Davis v. Washington

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Davis v. Washington
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 20, 2006
Decided June 19, 2006
Full case nameAdrian Martell Davis, Petitioner v. Washington; Hershel Hammon, Petitioner v. Indiana
Docket no. 05-5224
Citations547 U.S. 813 ( more )
126 S. Ct. 2266; 165 L. Ed. 2d 224; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4886; 74 U.S.L.W. 4356; 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 299
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorOn writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington; on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Indiana; State v. Davis, 154 Wn.2d 291, 111 P.3d 844, 2005 Wash. LEXIS 462 (2005) Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 2005 Ind. LEXIS 541 (Ind., 2005)
SubsequentOn remand at, Remanded by Hammon v. State, 2006 Ind. LEXIS 793 (Ind., Sept. 7, 2006)
Holding
A 911 phone call describing an "ongoing emergency" is not testimonial in nature, and thus may be admitted at trial even if the caller is not available without violating the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer  · Samuel Alito
Case opinions
MajorityScalia, joined by Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito
Concur/dissentThomas
Laws applied
Crawford v. Washington, Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and written by Justice Antonin Scalia that established the test used to determine whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Two years prior to its publication, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” [1] The Supreme Court declined to define "testimonial" in Crawford which left lower courts without any guidance. [2] [3] However, in Davis v. Washington, along with Hammon v. Indiana which was consolidated with Davis, the Court clarified the meaning of "testimonial" and articulated a new standard. [4]

Contents

Specifically, the Court stated that: [5]

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

The Court further developed this standard in Michigan v. Bryant. [6]

Davis v. Washington

Background

Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington . The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "testimonial" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford. [4]

Opinion

The Court held that McCottry's statements were nontestimonial. Although McCottry identified her attacker to the 911 operator, she provided the information intending to help the police resolve an "ongoing emergency," not to testify to a past crime. [7] Factors that were determinative in the Court's analysis were:

Hammon v. Indiana

Davis v. Washington was decided alongside Hammon v. Indiana. [4] In contrast to Davis, the statements in Hammon were "easily" found by the Court to be testimonial. [8]

In Hammon, responding to a domestic disturbance call, police found Amy Hammon on the porch appearing frightened and Herschel Hammon inside. [4] After getting permission to go inside, the police saw a broken furnace in the kitchen and glass on the floor. [4] The police proceeded to question the pair separately, and rebuffed multiple attempts by Herschel to enter the room where his wife was being interrogated. [9] Ultimately, the wife signed an affidavit stating that Herschel had broken their furnace, shoved her down on the floor into the broken glass, and hit her in the chest, among other things. [4] Herschel was charged with felony violation of a domestic no-contact order. [10] However, at Herschel's trial, Amy Hammon refused to testify. [4] Nonetheless, the trial court allowed her affidavit to be admitted after it was authenticated by the interrogating officer. [10]

The Supreme Court held that the affidavit was testimonial because it was "entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct." [8] Specifically, the Court noted the following facts as indicative of the statements in the affidavit being testimonial:

Thomas's Concurrence/Dissent

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that though McCottry's statements were not testimonial, the Court should not "guess" at the primary motive behind the statements.

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References

  1. ↑ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
  2. ↑ Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
  3. ↑ Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 11 (2006).
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Testimonial Hearsay and Confrontation, 21 Crim. Just. 47, 47 (Fall 2006)
  5. ↑ Andrew Dylan, Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1905, 1914 (2007) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)).
  6. ↑ Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman, Confrontation's Multi-Analyst Problem, 9 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 165, 171 (2021).
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
  8. 1 2 3 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
  9. ↑ Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819 (2006)
  10. 1 2 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
  11. 1 2 3 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
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