S v Jackson | |
---|---|
Court | Appellate Division |
Full case name | S v Jackson |
Decided | 18 March 1963 |
Citation(s) | 1963 (2) SA 626 (A) |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Steyn CJ, Wessels JA and Hoexter AJA |
Case opinions | |
Criminal law, Murder, Culpable homicide, Self-defence | |
Decision by | Hoexter AJA |
In S v Jackson, [1] an important case in South African criminal law, the Appellate Division held that a person is justified in killing in self-defence not only when he fears that his life is in danger but also when he fears grievous bodily harm. PE Linde appeared for the appellant and BG van der Walt, SC, Attorney-General OFS, for the State. The case was heard on March 8, 1963. The appellant's attorney was DA Carroll, Johannesburg.
In an appeal from a conviction of culpable homicide on a charge of murder, it appeared that the trial judge had repeatedly directed the jury that they could not acquit the appellant, on his plea of self-defence, unless they came to the conclusion that a reasonable man in his situation would have feared that his life was in danger.
The court held that the trial judge should have directed the jury that the appellant would have been justified in shooting the deceased if he justifiably feared that he was about to suffer grievous bodily harm at his hands. The failure so to direct the jury was an irregularity which had prejudiced the appellant, because it appeared that the jury might have found that, even though he did not fear for his life, he most certainly feared very serious bodily harm when he was assaulted by the deceased. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the conviction and sentence set aside.
Bodily harm is a legal term of art used in the definition of both statutory and common law offences in Australia, Canada, England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions. It is a synonym for injury or bodily injury and similar expressions, though it may be used with a precise and limited meaning in any given jurisdiction. The expression grievous bodily harm first appeared in a statute in Lord Ellenborough's Act (1803).
The concept of justifiable homicide in criminal law is a defense to culpable homicide. Generally, there is a burden to produce exculpatory evidence in the legal defense of justification.
Attempted murder is a crime of attempt in various jurisdictions.
Assault occasioning grievous bodily harm is a term used in English criminal law to describe the severest forms of battery. It refers to two offences that are created by sections 18 and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The distinction between these two sections is the requirement of specific intent for section 18; the offence under section 18 is variously referred to as "wounding with intent" or "causing grievous bodily harm with intent", whereas the offence under section 20 is variously referred to as "unlawful wounding", "malicious wounding" or "inflicting grievous bodily harm".
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm is a statutory offence of aggravated assault in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands. It has been abolished in the Republic of Ireland and in South Australia, but replaced with a similar offence.
R. v. Constanza [1997] is an English case reaching the Court of Appeal and is well-known for establishing the legal precedent in English criminal law that assault could be committed by causing the victim to apprehend violence which was to take place some time in the not immediate future, that it is not necessary for the victim to see the potential perpetrator of the violence, and that it was for the prosecution to prove that fear was in the victim's mind, but how it got there is irrelevant.
R v Brown[1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212 is a House of Lords judgment which re-affirmed the conviction of five men for their involvement in consensual unusually severe sadomasochistic sexual acts over a 10-year period. They were convicted of a count of unlawful and malicious wounding and a count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The key issue facing the Court was whether consent was a valid defence to assault in these circumstances, to which the Court answered in the negative. The acts involved included the nailing of a part of the body to a board, but not so as to necessitate, strictly, medical treatment.
In criminal law, intent is a subjective state of mind that must accompany the acts of certain crimes to constitute a violation. A more formal, generally synonymous legal term is scienter: intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.
Self-defence is a defence permitting reasonable force to be used to defend one's self or another. This defence arises both from common law and the Criminal Law Act 1967. Self-defence is a justification defence rather than an excuse.
Murder is an offence under the common law of England and Wales. It is considered the most serious form of homicide, in which one person kills another with the intention to cause either death or serious injury unlawfully. The element of intentionality was originally termed malice aforethought, although it required neither malice nor premeditation. Baker, chapter 14 states that many killings done with a high degree of subjective recklessness were treated as murder from the 12th century right through until the 1974 decision in DPP v Hyam.
In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.
R v Bailey is a 1983 decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales considering criminal responsibility as to non-insane automatism. The broad questions addressed were whether a hampered state of mind, which the accused may have a legal and moral duty to lessen or avoid, gave him a legal excuse for his actions; and whether as to any incapacity there was strong countering evidence on the facts involved. The court ruled that the jury had been misdirected as to the effect of a defendant's mental state on his criminal liability. However, Bailey's defence had not been supported by sufficient evidence to support an acquittal and his appeal was dismissed.
Fault, as a legal term, refers to legal blameworthiness and responsibility in each area of law. It refers to both the actus reus and the mental state of the defendant. The basic principle is that a defendant should be able to contemplate the harm that his actions may cause, and therefore should aim to avoid such actions. Different forms of liability employ different notions of fault, in some there is no need to prove fault, but the absence of it.
In Australia, murder is a criminal offence where a person, by a voluntary act or omission, causes the death of another person with either intent to kill, intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, or with reckless indifference to human life. It may also arise in circumstances where the accused was committing, or assisting in the commission, of a different serious crime that results in a person's death. It is usually punished by life imprisonment.
John Harris Byrne is a retired Australian jurist who previously served as Senior Judge Administrator of the Supreme Court of Queensland. Having been a judge of that court since 1989, he was one of the court's most experienced judges. He was also Chair of the National Judicial College of Australia, a body which provides programs and professional development resources to judicial officers in Australia. He is now a private Commercial Arbitrator.
English law contains homicide offences – those acts involving the death of another person. For a crime to be considered homicide, it must take place after the victim's legally recognised birth, and before their legal death. There is also the usually uncontroversial requirement that the victim be under the "Queen's peace". The death must be causally linked to the actions of the defendant. Since the abolition of the year and a day rule, there is no maximum time period between any act being committed and the victim's death, so long as the former caused the latter.
South African criminal law is the body of national law relating to crime in South Africa. In the definition of Van der Walt et al., a crime is "conduct which common or statute law prohibits and expressly or impliedly subjects to punishment remissible by the state alone and which the offender cannot avoid by his own act once he has been convicted." Crime involves the infliction of harm against society. The function or object of criminal law is to provide a social mechanism with which to coerce members of society to abstain from conduct that is harmful to the interests of society.
R v Patel is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on May 8, 1959. The appellant's attorneys were Levy, Rogaly & Cohen, Pretoria, and S. and v A Rosendorff, Bloemfontein. The Appellate Division ruled that "a person has the same right to use force in the defence of another from a threatened danger, as he would have to defend himself, if he were the person threatened."
Peterson v Minister of Safety and Security is an important case in South African criminal law. For the appellant appeared J Whitehead SC, instructed by JL Martinson & Company, Cape Town; for the respondents, A Schippers SC and S O'Brien, instructed by the State Attorney, Cape Town.
Rex v Zikalala is an important case in South African criminal law, heard on February 27, 1953. Zikalala, the appellant, had been charged and convicted of the culpable homicide in causing the death of one Alpheus Tsele. On appeal to the Appellate Division, he successfully argued self-defence.