Iowa v. Tovar

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Iowa v. Tovar
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 21, 2004
Decided March 8, 2004
Full case nameIowa v. Tovar
Docket no. 02-1541
Citations541 U.S. 77 ( more )
124 S. Ct. 1379
Argument Oral argument
Case history
Priorfirst OWI conviction: 1996
second OWI: 1998
third OWI indictment: 2000; motion to reduce the charges denied, 2001; conviction, 2001; affirmed (Iowa Court of Appeals); reversed, 656 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 2003); certiorari granted, 539 U.S. 987 (2003)
Holding
A guilty plea by a pro se defendant may be accepted, and their right to counsel validly waived, if
1) they are informed of the nature of the charges against them, of their right to be counseled regarding their plea, and of the range of allowable punishments,
taking into account
2) the defendant's education or sophistication and the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinion
MajorityGinsburg (unanimous)
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), [1] was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified how well-informed a defendant had to be to waive their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. [2] The defendant in this case had waived his right to counsel and pled guilty to drunk driving, and then had been convicted of drunk driving twice more, with sentences increasing as his convictions piled up. He argued that the judge in the first case had not explained that multiple drunk driving convictions would lead to more severe sentences, so his waiver of counsel had been invalid. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that the judge's warnings had been adequate, and the defendants' waiver was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." [1]

Contents

Background

The assistance of counsel clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally guarantees that defendants have a right to be represented by an attorney during criminal proceedings. [3] This is not mandatory, however, and defendants also have the right to represent themselves (known as litigating pro se ). [4] When a defendant chooses to proceed pro se, they are waiving their right to an attorney, and will not be able to claim later (e.g. on appeal) that the trial was unconstitutional because their right to counsel was violated. Because having an attorney can make an enormous difference during a trial, the Supreme Court decided in Faretta v. California in 1975 that pro se defendants had to be warned of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." [5]

Prior litigation

First OWI

In 1996, Felipe Tovar (then a college student in Ames, Iowa) was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI). [6] At his arraignment, he did not have a lawyer, and the judge confirmed with him that he wanted to represent himself during the hearing. [6] Tovar entered a guilty plea, and the judge went through a plea colloquy with him, following Iowa's Rules of Criminal Procedure. [6] The judge explained that (among other things), not only was Tovar giving up his right to a trial, but also a right to have an attorney at that trial, and "That attorney could help you select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present evidence, if any, in your behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on your behalf." [6] He also reviewed the other trial-related rights that Tovar would be waiving, and asked Tovar to verify that he still wanted to plead guilty. [6] Tovar did so. [6] After reviewing the factual basis for the charges, the judge accepted Tovar's guilty plea. [6] At the sentencing hearing, Tovar appeared pro se again, and the judge went through another colloquy to make sure that Tovar did not want a lawyer and understood the risks. [6] Tovar was sentenced to two days in jail and a $500 fine, plus fees (as well as a fine of $250 plus fees for driving himself to the courthouse, even though his license had been suspended). [1]

Second and third OWI

Tovar was charged for OWI again in 1998, and a third time in 2000. [1] He was represented by attorney for both of these charges; in 1998 he pled guilty, and in 2000 he pled not guilty. [1] Under Iowa law, the first OWI was a serious misdemeanor, the second was an aggravated misdemeanor, and the third was a felony. [1] [7] In 2001, Tovar's attorney filed a motion that the charge should be reduced, arguing that his waiver of counsel in 1996 had been invalid. [6] The trial court denied the motion, saying: [1]

Where the offense is readily understood by laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without counsel in the face of such awareness.

After Tovar was convicted and sentenced, he appealed the motion.

Appeal

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, saying Tovar's waiver in 1996 of his right to counsel was not "knowing and intelligent." [6] Although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet explicitly said what standard to apply for this situation, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that in Brady v. United States, a guilty plea was held constitutionally valid because it was "voluntary," "knowing," and "intelligent" (taking the circumstances into account), and in Patterson v. Illinois it had been held that the importance of the right to counsel varied depending on the stage and circumstances of litigation. [6] Moreover, the court in Patterson had pointed out two key issues: "whether the accused was 'made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present' at the proceeding and 'the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel.' " [6] With this in mind, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge's colloquy had been insufficient, and remanded the case for a new trial:

Not only was there an absence of any dialogue concerning the value of having an attorney when pleading guilty, there was no colloquy with Tovar that alerted him to the dangers and disadvantages of entering a guilty plea without the advice of counsel. Importantly, the court did not warn Tovar that he might have legal defenses to the charge that he, as a layperson, would not recognize.

— State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d at 120 (Justice Marsha Ternus, writing for the court)

Decision of the Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Iowa Supreme Court and reinstated Tovar's conviction. [1] Justice Ginsburg, writing for the court, said that the Sixth Amendment did not require colloquies as extensive as the Iowa court had held. A defendant had to be informed of "the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea," but that was all. [1]

An arraignment where a defendant might enter a guilty plea was certainly a "critical stage" of litigation, and thus there was a right to an attorney then. [1] The Court declined to decide on a "formula or script" for plea colloquies, however, because the amount of information necessary for "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" waiver would vary for different defendants and circumstances; the Court noted that "the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding" were all factors. [1] The ruling of the Iowa Supreme Court was simply too "rigid", as it did not take such factors into account. [1] It also might be counterproductive:

In a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one.

— Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 93 (Justice Ginsburg, writing for the court)

Ginsburg also noted that Tovar's motion was a collateral attack (meaning that Tovar was attacking a prior ruling because it was relevant to an ongoing case), and as such the burden of proof was on him. [1] Tovar had not done much to argue that he had actually been unaware of his rights in 1996; he had only argued that he might have been unaware, since the judge's colloquy had not been more extensive. [1] In the Court's view, this was insufficient.

See also

Related Research Articles

In legal terms, a plea is simply an answer to a claim made by someone in a criminal case under common law using the adversarial system. Colloquially, a plea has come to mean the assertion by a defendant at arraignment, or otherwise in response to a criminal charge, whether that person pleaded or pled guilty, not guilty, nolo contendere, no case to answer, or Alford plea.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires U.S. states to provide attorneys to criminal defendants who are unable to afford their own. The case extended the right to counsel, which had been found under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to impose requirements on the federal government, by imposing those requirements upon the states as well.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts prosecutors from using a person's statements made in response to interrogation in police custody as evidence at their trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them.

In United States law, ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) is a claim raised by a convicted criminal defendant asserting that the defendant's legal counsel performed so ineffectively that it deprived the defendant of the constitutional right guaranteed by the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ineffectiveness claims may only be brought where the defendant had the right to counsel, ordinarily during the critical stages of a prosecution.

A plea colloquy, in United States criminal procedure, is a conversation between a judge and a criminal defendant who has been sworn under oath, which must occur when the defendant enters a guilty plea in court in order for the plea to be valid. The United States Supreme Court has crafted a doctrine which requires the court to engage in a specific line of inquiry. Because a guilty plea must be made intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily, the court must advise the defendant of the following things:

  1. The nature of the charge
  2. The potential penalties which might result from the plea, including any mandatory minimum sentence
  3. The defendant's rights to not plead guilty, and to request a jury trial.

In criminal law, the right to counsel means a defendant has a legal right to have the assistance of counsel and, if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, requires that the government appoint one or pay the defendant's legal expenses. The right to counsel is generally regarded as a constituent of the right to a fair trial. Historically, however, not all countries have always recognized the right to counsel. The right is often included in national constitutions. Of the 194 constitutions currently in force, 153 have language to this effect.

In United States and Canadian law, competence concerns the mental capacity of an individual to participate in legal proceedings or transactions, and the mental condition a person must have to be responsible for his or her decisions or acts. Competence is an attribute that is decision-specific. Depending on various factors which typically revolve around mental function integrity, an individual may or may not be competent to make a particular medical decision, a particular contractual agreement, to execute an effective deed to real property, or to execute a will having certain terms.

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), held that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel protected by Miranda v. Arizona are separate and distinct, such that invoking one does not implicitly invoke the other.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was a landmark Supreme Court case that established the standard for determining when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by that counsel's inadequate performance.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed a defendant's right to have a competency evaluation before proceeding to trial. The Court outlined the basic standards for determining competency.

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), was a landmark decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a defendant was competent to stand trial, they were automatically competent to plead guilty, and thereby waive the panoply of trial rights, including the right to counsel.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case that considered two Fifth Amendment privileges related to a criminal defendant’s rights against self-incrimination in a Federal District Court. The court ruled that a defendant who waives the guilty plea does not also waive the privilege during the sentencing phase of the trial, and that the court cannot draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence when determining facts related to the crime which affect the severity of the sentence.

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court considered the role of standby counsel in a criminal trial where the defendant conducted his own defense. In this case the defendant claimed his Sixth Amendment right to present his own case in a criminal trial was violated by the presence of a court-appointed standby counsel.

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the standard for competency to stand trial was not linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself.

Plea bargaining in the United States is very common; the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial. They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases in 1984 to 94% by 2001. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court, and different States and jurisdictions have different rules. Game theory has been used to analyze the plea bargaining decision.

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that clarifies what constitutes "waiver" of the right to counsel for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Under Miranda v. Arizona, evidence obtained by police during interrogation of a suspect before he has been read his Miranda rights is inadmissible. Here, however, the defendant had been indicted in court and had asserted his desire to have counsel, thus his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. At issue was whether a voluntary admission of incriminating facts in response to police statements made while the defendant was in custody and outside the presence of his lawyer constituted a waiver of this right to counsel.

The Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court determined that when a defendant enters into a plea bargain, they waive their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. A defendant may not waive this Constitutional right unless he does so knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. The defendant was an African-American charged with robbery, which carried a death sentence in Alabama at the time. He pled guilty.

As one of the fifty states of the United States, California follows common law criminal procedure. The principal source of law for California criminal procedure is the California Penal Code, Part 2, "Of Criminal Procedure."

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004)
  2. ↑ "Iowa v. Tovar". Oyez . Retrieved August 16, 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  3. ↑ "Right to Counsel | Wex | US Law". Legal Information Institute . Retrieved August 16, 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  4. ↑ "Pro se | Wex | US Law". Legal Information Institute . Retrieved August 16, 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  5. ↑ Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 2003)
  7. ↑ Iowa Code § 321J.2 (1999)
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