Hussey v Palmer

Last updated

Hussey v Palmer
Former Town Hall, Wokingham - geograph.org.uk - 487176.jpg
Court Court of Appeal of England and Wales
Full case nameMrs. Emily Hussey v P. Palmer (male)
DecidedJune 22, 1972 (1972-06-22)
Citation(s)[1972] EWCA Civ 1, [1972] 1 WLR 1286, [1972] 3 All ER 744, CA
Case opinions
Lord Denning MR, Phillimore LJ, Cairns LJ (dissenting)
Keywords
Constructive trust, resulting trust, equity

Hussey v Palmer [1972] EWCA Civ 1 is an English trusts law case of the Court of Appeal. It concerned the equitable remedy of constructive trusts. It invokes the equitable maxim, "equity regards the substance and not the form."

Contents

Facts

A mother, Mrs Hussey, lived on the same property as her daughter at 9 Stanley Road, Wokingham. The mother spent £607 to build an extension to the house of her daughter and son-in-law. After they had a dispute, the mother left the house. The mother claimed that she had an interest in the property, and the daughter argued there was no proprietary right.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal held by majority that a trust was created in favour of the plaintiff. The payment was not intended as a gift, and it would be unconscientious for the money to be retained without a proprietary right arising, in proportion to the money expended.

Lord Denning MR said the following. [1]

If there was no loan, was there a resulting trust? and, if so, what were the terms of the trust?

Although the plaintiff alleged that there was a resulting trust, I should have thought that the trust in this case, if there was one, was more in the nature of a constructive trust: but this is more a matter of words than anything else. The two run together. By whatever name it is described, it is a trust imposed by law whenever justice and good conscience require it. It is a liberal process, founded upon large principles of equity, to be applied in cases where the legal owner cannot conscientiously keep the property for himself alone, but ought to allow another to have the property or the benefit of it or a share in it. The trust may arise at the outset when the property is acquired, or later on, as the circumstances may require. It is an equitable remedy by which the court can enable an aggrieved party to obtain restitution. It is comparable to the legal remedy of money had and received which, as Lord Mansfield said, is “very beneficial and therefore, much encouraged” [ Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1012]. Thus we have repeatedly held that, when one person contributes towards the purchase price of a house, the owner holds it on a constructive trust for him, proportionate to his contribution, even though there is no agreement between them, and no declaration of trust to be found, and no evidence of any intention to create a trust. Instances are numerous where a wife has contributed money to the initial purchase of a house or property; or later on to the payment of mortgage instalments; or has helped in a business: see Falconer v Falconer [1970] 1 WLR 1333; Heseltine v Heseltine [1971] 1 W.L.R. 342 and In re Cummins [1972] Ch. 62. Similarly, when a mistress has contributed money, or money's worth, to the building of a house: Cooke v Head [1972] 1 WLR 518. Very recently we held that a purchaser, who bought a cottage subject to the rights of an occupier, held it on trust for her benefit: Binions v Evans [1972] Ch. 359. In all those cases it would have been quite inequitable for the legal owner to take the property for himself and exclude the other from it. So the law imputed or imposed a trust for his or her benefit.

The present case is well within the principles of those cases. Just as a person, who pays part of the purchase price, acquires an equitable interest in the house, so also he does when he pays for an extension to be added to it. Mr. Owen has done a lot of research and has found a case in 1858 to that very effect. It is Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association v King (1858) 25 Beav. 72. A father had land on which he built a granary. His two sons built two other granaries on it at a cost of £1,200. Sir John Romilly M.R. held that the two sons had a lien or charge on the property as against the father, and any person claiming through him. The father had never promised to pay the sons £1,200. He was not indebted to them in that sum. He had never engaged or promised to make over the land to them or to give them a charge on it. Yet they had a lien or charge on the land. That case was approved by the Privy Council in Chalmers v Pardoe [1963] 1 WLR 677, 681–682, where it was said to be based on the “general equitable principle that… it would be against conscience” for the owner to take the land without repaying the sums expended on the buildings. To this I would add Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, when a son built a bungalow on his father's land in the expectation that he would be allowed to stay there as his home, though there was no promise to that effect. After the father's death, his trustees sought to turn the son out. It was held that he had an equitable interest which was good against the trustees. In those cases it was emphasised that the court must look at the circumstances of each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied. In some by an equitable lien. In others by a constructive trust. But in either case it is because justice and good conscience so require.

In the present case Mrs. Hussey paid £607 to a builder for the erection of this extension. It may well be, as the defendant says, that there was no contract to repay it at all. It was not a loan to the son-in-law. She could not sue him for repayment. He could not have turned her out. If she had stayed there until she died, the extension would undoubtedly have belonged beneficially to the son-in-law. If, during her lifetime, he had sold the house, together with the extension, she would be entitled to be repaid the £607 out of the proceeds. He admits this himself. But he has not sold the house. She has left, and the son-in-law has the extension for his own benefit and could sell the whole if he so desired. It seems to me to be entirely against conscience that he should retain the whole house and not allow Mrs. Hussey any interest in it, or any charge upon it. The court should, and will, impose or impute a trust by which Mr. Palmer is to hold the property on terms under which, in the circumstances that have happened, she has an interest in the property proportionate to the £607 which she put into it. She is quite content if he repays her the £607. If he does not repay the £607, she can apply for an order for sale, so that the sum can be paid to her. But the simplest way for him would be to raise the £607 on mortgage and pay it to her. But, on the legal point raised, I have no doubt there was a resulting trust, or, more accurately, a constructive trust, for her, and I would so declare. I would allow the appeal, accordingly.

Phillimore LJ concurred with Lord Denning MR.

Cairns LJ dissented, and said the following.

It must be a common thing indeed for a parent or a parent-in-law to make a loan of money to a son or daughter or a son-in-law which both of them know is a loan, as to which it is obvious that there is no immediate prospect of repayment, but which in law is a loan repayable on demand. In my view that is the position here. As it was a loan, I think it is quite inconsistent with that to say that it could create a resulting trust at the same time. I accept as a correct statement of law the short passage in Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees, 12th ed. (1970), p. 210, in these words: [2]

“Where the purchase money is provided by a third party at the request of and by way of loan to the person to whom the property is conveyed there is no resulting trust in favour of the third party, for the lender did not advance the purchase-money as purchaser… but merely as lender.”

And it seems to me that that proposition is equally applicable where it is not a matter of the property being purchased, but a matter of a builder being paid for an extension to a property which already belongs to the borrower of the money. For these reasons I consider that the plaintiff was certainly not entitled to succeed on the evidence which she had given. As the particulars of claim stood, the only doubt that I could have had about the matter, if my judgment had been decisive, would be as to whether she should simply have the appeal dismissed or whether at this late stage she should have been given an opportunity of amending her particulars of claim and having a re-trial. I should have been anxious that she should have that opportunity, because I think the strong probability is that one way or another she ought to have got this money back. So far as concerns the inconvenience of having a third hearing, I do not think that is owing to anything done or omitted on the defendant's side. However, in the circumstances it is unnecessary for me to arrive at any final opinion as to which would have been the right course.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Constructive trust</span>

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by a court to benefit a party that has been wrongfully deprived of its rights due to either a person obtaining or holding a legal property right which they should not possess due to unjust enrichment or interference, or due to a breach of fiduciary duty, which is intercausative with unjust enrichment and/or property interference. It is a type of implied trust.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tracing (law)</span>

Tracing is a legal process, not a remedy, by which a claimant demonstrates what has happened to his/her property, identifies its proceeds and those persons who have handled or received them, and asks the court to award a proprietary remedy in respect of the property, or an asset substituted for the original property or its proceeds. Tracing allows transmission of legal claims from the original assets to either the proceeds of sale of the assets or new substituted assets.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">English trust law</span> Creation and protection of asset funds

English trust law concerns the protection of assets, usually when they are held by one party for another's benefit. Trusts were a creation of the English law of property and obligations, and share a subsequent history with countries across the Commonwealth and the United States. Trusts developed when claimants in property disputes were dissatisfied with the common law courts and petitioned the King for a just and equitable result. On the King's behalf, the Lord Chancellor developed a parallel justice system in the Court of Chancery, commonly referred as equity. Historically, trusts have mostly been used where people have left money in a will, or created family settlements, charities, or some types of business venture. After the Judicature Act 1873, England's courts of equity and common law were merged, and equitable principles took precedence. Today, trusts play an important role in financial investment, especially in unit trusts and in pension trusts. Although people are generally free to set the terms of trusts in any way they like, there is a growing body of legislation to protect beneficiaries or regulate the trust relationship, including the Trustee Act 1925, Trustee Investments Act 1961, Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Trustee Act 2000, Pensions Act 1995, Pensions Act 2004 and Charities Act 2011.

<i>Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset</i>

Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset[1990] UKHL 14 is an English land law, trusts law and matrimonial law case. It specifically deals with the translation into money of physical contributions from a cohabitee or spouse, under which its principles have been largely superseded.

<i>DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets LBC</i>

DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 is a UK company law case where, on the basis that a company should be compensated for loss of its business under a compulsory acquisition order, a group was recognised as a single economic entity. It stands as a liberal example of when UK courts may lift the veil of incorporation of a company.

<i>Williams & Glyns Bank v Boland</i>

Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland [1980] is a House of Lords judgment in English land and trusts law on an occupier's potentially overriding interests in a home.

Dishonest assistance, or knowing assistance, is a type of third party liability under English trust law. It is usually seen as one of two liabilities established in Barnes v Addy, the other one being knowing receipt. To be liable for dishonest assistance, there must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant, the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind. The liability itself is well established, but the mental element of dishonesty is subject to considerable controversy which sprang from the House of Lords case Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.

<i>Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley</i>

Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley[2002] UKHL 12 is a leading case in English trusts law. It provides authoritative rulings in the areas of Quistclose trusts and dishonest assistance.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Resulting trusts in English law</span>

Resulting trusts in English law are trusts created where property is not properly disposed of. It comes from the Latin resultare, meaning to spring back, and was defined by Megarry VC as "essentially a property concept; any property that a man does not effectually dispose of remains his own". These trusts come in two forms: automatic resulting trusts, and presumed resulting trusts. Automatic resulting trusts arise from a "gap" in the equitable title of property. The equitable maxim "equity abhors a vacuum" is followed: it is against principle for a piece of property to have no owner. As such, the courts assign the property to somebody in a resulting trust to avoid this becoming an issue. They occur in one of four situations: where there is no declaration of trust, where an express trust fails, where there is surplus property, or upon the dissolution of an unincorporated association. Rules differ depending on the situation and the type of original trust under dispute; failed charitable trusts, for example, have the property reapplied in a different way from other forms of trust.

Constructive trusts in English law are a form of trust created by the English law courts primarily where the defendant has dealt with property in an "unconscionable manner"—but also in other circumstances. The property is held in "constructive trust" for the harmed party, obliging the defendant to look after it. The main factors that lead to a constructive trust are unconscionable dealings with property, profits from unlawful acts, and unauthorised profits by a fiduciary. Where the owner of a property deals with it in a way that denies or impedes the rights of some other person over that property, the courts may order that owner to hold it in constructive trust. Where someone profits from unlawful acts, such as murder, fraud, or bribery, these profits may also be held in constructive trust. The most common of these is bribery, which requires that the person be in a fiduciary office. Certain offices, such as those of trustee and company director, are always fiduciary offices. Courts may recognise others where the circumstances demand it. Where someone in a fiduciary office makes profits from their duties without the authorisation of that office's beneficiaries, a constructive trust may be imposed on those profits; there is a defence where the beneficiaries have authorised such profits. The justification here is that a person in such an office must avoid conflicts of interest, and be held to account should he fail to do so.

A Quistclose trust is a trust created where a creditor has lent money to a debtor for a particular purpose. If the debtor uses the money for any other purpose, then it is held on trust for the creditor. Any inappropriately spent money can then be traced, and returned to the creditors. The name and trust comes from the House of Lords decision in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd (1970), although the underlying principles can be traced back further.

Tracing is a procedure in English law used to identify property which has been taken from the claimant involuntarily or which the claimant wishes to recover. It is not in itself a way to recover the property, but rather to identify it so that the courts can decide what remedy to apply. The procedure is used in several situations, broadly demarcated by whether the property has been transferred because of theft, breach of trust, or mistake.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">English land law</span> Law of real property in England and Wales

English land law is the law of real property in England and Wales. Because of its heavy historical and social significance, land is usually seen as the most important part of English property law. Ownership of land has its roots in the feudal system established by William the Conqueror after 1066, and with a gradually diminishing aristocratic presence, now sees a large number of owners playing in an active market for real estate.

Bristol & West Building Society v Henning [1985] EWCA Civ 6 is an English land law case that holds a person can consent to give up the right to an overriding interest in land, that will bind third parties, such as banks, that purchase a property. Although dealing with unregistered land, it is equally applicable in the case of registered land and now falls under the Land Registration Act 2002.

<i>Abbey National Building Society v Cann</i>

Abbey National Building Society v Cann[1990] UKHL 3 is an English land law case concerning the right of a person with an equitable interest in a home to remain in actual occupation, if a bank has a charge and is seeking repossession. A controversial decision, it held that "actual occupation" entails some degree of permanence, and that if someone buys a property with a mortgage, the bank's charge is to be treated as having priority over any equitable interest.

<i>Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns</i>

Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns[1995] UKHL 10 is an English trusts law case, concerning the test for causation and the extent of compensation for breaches of trust.

<i>Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC</i> English legal case

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC[1996] UKHL 12, [1996] AC 669 is a leading English trusts law case concerning the circumstances under which a resulting trust arises. It held that such a trust must be intended, or must be able to be presumed to have been intended. In the view of the majority of the House of Lords, presumed intention to reflect what is conscionable underlies all resulting and constructive trusts.

<i>Chhokar v Chhokar</i>

Chhokar v Chhokar [1984] FLR 313 is an English land law case concerning constructive trusts law and widening the natural meaning of "actual occupation". The facts of the case showed an intention to do a woman out of her occupational interest in a matrimonial home, as the new co-owner buying his share from the husband knew of her situation from the outset and wished to resell the property. The court confirmed in these exact circumstances her interest was overriding at the time when she was in hospital and it was a constructive trust.

<i>Binions v Evans</i>

Binions v Evans[1972] EWCA Civ 6 is an English land law and English trusts law case, concerning a constructive trust of land which will often be irrevocable whilst the occupier is in occupation as opposed to a licence to occupy — and/or a tenancy at will which is similar save that without transfer of the underlying property it can be revoked without cause. The case hinged on the fact there was an agreement specifying the existing occupier was to remain.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Registered land in English law</span>

Registered land in English law accounts for around 88 per cent of the total land mass. Since 1925, English land law has required that proprietary interests in land be registered, except in cases where it is necessary to protect social or family interests that cannot reasonably be expected to be registered. English law also runs a parallel system for around 12 per cent of land that remains unregistered.

References

  1. [1972] 1 WLR 1286, 1289-1291
  2. [1972] 1 WLR 1286, 1292-1293