Lobster War

This article is about the 1960s dispute between Brazil and France. For the documentary television series, see Lobster Wars. For the lobster dispute between Canada and the United States, see Machias Seal Island.

Lobster War
A Brazilian Air Force Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress flying over the French escort vessel Tartu, off the coast of Brazil in 1963.
Date 1961–1963 Location Waters of Pernambuco, Brazil Result Peaceful resolution of the conflict: Withdrawal of French vessels; End of the mobilization of warships on both sides Extension of Brazil's territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile zone Fishing authorization granted to French lobster fishing boats for five years if a portion was given to Brazilian lobster fishermen
Belligerents
Brazil	France
Commanders and leaders
Jânio Quadros João Goulart Ad. Arnoldo Toscano	Charles de Gaulle
Units involved
Brazilian Navy Brazilian Air Force	French Navy
Strength
Brazilian Navy fleet in the dispute zone: 1 Corvette Ipiranga 6 Destroyers Paraná Babitonga Pará Acre Araguari Greenhalgh 2 Cruisers Almirante Barroso Tamandaré 1 Aircraft carrier Minas Gerais 1 Submarine Riachuelo Brazilian Air Force: 1 Squadron 5 B-17 Maritime Patrol 1 Squadron 12 P-2 Neptune 1 Squadron 4 S-2 Tracker	Offshore Brazil: First Escort squadron 1 Destroyer: Tartu 1 Aviso Paul Goffeny Offshore West Africa: 1 Aircraft carrier Clemenceau 1 Cruiser De Grasse Second Escort squadron 7 Destroyer: Cassard Jauréguiberry Picard Le Gascon L'Agenais Le Béarnais Le Vendéen 1 Tanker La Baise
Casualties and losses
None [1] [2] [3]	None [4]

The Lobster War (also known as the Lobster Operation; Portuguese : Guerra da Lagosta; French : Conflit de la langouste) was a dispute over spiny lobsters that occurred from 1961 to 1963 between Brazil and France. The Brazilian government refused to allow French fishing vessels to catch spiny lobsters 100 miles (160 km) off Brazil's northeastern coast ^[5] by arguing that lobsters "crawl along the continental shelf". The French maintained that "lobsters swim" and so they could be caught by any fishing vessel from any country. The dispute was resolved unilaterally by Brazil, which extended its territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile (370 km; 230 mi) zone and took in the disputed lobsters' bed. ^[6]

Although the historical incident of coercive diplomacy may have taken place long before the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the dispute ended with the signing of an agreement on 10 December 1964 ^[4] that granted to 26 French ships the right to fish for a period no longer than five years if they delivered to Brazilian fishermen a certain amount of profit from their fishing activities in the so-called "designated areas". ^[4]

Context

The lobster fishing crisis

In the early 1960s, France had lost almost all of its colonies on the African continent and consequently lost maritime areas where it exploited and dominated fishing. ^{[7] [8]} These losses, especially in Mauritania, put the French stock of lobsters in jeopardy. ^[8]

Interest in the Brazilian Northeast

With the shortage, there was increased interest from fishermen at the fishing port of Camaret, on the northwest coast of France, in the Brazilian Northeast and the lobsters that inhabited there. The French then sent a delegation to Recife to conduct research on lobster nurseries. In March 1961, the authorization was issued and was valid for 180 days; however, only three vessels could be sent, following a French request. ^[9] Moreover, the Brazilian government required representatives from the Brazilian Navy to board as inspectors. Thus, it didn't take long for the reports to show that instead of three, there were four fishing vessels in action. Furthermore, there was no research being conducted. The four boats were fishing uncontrollably and intended to take the lobsters to Europe. ^{[10] [lower-alpha 1]}

In November of the same year, France requested authorization again, now with João Goulart as the nation's president, as Jânio Quadros had resigned a month earlier. The authorization was granted, and as before, the French continued to commit illegal fishing and were expelled from the Brazilian maritime territory. From then on, vessels considered illegal began to be seized – but were soon released without further consequences. ^[10]

Since local fishermen complained that large boats were coming from France to catch lobster off the state of Pernambuco, Brazilian Admiral Arnoldo Toscano ordered two corvettes to sail to the area of the French fishing boats. ^[12] Seeing that the fishermen's claim was justifiable, the captain of the Brazilian vessel then demanded for the French boats to recede to deeper water and to leave the continental shelf to smaller Brazilian vessels.

Diplomatic battle

Throughout 1962, a diplomatic dispute between the two countries ensued. Brazil claimed that the lobsters were in the exclusive economic zone of the country, while France relied on the 1958 Geneva Convention, which established guidelines for high seas fishing, even though neither country had signed the convention. ^[10] Early in the year, the Brazilian corvette Ipiranga seized the fishing vessel Cassiopée, 10 miles off the northeast coast. ^[10]

During the negotiations to establish a form of modus vivendi regarding the crustacean, France argued that the lobster moved from one place to another by jumping and, therefore, should be considered as a fish and not a resource of the continental shelf. According to Commander Paulo de Castro, of the Brazilian Navy, the argument was weak and, ironically, he said: ^[13]

“By analogy, if a lobster is a fish because it moves by jumping, then a kangaroo is a bird.” ^[13]

Brazilian response

With the continued arrival of fishing boats on the Brazilian coast aiming to fish for lobsters, admiral Arnoldo Toscano, given the reports from fishermen from Pernambuco, decided to send corvettes from the Navy to the region to escort the French out of Brazilian territory. The aircraft carrier Minas Gerais, the star of the Navy at the time, was not sent towards the disputed waters, generating criticism of the government by the population. However, the use of an aircraft carrier would not be necessary in the conflict. ^[14]

French response

When peacefully approached by Brazilian warships, the fishermen, instead of ceasing their illegal activities, requested help from the French government, especially the French Navy, which promptly responded. ^[15]

At the time, the leader of the French was the former general and war hero Charles de Gaulle, known for being nationalist, conservative, and ruling with an iron fist. ^[16] In his third year as president, De Gaulle sent destroyers and an aircraft carrier of the Clemenceau class to the Atlantic Ocean to escort the fishing boats in their unauthorized activities from Brazilian warships. ^[15]

The same day, Brazilian Foreign Minister Hermes Lima considered the French approach as an act of hostility: "The attitude of France is inadmissible, and our government will not retreat. The lobster will not be caught." ^[17] He called a secret meeting with his assistants to review the latest developments in the lobster war against France.

Incident

On February 11, 1963, a Task Force led by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau departed from Toulon, France, along with 3 destroyers, 5 frigates, 1 cruiser, 1 tanker and 1 dispatch boat. The explanation given by the French Government was that it was just another routine mission in the Atlantic Ocean. ^[13] On February 21, these ships arrived in Dakar, Senegal and later headed to Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast. However, one of the Clemenceau escorts took a different course. The Tartu , one of the destroyers, headed alone to the Brazilian coast. ^{[10] [lower-alpha 2] [18]}

A B-17 photographing the destroyer Tartu

From the moment the Naval Operations Command (EMA) learned of the movement of a French warship to the Brazilian Coast, a search for the vessel began. High-Frequency Radiogoniometric stations in Recife and Bahia began tracking the electromagnetic emissions of all French ships sailing in the Atlantic Ocean. ^[19]

The Brazilian Government responded by mobilizing a large contingent of the Navy and Air Force, in a literal preparation for war, on February 22, on the eve of Carnival. During the mobilization, the US intervened, reminding that the licenses for American equipment used by the Brazilians – such as the bombers B-17 – did not allow them to be used against opponents. ^[20]

First radar contact with the Tartu

On February 26, a P-15 of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), patrolling far from the coast, detected on radar a large ship heading towards Fernando de Noronha. The next day, a bomber B-17 adapted for reconnaissance, also from the FAB, made the first photographic reconnaissance of the French ship which, from then on, would receive constant daytime and nighttime visits from Brazilian military aircraft. ^[21] Poggio (2011) describes:

Two aircraft flew in open formation at low altitude with all lights off and total radio silence. For the target approach, they used their passive electronic warfare equipment, which detected the emissions from the Tartu's radar air search. Near the ship, the planes closed formation and descended to 100 feet of altitude (about 30 meters) until, practically over the destroyer, they turned on everything that could illuminate it. It was a total surprise, and men could be seen running on deck, as if taking combat positions. ^[21]

Response of the Brazilian Navy

Days earlier, when the conflict broke out, Brazil was on holiday, and much of the military personnel of the navy were on leave, requiring a major call-up in the early hours of Carnival Saturday. Moreover, the units in Recife were lacking ammunition and fuel. ^[13]

Brazilian warships photographed during the conflict

In Rio de Janeiro, a large Task Force of warships set sail for the capital of Pernambuco. Three days later, the Force arrived in Recife, joining other reinforcements from various parts of the country, and on the same day headed to the open sea, with great anticipation from the press and the public regarding the meeting of the Brazilian ships with the French one. ^[13]

Encounter at sea

Onboard the Brazilian ships, the tension was high. The ships sailed in the dark and the radar operators were fully focused on searching for the enemy ship. The next day, at 10 am, the destroyer Paraná made radar contact with a surface target matching the Tartu ; it had to be him. ^[10]

At 13 kilometers away, the Paraná spotted the ship, along with six small fishing boats stopped beside it. ^[22] The Brazilian ship was also not alone: in escort, there were 4 more destroyers, 1 corvette and 1 submarine. ^[13] The fleet followed the French ships for some time and monitored radio frequencies, then moved away. From the location, a patrol schedule was established to always keep a ship close to the fishing boats and another at a distance, able to intervene when necessary. ^[13]

To secure the Tartu position, another destroyer, Paul Gaufeny, was sent to the region, totaling 2 warships and 6 French fishing boats. ^[23]

Withdrawal of ships from the Brazilian coast

In the meantime, diplomatic talks and the interference of the United States and the UN sought to end the imminent conflict and, consequently, the declaration of war. The return of the fishing boats and the two destroyers to France was a sign that the conflict was over, with a final, ironic, and humorous signal of “safe travels” sent from the destroyer Paraná to the ship Paul Gaufeny. ^[23]

Outcome

On March 10, 1963, the French withdrew their ships from the coast, but the diplomatic war had not yet ceased. Before the situation was concluded, the military coup occurred. It was during the dictatorship, on December 10, 1964, that Brazil and France reached a solution: an agreement allowing the exploitation of lobsters by French ships, in limited quantity and time, sharing the profits. Finally, the conflict of interests was resolved through diplomacy. ^[20]

Tribunal acts

On the scientific thesis

On 6 July 1966, the Administrative Tribunal of Rennes summarized the French government's claims that lobsters are like fish and that since they swim about in the open sea, they could not be considered part of the continental shelf. Brazil claimed that lobsters are like oysters in that they cling to the bottom of the ocean and so were part of the continental shelf. ^[24] Admiral Paulo Moreira da Silva, Brazil's Navy expert in the field of oceanography who had been sent to assist the diplomatic committee during the general discussions, ^[25] argued that for Brazil to accept the French scientific thesis that a lobster would be considered a fish when it "leaps" on the seafloor, it would be required in the same way to accept the Brazilian premise that when a kangaroo "hops", it would be considered a bird. ^[25]

On shipowner claims

It was also observed that the claims of Celton and Stephan, two of the shipowners who sought compensation from France for losses occurred during the January–March 1963 fishing season, had no right to any compensation at all once the French government could not be held responsible for the unsuccessful seizure because of the unilateral position by the Brazilian government. ^[26]

Decisions of the Conseil d'État then dismissed the allegations that the French government had authorized the plaintiff shipowners to send their vessels to go fish for lobsters on high seas or to off the coast of Brazil. It stated that the licenses given to the plaintiffs accorded to the masters of the vessels and not to the shipowners. The derogation was decided to have authorized the masters to exercise full command of their vessels for fishing on high seas, not in a particular zone. There is no evidence that the French government had authorized such actions and so their claims were rejected. ^[27]

See also

• Brazil–France relations
• Cod Wars
• Turbot War
• 1993 Cherbourg incident
• French invasions in Brazil

Notes

1. They settled on a spot off the coast of Brazil at which lobsters are found on submerged ledges at depths of 250–650 feet (76–198 m). ^[11]
2. On 21 February 1963, a task force from Toulon followed, headed by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and followed by the cruisers De Grasse, Cassard, Jauréguiberry, the destroyer Tartu, the corvettes Le Picard, Le Gascon, L'Agenais, Le Béarnais and Le Vendéen (all T52 class) and the tanker La Baïse and Paul Goffeny. Initially, it was to be only "one more commission" off the west coast of Africa to show the flag and to perform routine exercises.

References

1. Braga, Cláudio da Costa (2009). A Guerra da Lagosta. Armazém das Letras. pp. 90–165–166–167. ISBN   978-8590479017.
2. "O dia em que a lagosta virou peixe". FAB Ministério da Defesa. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
3. "Navios de Guerra Brasileiros". Navios Brasileiros. Retrieved 2023-04-02.
4. Rainer Lagoni; Peter Ehlers; Marian Paschke; Duygu Damar (2011). Recent developments in the law of the sea. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 26. ISBN   978-3-643-10946-0.
5. AP (25 Feb 1963). "France Recalls Ship Sent to Lobster War". The Milwaukee Journal: 22. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
6. Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan; Mango, Anthony (2004). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. Vol. 2 G-M. Routledge. p. 1334. ISBN   0415939224..
7. Andrade, Ana Luíza Mello Santiago de. "Colonização francesa na África - História". InfoEscola (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
8. Muniz, Túlio de Souza (November 2013). "A "Guerra da Lagosta": um Laboratório para o Golpe Militar de 1964". Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian Studies. 2: 352.
9. Poggio, Guilherme (2016-01-28). "A Guerra da Lagosta e suas lições". Poder Naval (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
10. Poggio, Guilherme (2016-01-28). "A Guerra da Lagosta e suas lições". Poder Naval (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
11. Reynaud, Paul (1964), In The foreign policy of Charles de Gaulle: a critical assessment , Odyssey Press, p. 118. LCCN   64-529.
12. (1963), In Arab Observer National Publications House (Cairo, Egypt), p. 142. OCLC   2641710
13. "A GUERRA DA LAGOSTA – O QUE FOI, COMO ACONTECEU, A ATUAÇÃO E OS PROBLEMAS DA MARINHA DO BRASIL". TOK de HISTÓRIA (in Brazilian Portuguese). 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2023-03-06.
14. Falconi, 2009, pp. 104–105. sfn error: no target: CITEREFFalconi,_2009 (help)
15. Lobato, Ricardo (2021-01-01). "Como um crustáceo quase mergulhou a América do Sul no maior conflito desde a Guerra do Paraguai". Aventuras na História (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
16. Abreu, Augusto (2017-01-11). "Charles de Gaulle". Portal São Francisco (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
17. "Brazil: Force de Flap". Time. March 8, 1963. Archived from the original on December 22, 2008. Retrieved 12 October 2010.
18. "Ships Augment 'Lobster War' Water Patrol". St. Petersburg Times. 79 (216): 5. 25 Feb 1963. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
19. Neto, Walter Carrocino (2021). "LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations" (PDF). LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations: 24.
20. Foco, Redação Defesa em (2020-10-25). "The Lobster War - Brazil vs France for the Crustaceans". www.defesaemfoco.com.br (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2023-03-06.
21. Neto, Walter Carrucino (2021). "LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations" (PDF). LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations: 25.
22. Neto, Walter Carrocino (2021). "LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations" (PDF). LOBSTER WAR: an analysis of civil-military relations: 26.
23. Vaccari, Glaucea. "Nilson Reia Boiteux: "Lobster War, the diplomatic-military dispute Brazil vs France"". correiodoestado.com.br. Retrieved 2023-03-06.
24. Ziegler, David W. (1990), In War, peace, and international politics , Scott, Foresman, p. 360. ISBN   0-673-52023-4.
25. Fehlberg, Carlos. "Solução surge através da argumentação e um debate entre os oficiais da Marinha, após crise diplomática chegar ao extremo". Institutojoaogoulart.org.br. Instituto Joao Goulart. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
26. Lauterpacht, E. (1974) In International Law Reports , Cambridge University Press, Vol. 47, p. 2, ISBN   0-521-46392-0.
27. Kulski, W. W. (1966), In De Gaulle and the World:The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic , Syracuse University Press, p. 360. ISBN   0-8156-0052-6.

External links

• The lobsters of conflict in Portuguese