 2/7, 4/7. It is not known if the number of required cuts is 4 (as in the lower bound) or 5 (as in the upper bound).

See also

Zeng [10] presented an algorithm for approximate envy-free cake-cutting with different entitlements.

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Edmonds–Pruhs protocol is a protocol for fair cake-cutting. Its goal is to create a partially proportional division of a heterogeneous resource among n people, such that each person receives a subset of the cake which that person values as at least 1/an of the total, where is some sufficiently large constant. It is a randomized algorithm whose running time is O(n) with probability close to 1. The protocol was developed by Jeff Edmonds and Kirk Pruhs, who later improved it in joint work with Jaisingh Solanki.

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In computer science, the Robertson–Webb (RW) query model is a model of computation used by algorithms for the problem of fair cake-cutting. In this problem, there is a resource called a "cake", and several agents with different value measures on the cake. The goal is to divide the cake among the agents such that each agent will consider his/her piece as "fair" by his/her personal value measure. Since the agents' valuations can be very complex, they cannot - in general - be given as inputs to a fair division algorithm. The RW model specifies two kinds of queries that a fair division algorithm may ask the agents: Eval and Cut. Informally, an Eval query asks an agent to specify his/her value to a given piece of the cake, and a Cut query asks an agent to specify a piece of cake with a given value.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Robertson, Jack; Webb, William (1998). Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You Can. Natick, Massachusetts: A. K. Peters. ISBN   978-1-56881-076-8. LCCN   97041258. OL   2730675W.
  2. McAvaney, Kevin; Robertson, Jack; Webb, William (1992). "Ramsey partitions of integers and fair divisions". Combinatorica. 12 (2): 193. doi:10.1007/bf01204722. S2CID   19376212.
  3. Cseh, Ágnes; Fleiner, Tamás (2020-06-01). "The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares". ACM Transactions on Algorithms. 16 (3): 29:1–29:21. arXiv: 1709.03152 . doi:10.1145/3380742. ISSN   1549-6325. S2CID   218517351.
  4. 1 2 Shishido, Harunor; Zeng, Dao-Zhi (1999). "Mark-Choose-Cut Algorithms For Fair And Strongly Fair Division". Group Decision and Negotiation. 8 (2): 125–137. doi:10.1023/a:1008620404353. ISSN   0926-2644. S2CID   118080310.
  5. Cseh, Ágnes; Fleiner, Tamás (2018), "The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares", Algorithmic Game Theory, Springer International Publishing, pp. 19–30, arXiv: 1709.03152 , doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_3, ISBN   9783319996592, S2CID   19245769
  6. Brams, S. J.; Jones, M. A.; Klamler, C. (2007). "Proportional pie-cutting". International Journal of Game Theory. 36 (3–4): 353. doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0108-z. S2CID   19624080.
  7. Note that there exists a connected division in which the ratios between the values of the partners are 3:1 – give Alice the two leftmost slices and 8/11 of the third slice (value 4+16/11=60/11) and give George the remaining 3/11 and the rightmost slice (value 1+9/11=20/11). However, this partition is not WPR since no partner receives his due share.
  8. Segal-Halevi, Erel (2018-03-14). "Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed?". Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. 480: 123382. arXiv: 1803.05470 . doi:10.1016/j.jmaa.2019.123382. S2CID   3901524.
  9. Crew, Logan; Narayanan, Bhargav; Spirkl, Sophie (2019-09-16). "Disproportionate division". arXiv: 1909.07141 [math.CO].
  10. Zeng, Dao-Zhi (2000). "Approximate Envy-Free Procedures". Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library. Vol. 23. Springer. pp. 259–271. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_17. ISBN   9781461546276.