Gateway belief model

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The gateway belief model (GBM) suggests that public perception of the degree of expert or scientific consensus on an issue functions as a so-called "gateway" cognition. [1] [2] Perception of scientific agreement is suggested to be a key step towards acceptance of related beliefs. [3] Increasing the perception that there is normative agreement within the scientific community can increase individual support for an issue. A perception of disagreement may decrease support for an issue. [1] [2]

Contents

Public opinion research has shown a "consensus gap" between the beliefs of the general public and the scientific community on a number of issues including climate change, vaccines, evolution, gun control, and GMO's. [4] [5] The general public is assumed to underestimate the degree of agreement among scientists on established facts relating to these issues. [1]

According to the gateway belief model, views can be influenced by presenting information about the scientific consensus on a subject. Communicating accurate information about the scientific consensus on a topic reduces perceptions that there is disagreement within the scientific community. Some studies show a causal connection between changes in perceived consensus and subsequent attitudes on issues. [1] [2] In the case of climate change, perceptions of expert agreement are considered a precursor to related beliefs about whether and why climate change is happening. [2] : 130  In the case of COVID-19, perception of scientific consensus predicted personal attitudes and support for mitigation policies. [6]

The gateway belief model also implies that organized disinformation campaigns may be able to deliberately undermine public support for an issue by suggesting a lack of scientific consensus or amplifying opinions that disagree with the scientific consensus. [7] Undermining scientific consensus is therefore a frequent disinformation tactic. [8]

History

Theoretical background

The gateway belief model is a dual process theory in psychology and the communication sciences. Specifically, the GBM postulates a two-step process of opinion change, where (mis)perceptions of normative agreement influence "key" personal beliefs that people hold about an issue (step 1), which in turn, shape public attitudes and support (step 2). [9] Although the basic process of debiasing judgment can be viewed as a form of knowledge deficit, [10] development of the gateway belief model is based on research in cognitive and social psychology, mainly drawing on theories of heuristic information-processing, social norms, decision-making, and motivated cognition. [11] [12]

Consensus-heuristic

In the face of uncertainty, people often look to others for guidance, including experts. [11] [13] Prior research shows that people heuristically rely on consensus cues in the absence of motivation to cognitively elaborate, [14] [15] because consensus typically implies correctness. Research also indicates that people desire to conform to the expert consensus [16] and generally prefer to rely on the combined judgment of multiple experts rather than on individual expert opinions. [17] Relying on consensus cues is often considered socially adaptive because it harnesses the wisdom of the crowd effect. [11] [12] Consensus is therefore an example of a descriptive norm, i.e., the collective judgment of a group of individuals, such as experts. [18]

Public opinion research shows that the views of the general public often diverge sharply from experts on a number of important societal issues, especially in the United States. [5] This is known as the "consensus gap". [19] The main premise of the gateway belief model is that this gap can be reduced by highlighting or communicating the actual degree of social or scientific consensus on an issue. [20] [21] [12]

Norm perception as a vehicle for social change

The basic mechanism of the gateway belief model involves realigning people's (mis)perception of the degree of group consensus with the factual degree of consensus. This parallels research in social psychology on leveraging norm-perception as a vehicle for social change. [22]

For example, early research [23] showed that college students frequently misperceive the social consensus on campus binge drinking. Through a method known as "estimate and reveal", social psychologists have attempted to reveal the discrepancy between students' subjective perceptions of the drinking norm among their peers and the actual norm (which is typically much lower). Social norm communication campaigns indeed evidence that increasing awareness of the actual drinking norm has positive subsequent impacts on students' own attitudes and behavior towards binge drinking. [24]

While excessive binge drinking is often harmful to the individual, large-scale societal misperceptions of scientific agreement on social dilemmas such as climate change or vaccines can be collectively harmful. When the consensus intervention involves experts rather than peers, the social influence process is referred to as obedience. [16]

Role of misinformation

The "sticky" nature of myths and the spread of misinformation is often cited as a major cause of public confusion over the nature of scientific consensus. [25] [26] [27] Prominent examples include autism-vaccine controversies, [28] the causal link between smoking and lung cancer [29] and the role of carbon dioxide emissions in driving global warming. [30] [31]

People's perception of expert consensus has generally shown to be sensitive to anecdotal evidence and misinformation. [7] [25] [32] Vested-interest groups, sometimes referred to as "merchants of doubt", [31] deliberately try to undermine public understanding of the scientific consensus on these topics through organized disinformation campaigns. [8] [7] [25] [32]

Other related concepts include the false-consensus effect [33] and pluralistic ignorance.

Other theories

The "cultural cognition of scientific consensus" thesis [34] advocated by Dan Kahan stands in contrast to the gateway belief model (GBM) [35] but has not been supported by empirical results. [36] The cultural cognition thesis suggests that people will credit or dismiss empirical evidence based on whether it coheres or conflicts with their cultural or political values, a process known as "identity-protective cognition". [27] [35] Because people are committed to the types of beliefs that define their everyday socio-political relations, the cultural cognition thesis predicts that exposing people to consensus information on contested issues will therefore increase attitude polarization. [34]

The empirical results of the gateway belief model contradict the prediction of the "cultural cognition of scientific consensus". [36] [37] [38] Notably, an emphasis on scientific consensus does not backfire, and can reduce or neutralize belief polarization between (political) groups. [9] [39] [37] [40] [25] [32] Related research has also shown that conveying scientific agreement can reduce directional motivated reasoning, [36] [41] although other research on this topic has revealed more mixed results. [42] [43] [38]

One explanation for these findings is that changing beliefs about what other groups think (so-called "meta-beliefs") does not require a full and immediate adjustment of one's own worldview. Perceived consensus can therefore be seen as a "non-identity threatening" cognition, [44] especially when a norm is described among a neutral out-group (scientists). [36] Kahan has a notable on-going scholarly debate in the literature with van der Linden and Lewandowsky on the role of perceived consensus and cultural cognition. [27] [37] [45] [46] [47]

Related Research Articles

Controversy is a state of prolonged public dispute or debate, usually concerning a matter of conflicting opinion or point of view. The word was coined from the Latin controversia, as a composite of controversus – "turned in an opposite direction".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Scientific consensus on climate change</span> Evaluation of climate change by the scientific community

There is a nearly unanimous scientific consensus that the Earth has been consistently warming since the start of the Industrial Revolution, that the rate of recent warming is largely unprecedented, and that this warming is mainly the result of a rapid increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) caused by human activities. The human activities causing this warming include fossil fuel combustion, cement production, and land use changes such as deforestation, with a significant supporting role from the other greenhouse gases such as methane and nitrous oxide. This human role in climate change is considered "unequivocal" and "incontrovertible".

Scientific consensus is the generally held judgment, position, and opinion of the majority or the supermajority of scientists in a particular field of study at any particular time.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pluralistic ignorance</span> Incorrect perception of others beliefs

In social psychology, pluralistic ignorance is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly believe that others predominantly hold an opinion different from their own. In this phenomenon, most people in a group may go along with a view they do not hold because they think, incorrectly, that most other people in the group hold it. Pluralistic ignorance encompasses situations in which a minority position on a given topic is wrongly perceived to be the majority position, or the majority position is wrongly perceived to be a minority position.

Misinformation is incorrect or misleading information. Misinformation can exist without specific malicious intent; disinformation is distinct in that it is deliberately deceptive and propagated. Misinformation can include inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or false information as well as selective or half-truths.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Risk perception</span>

Risk perception is the subjective judgement that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. Risk perceptions often differ from statistical assessments of risk since they are affected by a wide range of affective, cognitive, contextual, and individual factors. Several theories have been proposed to explain why different people make different estimates of the dangerousness of risks. Three major families of theory have been developed: psychology approaches, anthropology/sociology approaches and interdisciplinary approaches.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">False balance</span> Media bias on opposing viewpoints

False balance, known colloquially as bothsidesism, is a media bias in which journalists present an issue as being more balanced between opposing viewpoints than the evidence supports. Journalists may present evidence and arguments out of proportion to the actual evidence for each side, or may omit information that would establish one side's claims as baseless. False balance has been cited as a cause of misinformation.

The cultural cognition of risk, sometimes called simply cultural cognition, is the hypothesized tendency to perceive risks and related facts in relation to personal values. Research examining this phenomenon draws on a variety of social science disciplines including psychology, anthropology, political science, sociology, and communications. The stated objectives of this research are both to understand how values shape political conflict over facts and to promote effective deliberative strategies for resolving such conflicts consistent with sound empirical data.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Climate change denial</span> Denial of the scientific consensus on climate change

Climate change denial is a form of science denial characterized by rejecting, refusing to acknowledge, disputing, or fighting the scientific consensus on climate change. Those promoting denial commonly use rhetorical tactics to give the appearance of a scientific controversy where there is none. Climate change denial includes unreasonable doubts about the extent to which climate change is caused by humans, its effects on nature and human society, and the potential of adaptation to global warming by human actions. To a lesser extent, climate change denial can also be implicit when people accept the science but fail to reconcile it with their belief or action. Several studies have analyzed these positions as forms of denialism, pseudoscience, or propaganda.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stephan Lewandowsky</span> Australian psychologist

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Edward Maibach</span>

Edward Wile Maibach is a professor at George Mason University who works on public health and climate change communication.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Psychology of climate change denial</span> Human behaviour with regards to climate change denial

The psychology of climate change denial is the study of why people deny climate change, despite the scientific consensus on climate change. A study assessed public perception and action on climate change on grounds of belief systems, and identified seven psychological barriers affecting behavior that otherwise would facilitate mitigation, adaptation, and environmental stewardship: cognition, ideological worldviews, comparisons to key people, costs and momentum, disbelief in experts and authorities, perceived risks of change, and inadequate behavioral changes. Other factors include distance in time, space, and influence.

Disinformation attacks are strategic deception campaigns involving media manipulation and internet manipulation, to disseminate misleading information, aiming to confuse, paralyze, and polarize an audience. Disinformation can be considered an attack when it occurs as an adversarial narrative campaign that weaponizes multiple rhetorical strategies and forms of knowing—including not only falsehoods but also truths, half-truths, and value-laden judgements—to exploit and amplify identity-driven controversies. Disinformation attacks use media manipulation to target broadcast media like state-sponsored TV channels and radios. Due to the increasing use of internet manipulation on social media, they can be considered a cyber threat. Digital tools such as bots, algorithms, and AI technology, along with human agents including influencers, spread and amplify disinformation to micro-target populations on online platforms like Instagram, Twitter, Google, Facebook, and YouTube.

References

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