Al-Masdar News

Last updated

Al-Masdar News
Masdar.png
Type of site
News and opinion
Available inEnglish, Arabic, Turkish, Spanish, Russian, German, Serbo-Croatian
Area servedthe Arab world
EditorLeith Abou Fadel
URL www.almasdarnews.com
Advertising Yes
CommercialYes
RegistrationOptional
LaunchedAugust 2014;9 years ago (2014-08)
Current statusinactive

Al-Masdar News (sometimes abbreviated AMN) (Arabic : المصدر نيوز) was an online newspaper founded by Leith Abou Fadel. [1] Al-Masdar is Arabic for "the source". [2] Al-Masdar's coverage focuses largely on conflict zones in the Middle East: Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. Al-Masdar has been described as being favorable to President Bashar al-Assad during its coverage of the Syrian civil war. As of 2023, it appears to be inactive. [3]

Contents

Background

Al-Masdar News (AMN) was launched in August 2014 as a media service that provides frontline news and analysis from the Middle East. [4]

Position

The website was described by the BBC and Newsweek as having a pro-Syrian government viewpoint, [5] [6] while The Independent describes it as "sympathetic to the Syrian regime". [7] The New York Times has described it as a "pro-government website". [8] Leonid Bertshidsky writing in Bloomberg News, also calls Al-Masdar "somewhat pro-Assad." [9] The National Interest describes it as "pro-Assad". [10] The Jerusalem Post describes it as "generally supportive of the Syrian regime". [11] The New Statesman calls it a "regime-supporting outlet". [12]

Notable reports, fake news and disinformation

In 2015, The New York Times accused Fadel of spreading unfounded misinformation about a victim of the Petra László incident: after a right-wing Hungarian journalist assaulted a Syrian refugee, Fadel falsely reported that the refugee was “a former member of Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda)” adding “looks like Europe will be receiving more Islamist scumbags.” Although Fadel withdrew his allegation, it was picked up by a right-wing commentator Ezra Levant, among others. [8]

Following the April 2017 Khan Shaykhun chemical attack in the Idlib Governorate, al-Masdar News published an opinion article by deputy editor Paul Antonopoulos entitled "Jumping to conclusions; something is not adding up in Idlib chemical weapons attack". [13] [14]

A report by the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) published three days later described a "digital forensics" trail which showed how this Al-Masdar opinion article was used as a source by conspiracy, pro-Russian and far-right websites, in particular InfoWars, which recycled Antonopoulos' article in a piece by Mimi al Laham. It described Al-Masdar News as "an unofficial government outlet" and said that it had "repeatedly attacked regime critics and witnesses to regime atrocities, notably the White Helmets." [15] [16] [17] [18] Business Insider showed the conclusions in the AMN article differing markedly from those of other analysts, specifically Fred Hof (director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East), US defense officials, President Donald Trump and Dr. Monzer Khalil (rebel-held Idlib Province's health director). [19] Business Insider reporter Natasha Bertrand described Leith Abou Fadel, the editor of Al-Masdar, as someone who had pushed a conspiracy theory in the past, and described him as an "Assad loyalist". [19]

After Antonopoulos was shown to be active on the neo-Nazi site Stormfront, he was forced to resign from Al-Masdar on 28 April 2017. [20] [21] Al-Masdar issued a statement on behalf of its board of directors, [22] saying they found his behaviour "wholly unacceptable" and strongly condemned it, while also apologizing to its readers and all those offended by his actions. [23]

A 2018 report by the Alliance for Securing Democracy, based on analysis of its "Hamilton 68" database of Russian disinformation Twitter accounts, showed that Al-Masdar is a main source of Syria-related propaganda for Russian accounts aimed at US audiences. [24]

Related Research Articles

The following is a timeline of the Syrian Civil War from August to December 2015. Information about aggregated casualty counts is found at Casualties of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">25th Special Mission Forces Division</span> Syrian Army special forces unit

The 25th Special Mission Forces Division, mostly known by their former name Tiger Forces or Quwwat al-Nimr, is an elite formation of the Syrian Arab Army under the charge of Alawite commander Suheil al-Hassan. It was formed in late 2013 and functions primarily as an offensive unit in the Syrian Civil War. It has been described as a "hot commodity for any government offensive", but their relatively small numbers make it difficult to deploy them to multiple fronts at once.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Palmyra offensive (March 2016)</span> Military operation started by the Syrian Arab Army

The Palmyra offensive was a military operation of the Syrian Arab Army, supported by Russian airstrikes, to recapture from the Islamic State the city of Tadmur, which was strategically important for both forces due to its position in central Syria. The city was fully recaptured on 27 March.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Wadi Barada offensive (2016–2017)</span> Military operation against rebel-held villages by the Syrian Army

The Wadi Barada offensive (2016–2017) was a military operation against rebel-held villages in the Barada River valley by the Syrian Army and allied forces, including pro-government militias and Lebanese Hezbollah between December 2016 and January 2017. The Barada River valley includes the village of Ain al-Fijah which holds a water spring that provides drinking water to towns throughout the Rif Dimashq Governorate.

The following is a timeline of the Syrian Civil War from January to April 2017. Information about aggregated casualty counts is found at Casualties of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Deir ez-Zor offensive (January–February 2017)</span> Military operation

The Deir ez-Zor offensive was a military operation launched by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) against the Syrian Armed Forces, to capture the city of Deir ez-Zor, on 14 January 2017. The offensive came amid the group losing large amounts of territory in the Raqqa offensive as well as the Turkish military intervention in Syria, while Iraqi forces were advancing in its Iraq headquarters in Mosul. It ended with the city being split into two parts.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Idlib Governorate clashes (January–March 2017)</span> Military confrontations

The Idlib Governorate clashes , were military confrontations between Syrian rebel factions led by Ahrar al-Sham and their allies on one side and the al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and their allies on the other. After 7 February, the clashes also included Jund al-Aqsa as a third belligerent, which had re-branded itself as Liwa al-Aqsa and was attacking the other combatants. The battles were fought in the Idlib Governorate and the western countryside of the Aleppo Governorate.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Palmyra offensive (2017)</span> 2017 military operation of the Syrian Civil War

The Palmyra offensive in 2017 was launched by the Syrian Arab Army against the armed forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Eastern Homs Governorate in January 2017, with the goal of recapturing Palmyra and its surrounding countryside. ISIL forces had retaken the city of Palmyra in a sudden offensive from 8 to 11 December, after previously being expelled from it by Syrian government and Russian forces in March 2016. On 2 March 2017, the Syrian Army alongside Russian reinforcement, succeeded again in recapturing the beleaguered city of Palmyra.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Daraa offensive (February–June 2017)</span> Military operation

The Daraa offensive , code named as the battle of "Death Rather than Humiliation" by the rebels, was a military operation launched by Syrian rebels against positions of the Syrian Arab Army in the Manshiyah District of Daraa city, in southern Syria, during the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">East Aleppo offensive (2017)</span> Syrian military operation in January–April 2017

The East Aleppo offensive (2017), also referred to as the Dayr Hafir offensive, was an operation launched by the Syrian Army to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from advancing deeper into Syria, and also to ultimately capture the ISIL stronghold of Dayr Hafir. Another aim of the operation was to gain control of the water source for Aleppo city, at the Khafsa Water Treatment Plant, in addition to capturing the Jirah Military Airbase. At the same time, the Turkish-backed rebel groups turned towards the east and started launching attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces, west of Manbij.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eastern Homs offensive (2017)</span> Offensive

The Eastern Homs offensive in 2017 was a military operation of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies in Eastern part of Homs Governorate against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant forces during the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hama offensive (March–April 2017)</span> Military offensive

The Hama offensive was a military offensive launched by Syrian rebel groups led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) north of the city of Hama, as part of the Syrian Civil War. The offensive began on 21 March 2017, and the rebels aimed to recapture areas recaptured by the Syrian Armed Forces in the 2016 Hama offensive, as well as pushing into Hama city. The offensive was coordinated with rebel forces in Damascus' eastern suburbs, who launched their own operation in March 2017.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Syrian Desert campaign (May–July 2017)</span> Military operation of the Syrian Army

The Syrian Desert campaign was a large-scale military operation of the Syrian Army that initially started along the highway from Damascus to the border with Iraq against rebel forces during the Syrian Civil War. Its first intended goal was to capture both the highway and the al-Tanf border crossing, thus securing the Damascus countryside from a potential rebel attack. Later, multiple other fronts were opened as part of the operation throughout the desert, as well as operation "Grand Dawn" against ISIL with the aim of reopening the Damascus-Palmyra highway and preparing for an offensive towards Deir ez-Zor.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Maskanah Plains offensive</span> Offensive

The Maskanah Plains offensive was an operation by the Syrian Army against the remaining Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) strongholds in the eastern countryside of the Aleppo Province, with the goal of recapturing the Maskanah Plains from ISIL and advancing into the Raqqa Governorate.

The Eastern Hama offensive (2017) was a military operation conducted by the Syrian Army against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) with the goal to secure the Ithriyah-Sheikh Hilal road, the government supply line towards Aleppo, and advance towards Wadi Auzain.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2017 Southern Raqqa offensive</span> Offensive

The 2017 Southern Raqqa offensive was an operation by the Syrian Army against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the southwestern countryside of the Raqqa Province.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Central Syria campaign</span> Military operation of the Syrian Army

The Central Syria campaign, known as "Operation Khuzam", or "Lavender", was a large-scale military operation of the Syrian Army (SAA) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the Syrian Civil War. Its goal was to capture the strategic oil town of Al-Sukhnah, and besiege and capture 11,000 square kilometers of ISIL territory in central Syria, after which the Syrian Army would advance towards Deir ez-Zor, and lift the three-year ISIL siege of the government's enclave in the city. Afterwards, the Syrian Army advanced towards the Islamic State's then-capital of Mayadin.

The 2017 Euphrates Crossing offensive was a military offensive launched by the Syrian Arab Army against members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, following the breaking of the three-year siege of the city of Deir ez-Zor. The Euphrates Crossing offensive, conducted by government troops, was done with the aim of denying US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the US itself leverage over the Syrian government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hama offensive (September 2017)</span> Military offensive

The Hama offensive , code-named Oh Servants of God, Be Steadfast, was a military offensive launched by rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) north of the city Hama, as part of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Northwestern Syria campaign (October 2017–February 2018)</span> Major phase of the Syrian civil war

The Northwestern Syria campaign was a large-scale military operation that initially started with an offensive conducted by ISIL forces on areas controlled by Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the northern Hama Governorate. Subsequently, the Syrian Armed Forces launched their own offensive against HTS and other rebel groups in the area. The campaign took place at the intersection of the provinces of Hama, Idlib and Aleppo.

References

  1. ↑ "Contributors & Staff: Editorial Team". Al Masdar News. Archived from the original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved 30 April 2017.
  2. ↑ "Al-Masdar: The Source for Arabic Teaching and Learning". ISKME.org . Retrieved 28 April 2017.
  3. ↑ "Official website". Archived from the original on 15 July 2021. Retrieved 21 January 2023.
  4. ↑ "Al-Masdar News - About". Archived from the original on 29 October 2021. Retrieved 6 May 2017.
  5. ↑ "Syria conflict: 'Israeli jets' strike outside Damascus". BBC. 30 November 2016. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
  6. ↑ O'Connor, Tom (17 March 2017). "Syria at War: As U.S. Bombs Rebels, Russia Strikes ISIS and Israel Targets Assad". Newsweek. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
  7. ↑ McKernan, Bethan (2 February 2017). "Syrian army creates unit just for women after so many sign up to fight Isis" . The Independent. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017.
  8. 1 2 Mackey, Robert; Saad, Hwaida (23 September 2015). "Syrian Refugee Tripped in Hungary Fights Unfounded Accusations of Extremist Ties". New York Times. Retrieved 28 April 2017.
  9. ↑ Bertshidsky, Leonid (7 April 2017). "Trump Squeezes Putin in Syria. Don't Assume That's Good". Bloomberg.com.
  10. ↑ Roblin, Sebastien (3 June 2019). "Israeli F-16s Wiped Out a Syrian Missile Complex (Russia Didn't Fire Back)". The National Interest. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  11. ↑ Frantzman, Seth J. (24 April 2019). "Rumors seek to drive U.S. and Iran into conflict in eastern Syria". The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  12. ↑ Sabbour, Omar (18 January 2019). "How the Assad regime has exploited "evacuation deals" to redirect Isis against the rebels". Britain's Current Affairs & Politics Magazine. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  13. ↑ Antonopoulos, Paul. Jumping to conclusions; something is not adding up in Idlib chemical weapons attack. Al-Masdar News. 2017-04-04.
  14. ↑ "Media war over Syria". ABC Media Watch. 10 October 2003. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  15. ↑ Nimmo, Ben; Barojan, Donara (7 April 2017). "How the alt-right brought #SyriaHoax to America". Medium.com. Atlantic Council.
  16. ↑ Monbiot, George (15 November 2017). "A lesson from Syria: it's crucial not to fuel far-right conspiracy theories". The Guardian. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  17. ↑ "Report Traces How The "Alt-Right" Spread Pro-Assad Propaganda". Media Matters for America. 14 April 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  18. ↑ Ahmad, Muhammad Idrees (5 May 2017). "Chomsky and the Syria revisionists: Regime whitewashing". alaraby. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  19. 1 2 Bertrand, Natasha (8 April 2017). "From Al-Masdar to InfoWars: How a pro-Assad conspiracy theory got picked up by the far-right". Business Insider UK.
  20. ↑ Jennine Khalik (2 May 2017). "Journalist Paul Antonopoulos outed for racist slurs". The Australian. Retrieved 3 May 2017.
  21. ↑ "Paul Antonopoulos forced out - Media Watch". Media Watch. 30 April 2017. Retrieved 16 January 2023.
  22. ↑ "Board of Directors". Al-Masdar News. 3 May 2017. Archived from the original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved 1 December 2016.
  23. ↑ "Board of Directors Statement – April 28th, 2017". Al-Masdar News. 28 April 2017.
  24. ↑ Denise Clifton (9 November 2018). "Deep Inside a Pro-Putin Network That's Helping Trump Divide America". Mother Jones . Retrieved 18 September 2019.
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