R v Patel | |
---|---|
Court | Appellate Division |
Full case name | R v Patel |
Decided | 18 May 1959 |
Citation(s) | 1959 (3) SA 121 (A) |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Steyn CJ, AB Beyers JA and Holmes AJA |
Case opinions | |
Decision by | Holmes AJA |
Keywords | |
Criminal law, Murder, Culpable homicide, Self-defence |
R v Patel is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on May 8, 1959. The appellant's attorneys were Levy, Rogaly & Cohen, Pretoria, and S. and v A Rosendorff, Bloemfontein. The Appellate Division ruled that "a person has the same right to use force in the defence of another from a threatened danger, as he would have to defend himself, if he were the person threatened." [1]
In an appeal from a conviction of culpable homicide, it appeared that the appellant's brother had been struck by the deceased on the back with a hammer, and—he was then in a crouching position—that the next hammer blow might have landed on his head. The appellant had in this critical situation used the only weapon to hand: his revolver. He had fired at the deceased and killed him.
The general principles mentioned by Watermeyer CJ, in R v Attwood , [2] are that an accused is entitled to an acquittal on the ground that he was acting in self-defence if it appears as a reasonable possibility on the evidence
The court in Patel appeared to approve this view, [5] holding that a person has the same right to use force in the defence of another from a threatened danger as he would have to defend himself, if he were the person threatened. The Crown had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had exceeded the bounds of justifiable homicide.
The defence of property is a common method of justification used by defendants who argue that they should not be held liable for any loss and injury that they have caused because they were acting to protect their property.
In the criminal law of many nations, necessity may be either a possible justification or an exculpation for breaking the law. Defendants seeking to rely on this defense argue that they should not be held liable for their actions as a crime because their conduct was necessary to prevent some greater harm and when that conduct is not excused under some other more specific provision of law such as self defense. Except for a few statutory exemptions and in some medical cases there is no corresponding defense in English law for murder.
In law, provocation is when a person is considered to have committed a criminal act partly because of a preceding set of events that might cause a reasonable person to lose self control. This makes them less morally culpable than if the act was premeditated (pre-planned) and done out of pure malice. It "affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral blameworthiness."
The concept of justifiable homicide in criminal law is a defense to culpable homicide. Generally, there is a burden of production of exculpatory evidence in the legal defense of justification. In most countries, a homicide is justified when there is sufficient evidence to disprove the alleged criminal act or wrongdoing. The key to this legal defense is that it was reasonable for the subject to believe that there was an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger of death or grave bodily harm to the innocent by the deceased when they committed the homicide. A homicide in this instance is blameless. Although it does not constitute homicide, charges and claims of assaults, batteries, and other similar criminal charges and claims of wrongdoing are similarly defensible under the legal defense of self defense.
Battered woman syndrome (BWS) is a pattern of signs and symptoms displayed by a woman who has suffered persistent intimate partner violence: whether psychological, physical, or sexual, from her male partner. It is classified in the ICD-9 as battered person syndrome, but is not in the DSM-5. It may be diagnosed as a subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
A castle doctrine, also known as a castle law or a defense of habitation law, is a legal doctrine that designates a person's abode or any legally occupied place as a place in which that person has protections and immunities permitting one, in certain circumstances, to use force to defend oneself against an intruder, free from legal prosecution for the consequences of the force used. The term is most commonly used in the United States, though many other countries invoke comparable principles in their laws.
A stand-your-ground law provides that people may use deadly force when they reasonably believe it to be necessary to defend against deadly force, great bodily harm, kidnapping, rape, or robbery or some other serious crimes. Under such a law, people have no duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense, so long as they are in a place where they are lawfully present. The exact details vary by jurisdiction.
Self-defence is a defence permitting reasonable force to be used to defend one's self or another. This defence arises both from common law and the Criminal Law Act 1967. Self-defence is a justification defence rather than an excuse.
In the criminal law of Australia, self-defence is a legal defence to a charge of causing injury or death in defence of the person or, to a limited extent, property, or a partial defence to murder if the degree of force used was excessive.
Duress in English law is a complete common law defence, operating in favour of those who commit crimes because they are forced or compelled to do so by the circumstances, or the threats of another. The doctrine arises not only in criminal law but also in civil law, where it is relevant to contract law and trusts law.
In English law, provocation was a mitigatory defence which had taken many guises over generations many of which had been strongly disapproved and modified. In closing decades, in widely upheld form, it amounted to proving a reasonable total loss of control as a response to another's objectively provocative conduct sufficient to convert what would otherwise have been murder into manslaughter. It does not apply to any other offence. It was abolished on 4 October 2010 by section 56(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, but thereby replaced by the superseding—and more precisely worded—loss of control.
In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
Criminal procedure in South Africa refers to the adjudication process of that country's criminal law. It forms part of procedural or adjectival law, and describes the means by which its substantive counterpart, South African criminal law, is applied. It has its basis mainly in English law.
R v Victor, an appeal against a conviction by a magistrate, is an important case in South African criminal law, especially as it bears on the defence of automatism. The driver of a motor vehicle was prone to epileptic fits, and knew as much, but nevertheless put himself behind the wheel of a motor car. He suffered a fit while driving and collided with a pedestrian and another car. The court on appeal sustained his conviction by a magistrate on the ground that the negligence which the accused there committed was not so much in the driving of the vehicle, but in his driving at all, knowing of his physical disability. A reasonable person would have foreseen the likelihood of a fit and refrained from driving.
In S v Fernandez, an important case in South African criminal law, heard on February 17, 1966, the court held that the appellant had been negligent in mending a cage from which a baboon had subsequently escaped, which subsequently bit a child, who subsequently died. The appellant must have foreseen the likelihood of an attack in the event of the baboon's escaping; he was, the court held, therefore rightly convicted of culpable homicide. The case was an appeal from a decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division by Galgut J and Clayden J, who had dismissed an appeal from a conviction in a magistrate's court.
In S v Russell, an important case in South African criminal law, heard on July 12, 1967, the accused had been warned of the danger of operating a crane under a live electric wire, but had failed to pass on the warning to his co-employees. This omission, constituting negligence, led to the death of one of them. He was convicted of culpable homicide.
In S v Jackson, an important case in South African criminal law, the Appellate Division held that a person is justified in killing in self-defence not only when he fears that his life is in danger but also when he fears grievous bodily harm. PE Linde appeared for the appellant and BG van der Walt, SC, Attorney-General OFS, for the State. The case was heard on March 8, 1963. The appellant's attorney was DA Carroll, Johannesburg.
Peterson v Minister of Safety and Security is an important case in South African criminal law. For the appellant appeared J Whitehead SC, instructed by JL Martinson & Company, Cape Town; for the respondents, A Schippers SC and S O'Brien, instructed by the State Attorney, Cape Town.
Rex v Zikalala is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on February 27, 1953. Zikalala, the appellant, had been charged and convicted of the culpable homicide in causing the death of one Alpheus Tsele. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he successfully argued self-defence.