Land for peace

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Land for peace is a legalistic interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 which has been used as the basis of subsequent Arab-Israeli peace making. The name Land for Peace is derived from the wording of the resolution's first operative paragraph which affirms that peace should include the application of two principles: Withdrawal of Israeli forces (Giving Up Land), and Termination of all claims or states of belligerency (Making Peace). Since the resolution stipulates that both principles should apply, they can be viewed jointly as giving up land for peace, referred to more concisely as 'land for peace'. [1]

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This interpretation is widely contested because it implies that Israeli withdrawal is linked to its neighbours' willingness to formally make peace. Competing interpretations of the resolution regard Israel as being obligated to withdraw unilaterally from all territories captured in 1967. Operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 242 reads as follows:

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

In 1976, when Lord Caradon was asked about the concessions the Arab states would have to make to Israel as part of an overall settlement, he said "Well, that's perfectly obvious if you read again the principles of 242, which have been accepted by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, and in effect by Israel. The provision is that if there is an adequate withdrawal, all states in the area must be free to live within secure and recognized boundaries, free from force and threat of force. So it is an acceptance that Israel has a right to exist, just as they would have a right to their homeland, and have a right to exist. This is the essential bargain that we are proposing. It's not a new thing, it's been going since 1967. [2]

Peace treaties

Egypt-Israel border, looking north from the Eilat Mountains EgyptIsraelBorderEilat.JPG
Egypt–Israel border, looking north from the Eilat Mountains

On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories. [3] [4] [5] This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. [6] The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. [7] [8] Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments. [9]

The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the Khartoum Arab Summit, was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three no's": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King Hussein of Jordan had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states. [10]

The first application of the land for peace formula was Israel's peace treaty with Egypt in 1979,[ citation needed ] under which Israel withdrew from the Sinai as part of a comprehensive peace agreement facilitated by economic assistance to both sides from the United States.

In 1994 a similar comprehensive agreement invoking resolution 242 [11] formed the basis of the Israel Jordan peace treaty whereby both sides redeployed to their respective sides of the agreed international boundary.

Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

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References

  1. "The United Nations Security Council".
  2. An Interview with Lord Caradon, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring – Summer, 1976), page 147
  3. Herzog, Heroes of Israel, p. 253.
  4. Seth S. King (30 June 1967). "Israeli aims tied to 6 vital areas". The New York Times. Retrieved 21 September 2015.
  5. Drew Middleton (1 June 1967). "Latin nations bid Israel withdraw". The New York Times. Retrieved 21 September 2015.
  6. Raz, Avi (2013). "The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967". Diplomatic History. 37 (1): 85–108. ISSN   0145-2096.
  7. Shlaim, Avi (2014). The Iron Wall – Israel and the Arab World (paperback 2014 ed.). Penguin Books. p. 270. ISBN   978-0-14-103322-8. The decision of 19 June read, "Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel." The international border placed the Gaza strip within Israel's territory. ... it makes no mention of a request by Eban to transmit these terms to Egypt and Syria. ... One is left with the impression that Eban was more interested in using the cabinet decision of 19 June to impress the Americans than to engage the governments of Egypt and Syria in substantive negotiations
  8. Shlomo Ben-Ami (2005). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy. Phoenix. p. 125. ISBN   978-0-7538-2104-6. But was there on 19 June 1967 an Israeli peace overture towards Syria and Egypt? Did the Israeli cabinet end its deliberations on that day with a decision to convey concrete peace proposals to its Arab neighbors along the lines as discussed in the Cabinet, or perhaps ask the American administration to do so on its behalf? Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. At the meeting of 19 June the Israeli government developed policy guidelines; it did not discuss a peace initiative, nor did it ever formalise it as such.
  9. Smith, Terrebce (15 August 1967). "A Mediated Peace Rejected by Eban". New York Times. Retrieved 16 September 2015.
  10. "Eban rejects aid in settling crisis". The New York Times. 27 June 1967. p. 3. Retrieved 21 September 2015.
  11. "Overview of Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations". Jewish Virtual Library.