United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter

Last updated

United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter, 2 Hawy. & H. 394, 27 F. Cas. 599, was a case decided by the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in October 1861.

Contents

Background and noncompliance with court order

The case arose when John Murphy asked the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release his son from service in the United States Army during the Civil War on the grounds that he was underage. The case was decided at a time when habeas corpus had been suspended in the District of Columbia. General Andrew Porter, to whom the writ was directed, arrested Murphy's lawyer when he attempted to serve Porter with the writ, and Porter also had Judge William Matthew Merrick placed under house arrest in order to prevent him from proceeding in the case.

Merrick's fellow judges took up the case and ordered Gen. Porter to appear before them and explain himself, but President Abraham Lincoln prevented the marshal from delivering the court's order. John Hay was Lincoln's personal secretary. Hay recounts in his diary that Deputy U.S. Marshal George Philips approached Hay and Secretary of State William H. Seward to ask what should be done with the court order regarding Porter. Seward replied: "The President ... forbids you to serve any process upon any officer here." Hay confirmed that those were "Precisely his words." [1]

The court objected that this disruption of its process was unconstitutional, as the president had not declared martial law (while acknowledging that he did have the power to do so). The court noted that it was powerless to enforce its prerogatives.

Aftermath

On March 3, 1863, Congress abolished the circuit court, district court, and criminal court of the District of Columbia, and replaced them with the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. This resulted in the removal of judges from the bench who had ruled against the US in United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter. [2] [3]

Opponents of the reorganization declared that its sole purpose was to remove those judges from the bench, since it gave to the new court all the powers and jurisdiction of the old ones, something its supporters strenuously denied. Supporter Sen. Henry Wilson, however, while declaring that he had no desire to turn the judges out of office, said he had

"not the greatest faith in the present judges. … As to one of their judges, I mean Judge Merrick, I believe his heart is sweltering with treason. He has been under arrest since this rebellion broke out. I believe that during this session of Congress his home has been the resort where sympathizers with disloyal men have held councils, and secret councils, and I have good reason to believe this to be true." [4] [5]

See also

Notes

  1. Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete Civil War Diary of John Hay , p. 28 (SIU Press, Michael Burlingame and John R. Turner Ettlinger eds. 1999).
  2. 12  Stat.   762.
  3. "History of the Federal Judiciary: Circuit Court of the District of Columbia: Legislative History". Federal Judicial Center . Retrieved July 12, 2011.
  4. Congressional Globe , Thirty-Seventh Congress, Third Session, pp. 1049–52, 1128–30, 1135–40, 1480–83, 1538–39.
  5. "Federal Courts of the District of Columbia". Federal Judicial Center . Retrieved July 15, 2011.

Related Research Articles

Habeas corpus is a recourse in law through which a person can report an unlawful detention or imprisonment to a court and request that the court order the custodian of the person, usually a prison official, to bring the prisoner to court, to determine whether the detention is lawful.

<i>Ex parte Merryman</i> United States legal case

Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487), was controversial U.S. federal court case that arose out of the American Civil War. It was a test of the authority of the President to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" under the Constitution's Suspension Clause, when Congress was in recess and therefore unavailable to do so itself. More generally, the case raised questions about the ability of the executive branch to decline enforcement of judicial decisions when the executive believes them to be erroneous and harmful to its own legal powers.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that ruled that the use of military tribunals to try civilians when civil courts are operating is unconstitutional. In this particular case, the Court was unwilling to give President Abraham Lincoln's administration the power of military commission jurisdiction, part of the administration's controversial plan to deal with Union dissenters during the American Civil War. Justice David Davis, who delivered the majority opinion, stated that "martial rule can never exist when the courts are open" and confined martial law to areas of "military operations, where war really prevails", and when it was a necessity to provide a substitute for a civil authority that had been overthrown. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and three associate justices filed a separate opinion concurring with the majority in the judgment, but asserting that Congress had the power to authorize a military commission, although it had not done so in Milligan's case.

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that foreign nationals held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp could petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus to review the legality of their detention. The Court's 6–3 judgment on June 28, 2004, reversed a D.C. Circuit decision which had held that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to hear any petitions from foreign nationals held in Guantanamo Bay.

A writ of coram nobis is a legal order allowing a court to correct its original judgment upon discovery of a fundamental error that did not appear in the records of the original judgment's proceedings and that would have prevented the judgment from being pronounced. The term coram nobis is Latin for "before us" and the meaning of its full form, quae coram nobis resident, is "which [things] remain in our presence". The writ of coram nobis originated in the courts of common law in the English legal system during the sixteenth century.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Taney Arrest Warrant</span>

The Taney Arrest Warrant is a conjectural controversy in Abraham Lincoln scholarship. The argument is that in late May or early June 1861, President Lincoln secretly ordered an arrest warrant for Roger B. Taney, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, but abandoned the proposal. The arrest order is said to have been in response to Taney's Circuit Judge ruling in Ex parte Merryman, which found Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to be unconstitutional.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John Merryman</span> American politician (1824-1881)

John Merryman of Baltimore County, Maryland, was arrested in May 1861 and held prisoner in Fort McHenry in Baltimore and was the petitioner in the case "Ex parte Merryman" which was one of the best known habeas corpus cases of the American Civil War (1861–1865). Merryman was arrested for his involvement in the mob in Baltimore, specifically for his leadership in the destruction of telegraph lines, but was not charged, a right normally ensured by the writ of habeas corpus. The case was taken up by the federal circuit court and its current presiding judge who happened to be Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, a Democrat-leaning Marylander.

Extradition law in the United States is the formal process by which a fugitive found in the United States is surrendered to another country or state for trial, punishment, or rehabilitation. For foreign countries, the extradition process is regulated by treaty and conducted between the federal government of the United States and the government of a foreign country. International extradition is considerably different from interstate or intrastate extradition. If requested by the charging state, US states and territories must extradite anyone charged with a felony, misdemeanor, or even petty offense in another US state or territory, even if the offense is not a crime in the custodial state. The federal government of the United States is a separate jurisdiction from the states with limited scope, but has nationwide law enforcement presence.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Lambdin P. Milligan</span> American lawyer

Lambdin Purdy Milligan was an American lawyer and farmer who was the subject of Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. 2 (1866), a landmark case by the Supreme Court of the United States. He was known for his extreme opinions on states' rights and his opposition to the Lincoln administration's conduct of the American Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Maryland in the American Civil War</span> States participation as a Union slave state; a border state

During the American Civil War (1861–1865), Maryland, a slave state, was one of the border states, straddling the South and North. Despite some popular support for the cause of the Confederate States of America, Maryland did not secede during the Civil War. Governor Thomas H. Hicks, despite his early sympathies for the South, helped prevent the state from seceding.

In United States law, habeas corpus is a recourse challenging the reasons or conditions of a person's confinement under color of law. A petition for habeas corpus is filed with a court that has jurisdiction over the custodian, and if granted, a writ is issued directing the custodian to bring the confined person before the court for examination into those reasons or conditions. The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution specifically included the English common law procedure in Article One, Section 9, clause 2, which demands that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), was a writ of habeas corpus submission made in a civilian court of the United States on behalf of Lakhdar Boumediene, a naturalized citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in military detention by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay detention camps in Cuba. Guantánamo Bay is not formally part of the United States, and under the terms of the 1903 lease between the United States and Cuba, Cuba retained ultimate sovereignty over the territory, while the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control. The case was consolidated with habeas petition Al Odah v. United States. It challenged the legality of Boumediene's detention at the United States Naval Station military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Oral arguments on the combined cases were heard by the Supreme Court on December 5, 2007.

Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U.S. 216 (1885), was a case regarding a Chinese woman who—upon her arrival at a San Francisco port from China—was not permitted to stay in that city by reason of the Acts of Congress of May 6, 1882. She was forcibly kept on board another vessel scheduled to sail back to China and had to have someone sue out a writ of habeas corpus to obtain her release.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">William Matthews Merrick</span> American judge

William Matthews Merrick was a United States circuit judge of the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, a United States representative from Maryland and an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), was a United States Supreme Court case that denied a federal district court jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus if the person detained is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court when the petition is filed. The 6–3 ruling was handed down on June 21, 1948, with the majority opinion written by Justice William O. Douglas and the dissent written by Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Habeas Corpus Suspension Act (1863)</span> American Law during the Civil War

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 12 Stat. 755 (1863), entitled An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, was an Act of Congress that authorized the president of the United States to suspend the right of habeas corpus in response to the American Civil War and provided for the release of political prisoners. It began in the House of Representatives as an indemnity bill, introduced on December 5, 1862, releasing the president and his subordinates from any liability for having suspended habeas corpus without congressional approval. The Senate amended the House's bill, and the compromise reported out of the conference committee altered it to qualify the indemnity and to suspend habeas corpus on Congress's own authority. Abraham Lincoln signed the bill into law on March 3, 1863, and suspended habeas corpus under the authority it granted him six months later. The suspension was partially lifted with the issuance of Proclamation 148 by Andrew Johnson, and the Act became inoperative with the end of the Civil War. The exceptions to his Proclamation 148 were the States of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, the District of Columbia, and the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona.

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 is an act of Congress that significantly expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus. Passed February 5, 1867, the Act amended the Judiciary Act of 1789 to grant the courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States." Prior to the Act's passage, prisoners in the custody of one of the states who wished to challenge the legality of their detention could petition for a writ of habeas corpus only in state courts; the federal court system was barred from issuing writs of habeas corpus in their cases. The Act also permitted the court "to go beyond the return" and question the truth of the jailer's stated justification for detaining the petitioning prisoner, whereas prior to the Act courts were technically bound to accept the jailer's word that the prisoner was actually being held for the reason stated. The Act largely restored habeas corpus following its 1863 suspension by Congress, ensuring that anyone arrested after its passage could challenge their detention in the federal courts, but denied habeas relief to anyone who was already in military custody for any military offense or for having aided the Confederacy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal law in the Marshall Court</span>

The Marshall Court (1801–1835) heard forty-one criminal law cases, slightly more than one per year. Among such cases are United States v. Simms (1803), United States v. More (1805), Ex parte Bollman (1807), United States v. Hudson (1812), Cohens v. Virginia (1821), United States v. Perez (1824), Worcester v. Georgia (1832), and United States v. Wilson (1833).

United States v. More, 7 U.S. 159 (1805), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from criminal cases in the circuit courts by writs of error. Relying on the Exceptions Clause, More held that Congress's enumerated grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Court operated as an exercise of Congress's power to eliminate all other forms of appellate jurisdiction.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal law in the Taney Court</span> Aspect of U.S. judicial history (1836–1864)

The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).