United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), also known as the "Sugar Trust Case," was a United States Supreme Court antitrust case that severely limited the federal government's power to pursue antitrust actions under the Sherman Antitrust Act. In Chief Justice Melville Fuller's majority opinion, the Court held that the U.S. Congress could not regulate manufacturing and thus gave state governments the sole power to take legal action against manufacturing monopolies. The case has never been overruled, but in Swift & Co. v. United States and subsequent cases, the Court has held that Congress can regulate manufacturing when it affects interstate commerce.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. Congress could constitutionally use its spending power to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The case arose as a suit against the enforcement of provisions in a 1977 spending bill that required 10% of federal funds going towards public works programs to go to minority-owned companies.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), is a landmark court decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amendment's federal protection of religious free exercise incorporates via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and so applies to state governments too.
Navigable servitude is a doctrine in United States constitutional law that gives the federal government the right to regulate navigable waterways as an extension of the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the constitution. It is also sometimes called federal navigational servitude.
Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), also known as the Shreveport Rate Case, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court expanding the power of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. Justice Hughes's majority opinion stated that the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce also allowed it to regulate purely intrastate commerce in cases where control of the former was not possible without control of the latter. Because the Supreme Court consolidated several related appeals, they are sometimes collectively known as the "Shreveport Rate Cases" although the Supreme Court issued only one ruling.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), decided on May 19, 1958, was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that refined the doctrine regarding in what instances courts were required to follow state law.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court which further developed the “fruit-and-tree” metaphor established in Lucas v. Earl. Horst is the leading case that applies the assignment of income doctrine to income from property.
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), was a U.S. Supreme Court case considering whether a dam constructed on privately owned land served a public purpose and whether having the owner of the dam compensate any adjacent landowner was a legal form of eminent domain.
Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964), is a United States Supreme Court decision that extended the repair-reconstruction doctrine of Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. to enhancement of function.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), was a decision by the US Supreme Court that interpreted a provision of the Clean Water Act. Section 404 of the Act requires permits for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters," which is defined by the Act as "waters of the United States." That provision was the basis for the federal wetlands-permitting program.
United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case challenging the scope of federal regulatory powers over waterways as pertaining to the definition of "waters of the United States" as written in the Clean Water Act of 1972. The Court ruled unanimously that the government does have the power to control intrastate wetlands as waters of the United States. This ruling was effectively revised in Rapanos v. United States (2006), in which the Court adopted a very narrow interpretation of "navigable waters."
American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court, in an 8–0 decision, held that corporations cannot be sued for greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) under federal common law, primarily because the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates the management of carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Brought to court in July 2004 in the Southern District of New York, this was the first global warming case based on a public nuisance claim.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976), is an opinion from the United States Supreme Court which denied a motion from the State of Arizona seeking authorization to file suit against the State of New Mexico by invoking the original jurisdiction of the court.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Water Act regulations with regard to cooling water intakes for power plants. Existing facilities are mandated to use the "Best Technology Available" to "minimize the adverse environmental impact." The issue was whether the agency may use a cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in choosing the Best Available Technology or (BAT) to meet the National Performance Standards (NPS).
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), was a United States Supreme Court case that established a precedent for the preemption of United States Federal law over State laws. The case was argued November 15–16, 1955 and the decision was handed down April 2, 1956. The State of Pennsylvania tried to convict a man of sedition under a state law, but a Federal law existed on the same subject. The Court ruled that the Federal law, the Smith Act, overruled the state law, the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, even though the state law was created before the federal law. Nelson, who was convicted under the state law, was therefore mistried.
North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 327 U.S. 686 (1946), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) order under the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) directing a public utility holding company to divest its securities of all companies except for one electric company did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that reaffirmed the National Prohibition Act's limitation on the dispensation of alcoholic medicines. The five-to-four decision, written by Justice Louis D. Brandeis, affirmed the dismissal of a suit in which New York City physician Samuel Lambert sought to prevent Edward Yellowley, the acting federal prohibition director, from enforcing the Prohibition Act so as to preclude him from prescribing alcoholic medicines. The decision affirmed the police powers of the individual states, as well as the power of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution, which was cited in upholding the Prohibition Act's limitations as a necessary and proper implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass'n, 577 U.S. 260 (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had the authority to regulate demand response transactions. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in this case was the last opinion he wrote before his death in February 2016.
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883), is an important decision by the United States Supreme Court which provides the power to take private property for public uses, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to the government of the United States. However, once the government exercises of the right of eminent domain and after a fair determination of the amount of compensation, any unforeseen damage to the property as a result of activities prior to the purchase but realized only afterwards is to be compensated by the government per any legislative decree.
