All horses are the same color

Last updated

All horses are the same color is a falsidical paradox that arises from a flawed use of mathematical induction to prove the statement All horses are the same color. [1] There is no actual contradiction, as these arguments have a crucial flaw that makes them incorrect. This example was originally raised by George Pólya in a 1954 book in different terms: "Are any n numbers equal?" or "Any n girls have eyes of the same color", as an exercise in mathematical induction. [2] It has also been restated as "All cows have the same color". [3]

Contents

The "horses" version of the paradox was presented in 1961 in a satirical article by Joel E. Cohen. It was stated as a lemma, which in particular allowed the author to "prove" that Alexander the Great did not exist, and he had an infinite number of limbs. [4]

The argument

All horses are the same color paradox, induction step failing for n = 1 Horses induction2.svg
All horses are the same color paradox, induction step failing for n = 1

The argument is proof by induction. First, we establish a base case for one horse (). We then prove that if horses have the same color, then horses must also have the same color.

Base case: One horse

The case with just one horse is trivial. If there is only one horse in the "group", then clearly all horses in that group have the same color.

Inductive step

Assume that horses always are the same color. Consider a group consisting of horses.

First, exclude one horse and look only at the other horses; all these are the same color, since horses always are the same color. Likewise, exclude some other horse (not identical to the one first removed) and look only at the other horses. By the same reasoning, these, too, must also be of the same color. Therefore, the first horse that was excluded is of the same color as the non-excluded horses, who in turn are of the same color as the other excluded horse. Hence, the first horse excluded, the non-excluded horses, and the last horse excluded are all of the same color, and we have proven that:

We already saw in the base case that the rule ("all horses have the same color") was valid for . The inductive step proved here implies that since the rule is valid for , it must also be valid for , which in turn implies that the rule is valid for and so on.

Thus, in any group of horses, all horses must be the same color. [2] [5]

Explanation

The argument above makes the implicit assumption that the set of horses has the size at least 3, [3] so that the two proper subsets of horses to which the induction assumption is applied would necessarily share a common element. This is not true at the first step of induction, i.e., when .

Let the two horses be horse A and horse B. When horse A is removed, it is true that the remaining horses in the set are the same color (only horse B remains). The same is true when horse B is removed. However, the statement "the first horse that was excluded is of the same color as the non-excluded horses, who in turn are of the same color as the other excluded horse" is meaningless, because there are no "non-excluded horses" (common elements (horses) in the two sets, since each horse is excluded once). Therefore, the above proof has a logical link broken. The proof forms a falsidical paradox; it seems to show by valid reasoning something that is manifestly false, but in fact the reasoning is flawed.

See also

Related Research Articles

An axiom, postulate, or assumption is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Ancient Greek word ἀξίωμα (axíōma), meaning 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident'.

In mathematics, the axiom of regularity is an axiom of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory that states that every non-empty set A contains an element that is disjoint from A. In first-order logic, the axiom reads:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Gödel's completeness theorem</span> Fundamental theorem in mathematical logic

Gödel's completeness theorem is a fundamental theorem in mathematical logic that establishes a correspondence between semantic truth and syntactic provability in first-order logic.

In logic, the law of excluded middle states that for every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true. It is one of the so-called three laws of thought, along with the law of noncontradiction, and the law of identity. However, no system of logic is built on just these laws, and none of these laws provides inference rules, such as modus ponens or De Morgan's laws.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mathematical induction</span> Form of mathematical proof

Mathematical induction is a method for proving that a statement is true for every natural number , that is, that the infinitely many cases   all hold. This is done by first proving a simple case, then also showing that if we assume the claim is true for a given case, then the next case is also true. Informal metaphors help to explain this technique, such as falling dominoes or climbing a ladder:

Mathematical induction proves that we can climb as high as we like on a ladder, by proving that we can climb onto the bottom rung and that from each rung we can climb up to the next one.

In the philosophy of mathematics, constructivism asserts that it is necessary to find a specific example of a mathematical object in order to prove that an example exists. Contrastingly, in classical mathematics, one can prove the existence of a mathematical object without "finding" that object explicitly, by assuming its non-existence and then deriving a contradiction from that assumption. Such a proof by contradiction might be called non-constructive, and a constructivist might reject it. The constructive viewpoint involves a verificational interpretation of the existential quantifier, which is at odds with its classical interpretation.

A paradox is a logically self-contradictory statement or a statement that runs contrary to one's expectation. It is a statement that, despite apparently valid reasoning from true premises, leads to a seemingly self-contradictory or a logically unacceptable conclusion. A paradox usually involves contradictory-yet-interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time. They result in "persistent contradiction between interdependent elements" leading to a lasting "unity of opposites".

In logic, proof by contradiction is a form of proof that establishes the truth or the validity of a proposition, by showing that assuming the proposition to be false leads to a contradiction. Although it is quite freely used in mathematical proofs, not every school of mathematical thought accepts this kind of nonconstructive proof as universally valid.

In logic and deductive reasoning, an argument is sound if it is both valid in form and its premises are true. Soundness has a related meaning in mathematical logic, wherein a formal system of logic is sound if and only if every well-formed formula that can be proven in the system is logically valid with respect to the logical semantics of the system.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Raven paradox</span> Paradox arising from the question of what constitutes evidence for a statement

The raven paradox, also known as Hempel's paradox, Hempel's ravens, or rarely the paradox of indoor ornithology, is a paradox arising from the question of what constitutes evidence for the truth of a statement. Observing objects that are neither black nor ravens may formally increase the likelihood that all ravens are black even though, intuitively, these observations are unrelated.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cantor's diagonal argument</span> Proof in set theory

In set theory, Cantor's diagonal argument, also called the diagonalisation argument, the diagonal slash argument, the anti-diagonal argument, the diagonal method, and Cantor's diagonalization proof, was published in 1891 by Georg Cantor as a mathematical proof that there are infinite sets which cannot be put into one-to-one correspondence with the infinite set of natural numbers. Such sets are now known as uncountable sets, and the size of infinite sets is now treated by the theory of cardinal numbers which Cantor began.

Deductive reasoning is the mental process of drawing deductive inferences. An inference is deductively valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises, i.e. it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mathematical proof</span> Reasoning for mathematical statements

A mathematical proof is a deductive argument for a mathematical statement, showing that the stated assumptions logically guarantee the conclusion. The argument may use other previously established statements, such as theorems; but every proof can, in principle, be constructed using only certain basic or original assumptions known as axioms, along with the accepted rules of inference. Proofs are examples of exhaustive deductive reasoning which establish logical certainty, to be distinguished from empirical arguments or non-exhaustive inductive reasoning which establish "reasonable expectation". Presenting many cases in which the statement holds is not enough for a proof, which must demonstrate that the statement is true in all possible cases. A proposition that has not been proved but is believed to be true is known as a conjecture, or a hypothesis if frequently used as an assumption for further mathematical work.

Curry's paradox is a paradox in which an arbitrary claim F is proved from the mere existence of a sentence C that says of itself "If C, then F", requiring only a few apparently innocuous logical deduction rules. Since F is arbitrary, any logic having these rules allows one to prove everything. The paradox may be expressed in natural language and in various logics, including certain forms of set theory, lambda calculus, and combinatory logic.

In mathematics, certain kinds of mistaken proof are often exhibited, and sometimes collected, as illustrations of a concept called mathematical fallacy. There is a distinction between a simple mistake and a mathematical fallacy in a proof, in that a mistake in a proof leads to an invalid proof while in the best-known examples of mathematical fallacies there is some element of concealment or deception in the presentation of the proof.

In classical logic, intuitionistic logic and similar logical systems, the principle of explosion, or the principle of Pseudo-Scotus, is the law according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction. That is, from a contradiction, any proposition can be inferred; this is known as deductive explosion.

In logic and philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic. It is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid. The argument itself could have true premises, but still have a false conclusion. Thus, a formal fallacy is a fallacy where deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a logical process. This may not affect the truth of the conclusion, since validity and truth are separate in formal logic.

In logic and mathematics, proof by example is a logical fallacy whereby the validity of a statement is illustrated through one or more examples or cases—rather than a full-fledged proof.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Brouwer–Hilbert controversy</span>

In a controversy over the foundations of mathematics, in twentieth-century mathematics, L. E. J. Brouwer, a proponent of the constructivist school of intuitionism, opposed David Hilbert, a proponent of formalism. The debate concerned fundamental questions about the consistency of axioms and the role of semantics and syntax in mathematics. Much of the controversy took place while both were involved with Mathematische Annalen, the leading mathematical journal of the time, with Hilbert as editor-in-chief and Brouwer as a member of its editorial board. In 1920, Hilbert succeeded in having Brouwer, whom he considered a threat to mathematics, removed from the editorial board of Mathematische Annalen.

Plausible reasoning is a method of deriving new conclusions from given known premises, a method different from the classical syllogistic argumentation methods of Aristotelian two-valued logic. The syllogistic style of argumentation is illustrated by the oft-quoted argument "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore, Socrates is mortal." In contrast, consider the statement "if it is raining then it is cloudy." The only logical inference that one can draw from this is that "if it is not cloudy then it is not raining." But ordinary people in their everyday lives would conclude that "if it is not raining then being cloudy is less plausible," or "if it is cloudy then rain is more plausible." The unstated and unconsciously applied reasoning, arguably incorrect, that made people come to their conclusions is typical of plausible reasoning.

References

  1. Łukowski, Piotr (2011). Paradoxes. Springer. pp.  15.
  2. 1 2 Pólya, George (1954). Induction and Analogy in Mathematics. Princeton University Press. p. 120.
  3. 1 2 Thomas VanDrunen, Discrete Mathematics and Functional Programming, Franklin, Beedle and Associates, 2012, Section "Induction Gone Awry"
  4. Cohen, Joel E. (1961), "On the nature of mathematical proofs", Worm Runner's Digest , III (3). Reprinted in A Random Walk in Science (R. L. Weber, ed.), Crane, Russak & Co., 1973, pp. 34-36
  5. "All Horses are the Same Color". Harvey Mudd College Department of Mathematics. Archived from the original on 12 April 2019. Retrieved 10 November 2023.