Winds Code

Last updated

The "Winds Code" is a confused military intelligence episode relating to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, especially the advance-knowledge debate claiming that the attack was expected.

The Winds Code was an instruction from Tokyo to Japanese legations worldwide that diplomatic relations were in danger of being ruptured. [1] While the code was set up, the problem is whether the code was ever transmitted or not. Amid all the other indicators of approaching conflict, it seems likely that the message was never sent, or at least never recorded at a high level in the US command structure.

In any case a code message in a news or weather programs was not needed, as ordinary commercial communication facilities were available to Japan right up to the December 7 attack. Pearl Harbor historians Gordon Prange and Roberta Wholstetter sidestep the issue by saying that the intercepted codes-destruct messages of 2 December were a more accurate indication of war breaking out. [1] Both Henry Clausen [2] and John Costello [3] see the Winds Code controversy as a red herring and coming close to disinformation (Clausen) or only as an alert to legations (Costello).

The code was set up, so that in case of an emergency leading to the interruption of regular communication channels, a coded message would be inserted into the daily Japanese international news broadcast. Concealed within the meteorological reports, and repeated twice, would be "East wind rain" ("Higashi no kaze ame"), "West wind clear" ("Nishi no kaze hare") or "North wind cloudy" ("Kitano kaze kumori"), the first indicating an imminent major breach with the United States, the second a break with the British (including the invasion of Thailand); the third indicating a break with the Soviet Union. Presumably if sent both the first and second messages would have been sent, the third referring to the Soviet Union would not have been applicable in 1941.

The signal setting up the code was intercepted and broken by USN cryptographer Commander Laurance Safford at OP-20-G in Washington. Consequently, a close monitoring of the Japanese daily shortwave broadcasts was instituted for the codes, dubbed the Winds Code by the Americans.

USN Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs, an operator at Station M, the Navy's East Coast intercept installation at Cheltenham in Maryland, [4] stated he logged "Higashi no kaze ame" ("East wind rain") on the morning of December 4; this was transmitted to the Fleet Intelligence Office at Pearl through the secure TWX line. Briggs was subsequently given a four-day pass as a reward (and was away in Cleveland on the 7th). At the FIO, Commander Laurance Safford states he reported this message to his superiors in Washington. At this point there is no further record of the message. Some eight other Army and Navy officers testified that they, too, had seen a winds execute message. But two of the men completely reversed their original testimony and the others turned out to have only vague recollections. [5]

None of the official inquiries took Safford's statement as fact; the most generous reporting that he was "misled" and that his memory was faulty. His case was not helped by his uncertainty over the date, [6] although Lt Alwin Kramer also agreed in 1944 that he had seen Safford's yellow teletype sheet. [6]

It has been claimed[ citation needed ] that in the week after the attack there was significant document 'loss' at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. In 2008 historians from the National Security Agency went back and analyzed all American and foreign intelligence sources and decrypted cables. They came to the conclusion that "winds execute" message never reached Washington. [7] If there was a message then the blame would fall on the military for not passing it on.

Following the end of the war, Japanese officials advised General MacArthur that no Winds signal was ever sent relating to the United States. This is supported by the testimony of Commander Joseph Rochefort (based in Naval HQ in Pearl Harbor). [5] However an American intelligence team in Japan led by Colonel Abraham Sinkov of Central Bureau in September and October 1945 found they were told "half-truths or outright lies" by Japanese intelligence specialists, partly as there were rumours that the Americans would execute those involved in intelligence. The team was not allowed to reveal American intelligence successes. However some Japanese (Arisue and Nishimura) were more forthcoming when they saw that the Americans were interested in Japanese help against the Soviets. [8]

The coded Winds message was reported from Hong Kong, late on Sunday, December 7, local time. The signal was "higashi no kaze, ame; nishi no kaze, hare" ("Easterly wind, rain; Westerly wind, fine"); meaning that Japan was about to declare war on Britain and America (and attacked British Malaya before Hawaii). A skeleton staff had been left behind in Hong Kong when the British Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) moved to Singapore in August 1939. [9]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Attack on Pearl Harbor</span> Surprise attack by the Japanese Navy on the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service upon the United States against the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, just before 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. The United States was a neutral country at the time; the attack led to its formal entry into World War II the next day. The Japanese military leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation and Operation AI, and as Operation Z during its planning.

Takeo Yoshikawa was a Japanese spy in Hawaii before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Laurance Safford</span>

Captain, U.S.N. Laurance Frye Safford was a U.S. Navy cryptologist. He established the Naval cryptologic organization after World War I, and headed the effort more or less constantly until shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His identification with the Naval effort was so close that he was the Friedman of the Navy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joseph Rochefort</span> American naval officer and cryptanalyst

Joseph John Rochefort was an American naval officer and cryptanalyst. He was a major figure in the United States Navy's cryptographic and intelligence operations from 1925 to 1946, particularly in the Battle of Midway. His contributions and those of his team were pivotal to victory in the Pacific War.

Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from patterns in communication. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted. In general, the greater the number of messages observed, the greater information be inferred. Traffic analysis can be performed in the context of military intelligence, counter-intelligence, or pattern-of-life analysis, and is also a concern in computer security.

Magic was an Allied cryptanalysis project during World War II. It involved the United States Army's Signals Intelligence Service (SIS) and the United States Navy's Communication Special Unit.

Various conspiracy theories allege that U.S. government officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to why and how the United States had been caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack. In September 1944, John T. Flynn, a co-founder of the non-interventionist America First Committee, launched a Pearl Harbor counter-narrative when he published a 46-page booklet entitled The Truth about Pearl Harbor, arguing that Roosevelt and his inner circle had been plotting to provoke the Japanese into an attack on the U.S. and thus provide a reason to enter the war since January 1941.

OP-20-G or "Office of Chief Of Naval Operations (OPNAV), 20th Division of the Office of Naval Communications, G Section / Communications Security", was the U.S. Navy's signals intelligence and cryptanalysis group during World War II. Its mission was to intercept, decrypt, and analyze naval communications from Japanese, German, and Italian navies. In addition OP-20-G also copied diplomatic messages of many foreign governments. The majority of the section's effort was directed towards Japan and included breaking the early Japanese "Blue" book fleet code. This was made possible by intercept and High Frequency Direction Finder (HFDF) sites in the Pacific, Atlantic, and continental U.S., as well as a Japanese telegraphic code school for radio operators in Washington, D.C.

<i>Day of Deceit</i> 1999 book by Robert Stinnett

Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor is a book by Robert Stinnett. It alleges that Franklin Roosevelt and his administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to bring the United States into World War II. Stinnett argues that the attacking fleet was detected by radio and intelligence intercepts, but the information was deliberately withheld from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time.

Station HYPO, also known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific was the United States Navy signals monitoring and cryptographic intelligence unit in Hawaii during World War II. It was one of two major Allied signals intelligence units, called Fleet Radio Units in the Pacific theaters, along with FRUMEL in Melbourne, Australia. The station took its initial name from the phonetic code at the time for "H" for Heʻeia, Hawaii radio tower. The precise importance and role of HYPO in penetrating the Japanese naval codes has been the subject of considerable controversy, reflecting internal tensions amongst US Navy cryptographic stations.

Colonel Rufus Sumter Bratton was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) in the War Department in December 1941, when the United States entered World War II.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Central Bureau</span>

The Central Bureau was one of two Allied signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisations in the South West Pacific area (SWPA) during World War II. Central Bureau was attached to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur. The role of the Bureau was to research and decrypt intercepted Imperial Japanese Army traffic and work in close co-operation with other SIGINT centers in the United States, United Kingdom and India. Air activities included both army and navy air forces, as there was no independent Japanese air force.

The Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States, often called the Munson Report, was a 25-page report written in 1941 by Curtis B. Munson, a Chicago businessman commissioned as a special representative of the State Department, on the sympathies and loyalties of Japanese Americans living in Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States, particularly California. Munson's report was submitted to the White House on November 7, 1941, exactly one month before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Great Pacific War was a 1925 novel by British author Hector Charles Bywater which discussed a hypothetical future war between Japan and the United States. The novel accurately predicted a number of details about the Pacific Campaign of World War II. Bywater was a naval correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph.

Henry Christian Clausen was an American lawyer, and investigator. He authored the Clausen Report, an 800-page report on the Army Board's Pearl Harbor Investigation. He traveled over 55,000 miles over seven months in 1945, and interviewed nearly a hundred personnel, Army, Navy, British and civilian, as a Special Investigator for the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson carrying out an investigation ordered by Congress of the Secretary of War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Edwin T. Layton</span> U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, noted for intelligence work during the Second World War

Edwin Thomas Layton was a rear admiral in the United States Navy. Layton is most noted for his work as an intelligence officer before and during World War II.

A series of events led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. War between Japan and the United States was a possibility for which each nation's military forces had planned for after World War I. The expansion of American territories in the Pacific had been a threat to Japan since the 1890s, but real tensions did not begin until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Military Intelligence Division (United States)</span> Military unit

The Military Intelligence Division was the military intelligence branch of the United States Army and United States Department of War from May 1917 to March 1942. It was preceded by the Military Information Division and the General Staff Second Division and in 1942 was reorganised as the Military Intelligence Service.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Z flag</span> International maritime signal flag

The Z flag is one of the international maritime signal flags.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Attack on Pearl Harbor in popular culture</span>

The attack on Pearl Harbor has received substantial attention in popular culture in multiple media and cultural formats including film, architecture, memorial statues, non-fiction writing, historical writing, and historical fiction. Today, the USS Arizona Memorial on the island of Oahu honors the dead. Visitors to the memorial reach it via boats from the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The memorial was designed by Alfred Preis, and has a sagging center but strong and vigorous ends, expressing "initial defeat and ultimate victory". It commemorates all lives lost on December 7, 1941.

References

  1. 1 2 Costello 1994, p. 345.
  2. Clausen 1992, p. 123.
  3. Costello 1994, p. 345f.
  4. Toland 1982, pp. 195–198.
  5. 1 2 Evans, Harold (1998). The American Century. London, UK: Jonathan Cape.
  6. 1 2 Costello 1994, pp. 346, 347.
  7. Roberts, Sam (December 6, 2008). "Report Debunks Theory That the U.S. Heard a Coded Warning About Pearl Harbor". The New York Times. Retrieved January 29, 2017.
  8. Bou 2012, pp. 116, 117.
  9. Smith 2000, p. 100.