R v Soqokomashe [1] is an important case in South African law, heard in the Eastern Districts Local Division by Price JP and Jennett J on 2 March 1956, with judgment handed down on 9 March.
The appellants had pleaded guilty to a charge of arson, it being alleged that they had set fire to a rondavel classroom of a "native" school. The Crown evidence showed that the structure was immovable, but that there was no evidence to prove that it had been burned intentionally.
In an appeal from convictions in a magistrate's court, the court held that, as long as an accidental burning had not been excluded by the evidence as a reasonable possibility, it could not be said that it had been proved aliunde beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime had been committed. The court held further that the case should not be remitted for further evidence.
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions under which a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved in the context of tort litigation. Although specific criteria differ by jurisdiction, an action typically must satisfy the following elements of negligence: the existence of a duty of care, breach of appropriate standard of care, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the existence of the first three elements is inferred from the existence of injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.
In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party has no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.
Corpus delicti, in Western law, is the principle that a crime must be proved to have occurred before a person can be convicted of committing that crime.
The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to the trier of fact. If the prosecution does not prove the charges true, then the person is acquitted of the charges. The prosecution must in most cases prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable doubt remains, the accused must be acquitted. The opposite system is a presumption of guilt.
Lemuel Shaw was an American jurist who served as chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (1830–1860). Prior to his appointment he also served for several years in the Massachusetts House of Representatives and as a state senator. In 1847, Shaw became the father-in-law of author Herman Melville. He ruled on prominent cases involving slavery, segregation, and religion.
Beyond (a) reasonable doubt is a legal standard of proof required to validate a criminal conviction in most adversarial legal systems. It is a higher standard of proof than the standard of balance of probabilities commonly used in civil cases because the stakes are much higher in a criminal case: a person found guilty can be deprived of liberty or, in extreme cases, life, as well as suffering the collateral consequences and social stigma attached to a conviction. The prosecution is tasked with providing evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to get a conviction; albeit prosecution may fail to complete such task, the trier-of-fact's acceptance that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt will in theory lead to conviction of the defendant. A failure for the trier-of-fact to accept that the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been met thus entitles the accused to an acquittal. This standard of proof is widely accepted in many criminal justice systems, and its origin can be traced to Blackstone's ratio, "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."
In criminal law, a mistake of fact may sometimes mean that, while a person has committed the physical element of an offence, because they were labouring under a mistake of fact, they never formed the mental element. This is unlike a mistake of law, which is not usually a defense; law enforcement may or may not take for granted that individuals know what the law is.
Self-defence is a defence permitting reasonable force to be used to defend one's self or another. This defence arises both from common law and the Criminal Law Act 1967. Self-defence is a justification defence rather than an excuse.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
Criminal procedure in South Africa refers to the adjudication process of that country's criminal law. It forms part of procedural or adjectival law, and describes the means by which its substantive counterpart, South African criminal law, is applied. It has its basis mainly in English law.
S v Motau and Another is an important case in South African law. It was heard in the Transvaal Provincial Division on March 11, 1963, with judgment handed down on March 25. The judges were Ludorf J en Trollip J.
R v Mataung is an important case in South African law, heard and decided in the Orange Free State Provincial Division on 13 August 1953. Brink J wrote the judgment; Van Blerk J concurred.
R v Kewelram is an important case in South African law. It was heard in the Appellate Division, Bloemfontein, on 15 February 1922, with judgment handed down on 6 March. The judges were Innes CJ, Solomon JA, Maasdorp JA, De Villiers JA and Juta JA.
R v Shein is an important case in South African law, heard in the Appellate Division, Bloemfontein, on 15 September 1924, with judgment handed down on 3 October. Innes CJ, Solomon JA, De Villiers JA, Kotz JA and Wessels JA presided. The court found that the evidence on which a jury is entitled to convict upon a criminal charge is evidence on which reasonable men could properly convict. If the evidence produced cannot be so described, the court will set aside the verdict not as deciding the facts itself, but because the jury has not, in its opinion, duly discharged the judicial duty cast upon it. If, on the other hand, the evidence does answer to that description, the court will refuse to interfere, not because it would have come to the same conclusion itself, but because no ground exists for interference with the discharge of a duty entrusted by law to the jury alone.
The South African law of evidence forms part of the adjectival or procedural law of that country. It is based on English common law.
Administrator, Transvaal v Theletsane is an important case in South African law, heard in an Appellate Division comprising Botha JA, Smalberger JA, MT Steyn JA, FH Grosskopf JA and Nicholas AJA. The case was heard on November 5, 1990; judgment was delivered on November 30. The respondents' attorneys were SV Khampepe, Johannesburg, and EG Cooper & Sons, Bloemfontein. The appellants had the State Attorney.
In S v Van As en 'n Ander, an important case in South African criminal law, the police were locking a suspect in a patrol van, when the young children in his company disappeared. The following morning, after a search in vain the night before, two of them were found dead from exposure. The police were charged with and convicted of culpable homicide. On appeal, however, the court held that, although it would have been reasonable to continue the search and to make further inquiries, it had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the children would have been found by a proper search. It also had not been so proved that the failure to institute such a search was responsible for the children's deaths.
R v Patel is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on May 8, 1959. The appellant's attorneys were Levy, Rogaly & Cohen, Pretoria, and S. and v A Rosendorff, Bloemfontein. The Appellate Division ruled that "a person has the same right to use force in the defence of another from a threatened danger, as he would have to defend himself, if he were the person threatened."
The appellant in Van Aardt v S, an important case in South African criminal law, had been convicted in the Grahamstown High Court of the murder of a fifteen-year-old youth, following a savage beating administered by the appellant, who suspected the deceased of theft. An appeal to the full bench of the Eastern Cape High Court was unsuccessful, so the matter came on further appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal. The appellant admitted common assault, but denied that such assault had caused the death of the deceased, or that he bore a legal duty to seek medical intervention for the deceased.
Informal admissions in South African law are part of the South African law of evidence. Briefly, an admission is a statement made by a party, in civil or criminal proceedings, which is adverse to that party's case. Informal admissions, which are usually made out of court, must be distinguished from formal admissions, made in the pleadings or in court. Formal admissions are binding on the maker, and are generally made in order to reduce the number of issues before the court; an informal admission is merely an item of evidence that can be contradicted or explained away.