R v Starr | |
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Hearing: December 3, 1998 Rehearing: February 24, 2000 Judgment: September 29, 2000 | |
Full case name | Robert Dennis Starr v Her Majesty The Queen |
Citations | [2000] 2 SCR 144, 2000 SCC 40 |
Court Membership | |
Chief Justice | Antonio Lamer CJ (*)/Beverley McLachlin CJ(+) |
Puisne Justices | L'Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Cory(*), McLachlin (*), Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour(+) and LeBel(+) JJ (*) hearing only, (+) rehearing only |
Reasons given | |
Majority | Iacobucci J, joined by Major, Binnie, Arbour and Lebel JJ |
Dissent | L'Heureux‑Dubé J, joined by Gonthier J |
Dissent | McLachlin CJ, joined by Bastarache J |
Laws Applied | |
R v Lifchus , [1997] 3 SCR 320 |
R v Starr [2000] 2 SCR 144 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision that re-evaluated several principles of evidence. In particular, they held the "principled approach" hearsay evidence under R v Khan and R v Smith (1992) can be equally used to exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. In addition, the Court examined the judge's charge to the jury on the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court of Canada, the final court of appeals in the Canadian justice system. The court grants permission to between 40 and 75 litigants each year to appeal decisions rendered by provincial, territorial and federal appellate courts. Its decisions are the ultimate expression and application of Canadian law and binding upon all lower courts of Canada, except to the extent that they are overridden or otherwise made ineffective by an Act of Parliament or the Act of a provincial legislative assembly pursuant to section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Hearsay evidence is "an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein." In certain courts, hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless an exception to the Hearsay Rule applies.
R v Khan [1990] 2 SCR 531 is a landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision that began a series of major changes to the hearsay rule and the rules regarding the use of children as witnesses in court. In this case, and subsequently in R v Smith (1992), R v B (KG) (1993), R v U (FJ) (1995), R v Starr (2000), and finally, R v Khelawon (2006), the Court developed the “principled approach” to hearsay, where hearsay statements can be admitted if they are sufficiently reliable and necessary.
In August 1994, Bernard Cook and Darlene Weselowski were drinking with Robert Dennis Starr in a hotel near Winnipeg. In the late hours of the night Starr parted ways with Cook and Weselowski. Together, Cook and Weselowski were approached by Jodie Giesbrecht, a sometimes girlfriend of Cook. During an ensuing conversation Cook told Giesbrecht that he could not go with her that night because he had to "go and do an Autopac scam with Robert", as he had been given $500 for wrecking a car for insurance purposes.
A few hours later the bodies of both Cook and Weselowski were found on the side of a nearby highway. They had been shot in the head. Starr was arrested in connection with the murders.
At trial, the Crown advanced the theory that the murders were gang-related, where Starr had used the insurance fraud scam as a means to get Cook into the countryside to murder him. The case hinged on the testimony of Giesbrecht and the statement she heard from Cook that night. The trial judge found the statement admissible on the "present intentions" or "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held the evidence should not be admitted and sent the case back for a retrial.
Two significant holdings came from Starr, which affected the way the principled approach was to be implemented. The first was that the traditional hearsay exceptions would continue to operate, but that they would have to conform to the principled approach's tenets of reliability and necessity (at paragraphs 202–207). Therefore, if a conflict arose between the traditional exceptions and the principled approach, it would be the principled approach that would prevail. The second and most controversial aspect of the decision was that in assessing threshold reliability, the trial judge must only consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement (at paragraphs 215–217). This holding effectively barred the consideration of corroborative evidence in the reliability assessment. This aspect of Starr was overruled by R v Khelawon , 2006 SCC 57 on December 14, 2006.
R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 is a leading decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the principled approach to hearsay evidence.
As a side issue, the Court held that the judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the standard of proof. The judge should have placed "beyond a reasonable doubt" between absolute certainty and "balance of probabilities".
Although Starr still has precedential value, the Court explicitly overturned some of its findings in Khelawon. Charron J at paragraph 4 said:
As I will explain, I have concluded that the factors to be considered on the admissibility inquiry cannot be categorized in terms of threshold and ultimate reliability. Comments to the contrary in previous decisions of this Court should no longer be followed. Rather, all relevant factors should be considered including, in appropriate cases, the presence of supporting or contradictory evidence. In each case, the scope of the inquiry must be tailored to the particular dangers presented by the evidence and limited to determining the evidentiary question of admissibility.
Once the proposed evidence is identified as hearsay, it is presumptively inadmissible. I stress the nature of the hearsay rule as a general exclusionary rule because the increased flexibility introduced in the Canadian law of evidence in the past few decades has sometimes tended to blur the distinction between admissibility and weight. Modifications have been made to a number of rules, including the rule against hearsay, to bring them up to date and to ensure that they facilitate rather than impede the goals of truth seeking, judicial efficiency and fairness in the adversarial process. However, the traditional rules of evidence reflect considerable wisdom and judicial experience. The modern approach has built upon their underlying rationale, not discarded it. In Starr itself, where this Court recognized the primacy of the principled approach to hearsay exceptions, the presumptive exclusion of hearsay evidence was reaffirmed in strong terms. Iacobucci J. stated as follows (at para. 199):
By excluding evidence that might produce unfair verdicts, and by ensuring that litigants will generally have the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, the hearsay rule serves as a cornerstone of a fair justice system.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit introducing hearsay statements during applicable federal court proceedings, unless one of nearly thirty exemptions or exceptions applies. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as:
A statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement..
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court decision that reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that cross-examination is required to admit prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have since become unavailable.
First adopted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence codify the evidence law that applies in United States federal courts. In addition, many states in the United States have either adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, with or without local variations, or have revised their own evidence rules or codes to at least partially follow the federal rules.
Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] W.L.R. 965 is a leading Privy Council case that created an exception for the hearsay rule. It was a case heard on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government. The right only applies to criminal prosecutions, not civil cases or other proceedings.
R v B (KG), [1993] 1 SCR 740, popularly known as the KGB case, is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as proof of the truth of their contents. Prior to this case, prior inconsistent statements made by a witness other than an accused could merely be used to impeach the witness's credibility, not for substantive purposes. Here, the Court held that if the statements could be found to be both necessary and reliable then the statements could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reformed the common law relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings begun on or after 4 April 2005.
In the law of evidence, an implied assertion is a statement or conduct that implies a side issue surrounding certain admissible facts which have not necessarily been complied with the rules of relevance. There is varying opinion of whether hearsay evidence of implied assertions should be admissible in court to prove the issue within contents. While they are considered hearsay, they are generally considered to some extent unreliable than regular statements which are less easy to be fabricated.
In the law of evidence, a dying declaration is testimony that would normally be barred as hearsay but may in common law nonetheless be admitted as evidence in criminal law trials because it constituted the last words of a dying person. The rationale, accurate or not, is that someone who is dying or believes death to be imminent would have less incentive to fabricate testimony, and as such, the hearsay statement carries with it some reliability.
R v Smith, [1992] 2 SCR 915 is a leading decision on hearsay by the Supreme Court of Canada. This decision, along with R v Khan (1990), began what is called the "hearsay revolution", supplementing the traditional categorical approach to hearsay exceptions with a new "principled approach" based on reliability and necessity of testimony.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The business records exception to the U.S. hearsay rule is based on Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). It is sometimes referred to as the business entry rule.
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company, 241 F.R.D. 534, is a case in which a landmark decision about the admissibility and authentication of digital evidence was set down in the form of a 100-page opinion by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm.
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that for testimonial statements to be admissible under the forfeiture exception to hearsay, the defendant must have intended to make the witness unavailable for trial.
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is not hearsay only if the statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose.
Beech Aircraft Corporation v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed a longstanding conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals over whether Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for public investigatory reports containing "factual findings," extends to conclusions and opinions contained in such reports. The court also considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit, on cross-examination, testimony intended to provide a more complete picture of a document about which the witness had testified on direct.
R v Baker [1989] 1 NZLR 738 was a decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a criminal trial. The judgment of President Sir Robin Cooke's created a common law exception to the rule against hearsay evidence in situations where the evidence is reliable and the witness unavailable. This principle was incorporated into the codification of the hearsay rule in the Evidence Act 2006.