Safety engineering is an engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems provide acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to industrial engineering/systems engineering, and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail.
Risk assessment determines possible mishaps, their likelihood and consequences, and the tolerances for such events. The results of this process may be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative fashion. Risk assessment is an inherent part of a broader risk management strategy to help reduce any potential risk-related consequences.
Failure mode and effects analysis is the process of reviewing as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify potential failure modes in a system and their causes and effects. For each component, the failure modes and their resulting effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. There are numerous variations of such worksheets. An FMEA can be a qualitative analysis, but may be put on a quantitative basis when mathematical failure rate models are combined with a statistical failure mode ratio database. It was one of the first highly structured, systematic techniques for failure analysis. It was developed by reliability engineers in the late 1950s to study problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems. An FMEA is often the first step of a system reliability study.
Reliability engineering is a sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes the ability of equipment to function without failure. Reliability describes the ability of a system or component to function under stated conditions for a specified period of time. Reliability is closely related to availability, which is typically described as the ability of a component or system to function at a specified moment or interval of time.
In functional safety, safety integrity level (SIL) is defined as the relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety instrumented function (SIF), i.e. the measurement of the performance required of the SIF.
Software assurance (SwA) is a critical process in software development that ensures the reliability, safety, and security of software products. It involves a variety of activities, including requirements analysis, design reviews, code inspections, testing, and formal verification. One crucial component of software assurance is secure coding practices, which follow industry-accepted standards and best practices, such as those outlined by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in their CERT Secure Coding Standards (SCS).
A hazard analysis is used as the first step in a process used to assess risk. The result of a hazard analysis is the identification of different types of hazards. A hazard is a potential condition and exists or not. It may, in single existence or in combination with other hazards and conditions, become an actual Functional Failure or Accident (Mishap). The way this exactly happens in one particular sequence is called a scenario. This scenario has a probability of occurrence. Often a system has many potential failure scenarios. It also is assigned a classification, based on the worst case severity of the end condition. Risk is the combination of probability and severity. Preliminary risk levels can be provided in the hazard analysis. The validation, more precise prediction (verification) and acceptance of risk is determined in the risk assessment (analysis). The main goal of both is to provide the best selection of means of controlling or eliminating the risk. The term is used in several engineering specialties, including avionics, food safety, occupational safety and health, process safety, reliability engineering.
Failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an extension of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).
A bridge management system (BMS) is a set of methodologies and procedures for managing information about bridges. Such system is capable of document and process data along the entire life cycle of the structure steps: project design, construction, monitoring, maintenance and end of operation.
Process safety is an interdisciplinary engineering domain focusing on the study, prevention, and management of large-scale fires, explosions and chemical accidents in process plants or other facilities dealing with hazardous materials, such as refineries and oil and gas production installations. Thus, process safety is generally concerned with the prevention of, control of, mitigation of and recovery from unintentional hazardous materials releases that can have a serious effect to people, plant and/or the environment.
The technique for human error-rate prediction (THERP) is a technique used in the field of human reliability assessment (HRA), for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout the completion of a specific task. From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall levels of safety. There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA: error identification, error quantification and error reduction. As there exist a number of techniques used for such purposes, they can be split into one of two classifications: first-generation techniques and second-generation techniques. First-generation techniques work on the basis of the simple dichotomy of ‘fits/doesn’t fit’ in matching an error situation in context with related error identification and quantification. Second generation techniques are more theory-based in their assessment and quantification of errors. ‘HRA techniques have been utilised for various applications in a range of disciplines and industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation and business.
Human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART) is a technique used in the field of human reliability assessment (HRA), for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout the completion of a specific task. From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall levels of safety. There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA: error identification, error quantification, and error reduction. As there exist a number of techniques used for such purposes, they can be split into one of two classifications: first-generation techniques and second generation techniques. First generation techniques work on the basis of the simple dichotomy of 'fits/doesn't fit' in the matching of the error situation in context with related error identification and quantification and second generation techniques are more theory based in their assessment and quantification of errors. HRA techniques have been used in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation, and business sectors. Each technique has varying uses within different disciplines.
Technical Integrity Engineering/Asset Integrity: is a term applied to the engineering disciplines associated with the design, assurance, and verification functions that ensure a product, process, or system meets its appropriate and intended requirements under stated operating conditions. Application of these disciplines minimizes the cost, schedule, technical, and legal risks of a program and improves the overall life cycle cost.
Risk management tools allow the uncertainty to be addressed by identifying and generating metrics, parameterizing, prioritizing, and developing responses, and tracking risk. These activities may be difficult to track without tools and techniques, documentation and information systems.
Integrity Management Plan is a documented and systematic approach to ensure the long-term integrity of an asset or assets.
IT risk management is the application of risk management methods to information technology in order to manage IT risk, i.e.:
Piping corrosion circuit or Corrosion loop / Piping Circuitization and Corrosion Modelling, is carried out as part of either a Risk Based Inspection analysis (RBI) or Materials Operating Envelope analysis (MOE). It is the systematization of the piping components versus failure modes analysis into materials operating envelope. It groups piping materials / chemical make-up into systems / sub systems and assigns corrosion mechanisms. These are then monitored over the operating lifetime of the facility. This analysis is performed on circuit inspection results to determine and optimize circuit corrosion rates and measured thickness/dates for circuit components. Corrosion Circuits are utilized in the Integrity Management Plan (IMP) which forms a part of the overall Asset integrity management system and is an integral part of any RBI analysis. Many times a "system" will be a broad overview of the facilities process flow, broken by stream constituents, while a circuit level analysis breaks systems into smaller "circuits" that group common metallurgies, equal temperatures and pressures, and expected damage mechanisms.
Corrosion loop(s) are systematized analysis "loops" used during Risk-based inspection analysis. Both terms “RBI Corrosion loops” or “RBI corrosion circuits” are generic terms used to indicate the systematization of piping systems into usable and understandable parts associated with corrosion. Systematized piping loops or circuits are systems used in Risk Based Inspection analysis to assess the likelihood and consequence of failure. Other systematization may also prove useful, such as, i.e. inspection, consequence, materials of construction and chemistry. The system (or sub systems) maybe used to identify, pressure / temperature, subsequent failure mechanism and possible failure rate. They may be based upon Construction drawings, Process Flow diagrams or Piping & Instrument diagrams as required. Each loop or circuit maybe identified using a unique code, with description about; process, material & degradation mode, material, cladding, C.A, specs. See system model comes under the general heading of system analysis the terms analysis and synthesis come from Greek where they mean respectively "to take apart" and "to put together". See also systems theory: Note the exact definition of the systematized risk analysis " loop" is left to the reader and their requirements of the system analysis required, however to ensure consistency and that the expected results is produced, this should be defined before they are constructed. It is suggested that a “true” corrosion loop should be a grouping were the degradation mechanism is "likely" to be the same i.e.
A cascade chart is tool that can be used in damage tolerance analysis to determine the proper inspection interval, based on reliability analysis, considering all the context uncertainties. The chart is called a "cascade chart" because the scatter of data points and downward curvature resembles a waterfall or cascade. This name was first introduced by Dr. Alberto W Mello in his work "Reliability prediction for structures under cyclic loads and recurring inspections". Materials subject to cyclic loads, as shown in the graph on the right, may form and propagate cracks over time due to fatigue. Therefore, it is essential to determine a reliable inspection interval. There are numerous factors that must be considered to determine this inspection interval. The non-destructive inspection (NDI) technique must have a high probability of detecting a crack in the material. If missed, a crack may lead the structure to a catastrophic failure before the next inspection. On the other hand, the inspection interval cannot be too frequent that the structure's maintenance is no longer profitable.
A bow-tie diagram is a graphic tool used to describe an accidental event in terms of its initial causes, ultimate negative consequences, and safety barriers designed to prevent or control the associated hazards. It can be considered as a simplified, linear representation of a fault tree combined with an event tree, although it can maintain the quantitative, probabilistic aspects of the fault and event tree when it is used in the context of quantified risk assessments. The diagram visualizes an unintended event, usually one with the potential to escalate to undesired consequences, with all its credible initiating causes on the left of the event and its ultimate outcomes on the right. A number of barriers, either hard/engineered or administrative/procedural, are placed on the path from the initiators to the final outcomes. The shape of the diagram recalls that of a bow tie, after which it is named.
