Williams v Commonwealth

Williams v Commonwealth
Williams v Commonwealth
Court	High Court of Australia
Full case name	Williams v Commonwealth of Australia
Decided	20 June 2012
Citation(s)	[2012] HCA 23, (2012) 248 CLR 156
Case history
Subsequent action(s)	Williams v Commonwealth (No 2) [2014] HCA 23, (2014) 252 CLR 416
Case opinions
	(6:1) The making of payments pursuant to the Darling Heights Funding Agreement was not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution. (per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Heydon J dissenting)
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting	French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Last updated May 17, 2022

Williams v Commonwealth of Australia^[1] (also known as the "School chaplains case") is a landmark judgment of the High Court. The matter related to the power of the Commonwealth executive government to enter into contracts and spend public moneys under section 61 of the Australian Constitution.^[1]

Background

As part of the National School Chaplaincy Programme, the Commonwealth government entered into a contract with a company, Scripture Union Queensland, for the provision of chaplaincy services at a State school in Queensland. The contract was described as the Darling Heights Funding Agreement. Ronald Williams, the father of four children attending the school, brought proceedings in the High Court challenging the validity of the funding agreement and the making of payments under the funding agreement. Mr Williams contended that the Commonwealth did not have power under s 61 of the Constitution to enter into the funding agreement, and that the funding agreement was prohibited by s 116 of the Constitution.^[1]^{: para 2}

The parties agreed to submit a special case stating questions for determination by the High Court. Relevantly, the questions stated in the special case raised the following substantive issues:

whether Mr Williams had standing to challenge the funding agreement and the making of payments pursuant to that agreement (Question 1);
whether the funding agreement was invalid because it was (a) beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution, or (b) prohibited by s 116 of the Constitution (Question 2);
whether the drawing of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the purposes of the funding agreement was authorised by the relevant Appropriation Acts (Question 3); and
whether the making of payments pursuant to the funding agreement was (a) beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution, or (b) prohibited by s 116 of the Constitution (Question 4).

Questions 5 and 6 were directed to the relief to be granted.

The Attorneys-General of New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia intervened in the proceedings, exercising the right to intervene in s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Submissions were received from the Churches' Commission on Education Inc as amicus curiae.

Decision

The Court held by majority that Mr Williams had standing, and that the funding agreement and the making of payments pursuant to that agreement were beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth. Justice Heydon dissented.

The Court unanimously rejected that part of Mr Williams' challenge which relied on s 116 of the Constitution. Section 116 states that "no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth". All members of the Court agreed that chaplains engaged by Scripture Union Queensland held no "office ... under the Commonwealth".^[1]^{: paras 4, 109, 168, 447, 476, 597}

Majority judgments

In the majority, Chief Justice French, Justice Hayne, Justice Crennan and Justice Kiefel each wrote separate judgments, while Justices Gummow and Bell wrote together.

The majority resolved the question of standing by reference to the involvement of the Attorneys-General of the States. In particular, the majority concluded that because the States had exercised their right to intervene under the Judiciary Act, and because Victoria and Western Australia had intervened substantially in support of Mr Williams, "the questions of standing may be put to one side".^[1]^{: para 112}

Resolution of the issues concerning the Commonwealth executive power turned on two arguments made by the Commonwealth about the scope of the power of the Commonwealth to contract and spend. First, all six members of the majority rejected a broad submission that the Commonwealth executive's power to spend lawfully appropriated money was unlimited.^[1]^{: paras 35, 159, 253, 524, 595} Secondly, four members of the majority (Chief Justice French and Justices Gummow, Crennan and Bell) rejected a narrower submission to the effect that the Commonwealth executive could spend money on any subject matter that corresponded to a head of Commonwealth legislative power, as identified in sections 51, 52 and 122 of the Constitution.^[1]^{: paras 27, 137, 544} The other members of the majority (Justices Hayne and Kiefel) did not reach a final view about the narrower submission; their conclusion was that, even if the submission was correct, no head of Commonwealth legislative power supported the Commonwealth's entry into the funding agreement or the making of payments under that agreement.^[1]^{: paras 288, 569}

In relation to Question 3, which concerned whether the drawing of money for the purposes of the funding agreement was authorised by appropriations, the majority of the High Court held that it was unnecessary to answer the question.^[1]^{: paras 9, 117, 168, 457, 598}

Dissenting judgment

Justice Heydon concluded that Mr Williams had no standing to challenge the drawing of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (Question 3).^[1]^{: paras 315, 325} However, he concluded that Mr Williams did have standing to challenge the validity of the funding agreement, and to challenge the making of payments to Scripture Union Queensland in the 2010-11 year.^[1]^{: para 331}

Justice Heydon concluded that the Commonwealth's narrower submission – that the Commonwealth executive could spend money on any subject matter that corresponded to a head of Commonwealth legislative power – was correct.^[1]^{: para 403} On that basis, the funding agreement and the payments made under the funding agreement were supported by the Commonwealth executive power. In particular, they were within the scope of the "provision of ... benefits to students" within the meaning of s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution.^[1]^{: para 441}

Legislative response

Following the High Court's decision, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) (Cth)^[2] in an attempt to validate contracts and payments made under the National School Chaplaincy Programme as well as hundreds of other Commonwealth spending programs. Mr Williams challenged the validity and effectiveness of that legislation in Williams v Commonwealth (No 2) . The High Court unanimously held in that case that, notwithstanding the enactment of the validation legislation, the Commonwealth's entry into and expenditure of moneys under the funding agreement were beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth.^[3]

Related Research Articles

The Family Court of Australia was a superior Australian federal court of record which deals with family law matters, such as divorce applications, parenting disputes, and the division of property when a couple separate. Together with the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, it covered family law matters in all states and territories of Australia except for Western Australia, which has a separate Family Court. Its core function was to determine cases with the most complex law, facts and parties, to cover specialised areas in family law, and to provide national coverage as the national appellate court for family law matters.

The second question of the 1967 Australian referendum of 27 May 1967, called by the Holt Government, related to Indigenous Australians. Voters were asked whether to give the Federal Government the power to make special laws for Indigenous Australians in states, and whether in population counts for constitutional purposes to include all Indigenous Australians. The term "the Aboriginal Race" was used in the question.

The Constitution Alteration Bill 1946, was a successful proposal to alter the Australian Constitution to give the Commonwealth power over a range of social services. The question was put to a referendum in the 1946 Australian referendum with two other (unrelated) questions. It was carried and inserted into section 51 of the Australian Constitution.

The reserved powers doctrine was a principle used by the inaugural High Court of Australia in the interpretation of the Constitution of Australia, that emphasised the context of the Constitution, drawing on principles of federalism, what the Court saw as the compact between the newly formed Commonwealth and the former colonies, particularly the compromises that informed the text of the constitution. The doctrine involved a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the specific powers of the Federal Parliament to preserve the powers that were intended to be left to the States. The doctrine was challenged by the new appointments to the Court in 1906 and was ultimately abandoned by the High Court in 1920 in the Engineers' Case, replaced by an approach to interpretation that emphasised the text rather than the context of the Constitution.

In Australian constitutional law, Chapter III Courts are courts of law which are a part of the Australian federal judiciary and thus are able to discharge Commonwealth judicial power. They are so named because the prescribed features of these courts are contained in Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.

Ruddock v Vadarlis was an Australian court case decided in the Federal Court of Australia on 18 September 2001. It concerned the actions of the Government of Australia in preventing asylum seekers aboard the Norwegian cargo vessel MV Tampa from entering Australia in late August 2001. The Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, and solicitor Eric Vadarlis, were seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The case is significant because it is one of the few cases to consider the nature and scope of the prerogative power of the executive branch of Government in Australia.

Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth, also known as the Communist Party Case, was a legal case in the High Court of Australia in 1951 in which the court declared the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 unconstitutional and invalid as being beyond the power of the Parliament. Notable Australian academic George Winterton described the case as "undoubtedly one of the High Court's most important decisions."

Combet v Commonwealth, was an Australian court case commenced in the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia by Greg Combet, then the secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, and Nicola Roxon. The plaintiffs challenged the Australian Government's use of public funds to advertise the new Work Choices legislation. The High Court found that the expenditure was authorised by the Appropriation Act 2005–2006.

The Court of Disputed Returns in Australia is a special jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia. The High Court, sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, hears challenges regarding the validity of federal elections. The jurisdiction is twofold: (1) on a petition to the Court by an individual with a relevant interest or by the Australian Electoral Commission, or (2) on a reference by either house of the Commonwealth Parliament. This jurisdiction was initially established by Part XVI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1902 and is now contained in Part XXII of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. Challenges regarding the validity of State elections are heard by the Supreme Court of that State as the State's Court of Disputed Returns.

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which ruled that taxpayers do not have the right to challenge the constitutionality of expenditures by the executive branch of the government. The issue was whether taxpayers have the right to challenge the existence of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The case centered on three Supreme Court precedents: Flast v. Cohen, Bowen v. Kendrick, and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State.

Section 44 of the Australian Constitution lists the grounds for disqualification on who may become a candidate for election to the Parliament of Australia. It has generally arisen for consideration by the High Court sitting in its capacity as the Court of Disputed Returns. It has been reviewed several times, but has not been amended. Following several disqualifications under sub-section 44(i), a new review of the whole section was instituted on 28 November 2017.

Bryan Pape was a senior lecturer at the University of New England, New South Wales, Australia and a former office holder and member of the National Party of Australia, who in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation lost his challenge to the constitutional legality of the Kevin Rudd Government's proposed $7.7 billion tax bonus payments as part of the $42 billion economic stimulus package in the High Court of Australia.

Pape v Commissioner of Taxation is an Australian court case concerning the constitutional validity of the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Act 2009 (Cth) which seeks to give one-off payments of up to $900 to Australian taxpayers. The decision of the High Court of Australia was announced on 3 April 2009, with reasons to follow later.

Section 116 of the Constitution of Australia precludes the Commonwealth of Australia from making laws for establishing any religion, imposing any religious observance, or prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. Section 116 also provides that no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth. The product of a compromise in the pre-Federation constitutional conventions, Section 116 is based on similar provisions in the United States Constitution. However, Section 116 is more narrowly drafted than its US counterpart, and does not preclude the states of Australia from making such laws.

Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Dale v Commonwealth, commonly known as the "First Pharmaceutical Benefits case", was a High Court of Australia decision. The case dealt with limits of the powers of the Australian Federal Government under section 81 of the Constitution of Australia, to take and spend money by legislation, in this case to fund reduced prices for prescription medicines.

Rowe v Electoral Commissioner is a High Court of Australia case dealing with the requirement of the Australian Constitution that members of Parliament be "directly chosen by the people". The High Court held that Commonwealth legislation that sought to restrict the time in which a person may seek to enroll in an election or alter their enrolment details after the writs for an election have been issued was invalid.

The Marriage Equality Act 2013 was an act of parliament of the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly that was intended to legalise same-sex marriage in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). It was first presented to the ACT Legislative Assembly on 19 September 2013 by the ACT Attorney-General, Simon Corbell. The law intended to build on the existing recognition of same-sex unions in the Australian Capital Territory, which included recognition of de facto partners, civil partnerships and same-sex-only civil unions. The act was passed in the Legislative Assembly on 22 October 2013. It came into operation on 7 November although wedding ceremonies under the provisions of the Act did not occur until 7 December 2013.

Bond v Commonwealth was an early decision of the High Court of Australia that established that rights under the Constitution could not be taken away by Commonwealth legislation. The case was the second case heard by the High Court.

The National School Chaplaincy Programme (NSCP), between 2011 and 2014 known as the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Programme, is an Australian federal government programme which funds chaplains in Australian primary and secondary schools. The chaplains are to provide "support and guidance about ethics, values, relationships and spirituality", and is based on pastoral care, not religious instruction. The grants are $20,000 a year for schools and $24,000 for schools in remote areas.

Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] HCA 23 judgment of the High Court. It is related to executive prerogative and spending in relation to the Australian Government's National School Chaplaincy Programme.

References

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23 , (2012) 248 CLR 156.
↑ See the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth), s 32B.
↑ Williams v Commonwealth (No 2) [2014] HCA 23 , (2014) 252 CLR 416.

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.

[Williams_v_Cth-1] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23 , (2012) 248 CLR 156.

[2] See the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth), s 32B.

[Williams_v_Cth_#2-3] Williams v Commonwealth (No 2) [2014] HCA 23 , (2014) 252 CLR 416.

[1]

[2]

[3]