In behavioural sciences, social rationality is a type of decision strategy used in social contexts, in which a set of simple rules is applied in complex and uncertain situations.
Social rationality is a form of bounded rationality applied to social contexts, where individuals make choices and predictions under uncertainty. [1] While game theory deals with well-defined situations, social rationality explicitly deals with situations in which not all alternatives, consequences, and event probabilities can be foreseen. The idea is that, similar to non-social environments, individuals rely, and should rely, on fast and frugal heuristics in order to deal with complex and genuinely uncertain social environments. [1] This emphasis on simple rules in an uncertain world contrasts with the view that the complexity of social situations requires highly sophisticated mental strategies, as has been assumed in primate research[ better source needed ] [2] and neuroscience, [3] among others.
Social rationality is both a descriptive program and a normative program. The descriptive program studies the repertoire of heuristics an individual or organization uses, that is, their adaptive toolbox. The normative program studies the environmental conditions to which a heuristic is adapted, that is, where it performs better than other decision strategies. This approach is called the study of the ecological rationality of social heuristics. It assumes that social heuristics are domain- and problem-specific. [4] [5]
Heuristics can be applied to social and non-social decision tasks (also called social games and games against nature), judgments, or categorizations. They can use social or non-social input. Social rationality is thus about three of the four possible combinations, excluding the case of heuristics using non-social input for non-social tasks. 'Games against nature' comprise situations where individuals face environmental uncertainty, and need to predict or outwit nature, e.g., harvest food or master hard-to-predict or unpredictable hazards. [6] 'Social games' include situations, where the decision outcome depends on the choices of others, e.g., in cooperation, competition, mate search and even in morally significant situations. [7]
Social rationality has been studied in a number of other fields than human decision-making, e.g. in evolutionary social learning, [8] and social learning in animals. [9]
An example for a heuristic that is not necessarily social but that requires social input is the imitate-the-majority heuristic, where in a situation of uncertainty, individuals follow the actions or choices of the majority of their peers regardless of their social status. The domain of pro-environmental behavior provides numerous illustrations for this strategy, such as littering behavior in public places, [10] the reuse of towels in hotel rooms, [11] and changes in private energy consumption in response to information about the consumption of the majority of neighbors. [12]
Following the equality heuristic (sometimes called 1/N rule) people divide and invest their resources equally in a number of N different options. These options can be both social (e.g., time spent with children) and nonsocial entities (e.g., financial investments or natural resources). For example, many parents invest their limited resources, such as affection, time, and money (e.g., for education) equally into their offspring. [13] In highly uncertain environments with large numbers of assets and only few possibilities to learn, the equality heuristic can outperform optimizing strategies and yield better performance on various measures of success than optimal asset allocation strategies. [14]
Adapted from Hertwig & Herzog, 2009. [4]
A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment. Individuals create their own "subjective reality" from their perception of the input. An individual's construction of reality, not the objective input, may dictate their behavior in the world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality.
A heuristic, or heuristic technique, is an approach to problem solving or self-discovery using 'a calculated guess' derived from previous experiences. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that ease the cognitive load of making a decision. Usually the opposite process to heuristics is the application of algorithms. Algorithms involve calculated answers and guesswork is eliminated.
Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited when individuals make decisions, and under these limitations, rational individuals will select a decision that is satisfactory rather than optimal.
Decision theory is a branch of applied probability theory concerned with the theory of making decisions based on assigning probabilities to various factors and assigning numerical consequences to the outcome.
The base rate fallacy, also called base rate neglect or base rate bias, is a type of fallacy in which people tend to ignore the base rate in favor of the individuating information . Base rate neglect is a specific form of the more general extension neglect.
The recognition heuristic, originally termed the recognition principle, has been used as a model in the psychology of judgment and decision making and as a heuristic in artificial intelligence. The goal is to make inferences about a criterion that is not directly accessible to the decision maker, based on recognition retrieved from memory. This is possible if recognition of alternatives has relevance to the criterion. For two alternatives, the heuristic is defined as:
If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.
Gerd Gigerenzer is a German psychologist who has studied the use of bounded rationality and heuristics in decision making. Gigerenzer is director emeritus of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy, both in Berlin.
Daniel G. Goldstein is an American cognitive psychologist known for the specification and testing of heuristics and models of bounded rationality in the field of judgment and decision making. He is an honorary research fellow at London Business School and works with Microsoft Research as a principal researcher.
In psychology, the take-the-best heuristic is a heuristic which decides between two alternatives by choosing based on the first cue that discriminates them, where cues are ordered by cue validity. In the original formulation, the cues were assumed to have binary values or have an unknown value. The logic of the heuristic is that it bases its choice on the best cue (reason) only and ignores the rest.
Counterproductive norms are group norms that prevent a group, organization, or other collective entities from performing or accomplishing its originally stated function by working oppositely to how they were initially intended. Group norms are typically enforced to facilitate group survival, to make group member behaviour predictable, to help avoid embarrassing interpersonal interactions, or to clarify distinctive aspects of the group’s identity. Counterproductive norms exist despite the fact that they cause opposite outcomes of the intended prosocial functions.
Douglas T. Kenrick is professor of psychology at Arizona State University. His research and writing integrate three scientific syntheses of the last few decades: evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and dynamical systems theory. He is author of over 170 scientific articles, books, and book chapters, the majority applying evolutionary ideas to human cognition and behavior.
Heuristics is the process by which humans use mental short cuts to arrive at decisions. Heuristics are simple strategies that humans, animals, organizations, and even machines use to quickly form judgments, make decisions, and find solutions to complex problems. Often this involves focusing on the most relevant aspects of a problem or situation to formulate a solution. While heuristic processes are used to find the answers and solutions that are most likely to work or be correct, they are not always right or the most accurate. Judgments and decisions based on heuristics are simply good enough to satisfy a pressing need in situations of uncertainty, where information is incomplete. In that sense they can differ from answers given by logic and probability.
Scarcity, in the area of social psychology, works much like scarcity in the area of economics. Scarcity is basically how people handle satisfying themselves regarding unlimited wants and needs with resources that are limited. Humans place a higher value on an object that is scarce, and a lower value on those that are in abundance. For example diamonds are more valuable than rocks because diamonds are not as abundant. These perceptions of scarcity can lead to irregular consumer behavior, such as systemic errors or cognitive bias.
Heuristics are simple decision making strategies used to achieve a specific goal quickly and efficiently, and are commonly implemented in sports.
Social heuristics are simple decision making strategies that guide people's behavior and decisions in the social environment when time, information, or cognitive resources are scarce. Social environments tend to be characterised by complexity and uncertainty, and in order to simplify the decision making process, people may use heuristics, which are decision making strategies that involve ignoring some information or relying on simple rules of thumb.
Ecological rationality is a particular account of practical rationality, which in turn specifies the norms of rational action – what one ought to do in order to act rationally. The presently dominant account of practical rationality in the social and behavioral sciences such as economics and psychology, rational choice theory, maintains that practical rationality consists in making decisions in accordance with some fixed rules, irrespective of context. Ecological rationality, in contrast, claims that the rationality of a decision depends on the circumstances in which it takes place, so as to achieve one's goals in this particular context. What is considered rational under the rational choice account thus might not always be considered rational under the ecological rationality account. Overall, rational choice theory puts a premium on internal logical consistency whereas ecological rationality targets external performance in the world. The term ecologically rational is only etymologically similar to the biological science of ecology.
The less-is-more effect refers to the finding that heuristic decision strategies can yield more accurate judgments than alternative strategies that use more pieces of information. Understanding these effects is part of the study of ecological rationality.
The priority heuristic is a simple, lexicographic decision strategy that correctly predicts classic violations of expected utility theory such as the Allais paradox, the four-fold pattern, the certainty effect, the possibility effect, or intransitivities.
Ralph Hertwig is a German psychologist whose work focuses on the psychology of human judgment and decision making. Hertwig is Director of the Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. He grew up with his brothers Steffen Hertwig and Michael Hertwig in Talheim, Heilbronn.
Robin Miles Hogarth is a British-American psychologist and emeritus professor in the Department of Economics and Business at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. He has served as president of both the Society for Judgment and Decision Making and the European Association for Decision Making. His previous positions include ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Wallace W. Booth Professor of Behavioral Science at the University of Chicago.
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