Matthew Kramer

Last updated

Matthew H. Kramer
FBA
Born (1959-06-09) 9 June 1959 (age 64)
United States
NationalityAmerican
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School
Institutions
Main interests

Matthew Henry Kramer FBA (born 9 June 1959) [1] is an American philosopher, and is currently a Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge [2] and a Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. [3] He writes mainly in the areas of metaethics, normative ethics, legal philosophy, and political philosophy. He is a leading proponent of legal positivism. He has been Director of the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy since 2000. He has been teaching at Cambridge University and at Churchill College since 1994.

Contents

Career

Kramer was born in Massachusetts and educated at Middleborough High School, Cornell University (B.A. in Philosophy) where he became a member of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, Harvard University (J.D.) and Cambridge University (Ph.D. in Philosophy and LL.D.).

His seventeen books as author and four as editor, as well as his dozens of journal articles, range over many areas of legal, political and moral philosophy. He has received several major research awards including a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship (2001) and a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship (2005). He is a subject editor for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy and is on the editorial board of the Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, the American Journal of Jurisprudence, Law & Philosophy, Ratio Juris, and Legal Theory. He is also an Advisory Editor for the University of Bologna Law Review (general student-edited law journal). [4]

At the undergraduate level he lectures and supervises in Jurisprudence, and he also lectures on Topics in Legal & Political Philosophy in the postgraduate LL.M. program. At Cambridge, he is a graduate supervisor both for Ph.D. students in the Law Faculty and for M.Phil. and Ph.D. students in the Philosophy Faculty.

He was a visiting professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem in April 2009, and at Tel Aviv University in March 2012.

In 2014 he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy, the United Kingdom's national academy for the humanities and social sciences. [5]

An inclusive legal positivist, Kramer argues in his book Where Law and Morality Meet that moral principles can enter into the law of any jurisdiction. He contends that legal officials can invoke moral principles as laws for resolving disputes, and that they can also invoke them as threshold tests which ordinary laws must satisfy. In opposition to many other theorists, Kramer argues that these functions of moral principles are consistent with all the essential characteristics of any legal system. He is also a leading proponent of the legal positivist argument that law and morality are separable, arguing against the position of natural-law theory, which portrays legal requirements as a species of moral requirements.[ citation needed ] According to him, even though the existence of a legal system in any sizeable society is essential for the realization of fundamental moral values, law is not inherently moral either in its effects or in its motivational underpinnings.

Moral realism as a moral doctrine

Influenced by the theories of Ronald Dworkin, Kramer is a moral realist who argues that "moral requirements are strongly objective" and that "the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations." In his book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, he claims that "[m]oral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine." Unlike Dworkin, he believes that, although there is a determinately correct moral answer to most moral questions, there exists genuine moral indeterminacy in relation to some rare moral questions. He also distances himself from Dworkin's defense of value monism.[ citation needed ]

Publications

The following is a list of books written by Kramer.

YearTitle ISBN
1991Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction: Against Rhadamanthus 0-253-33148-X
1995Critical Legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A Philosophical Reconception 0-847-67988-8
1997John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations of Individualism, Community, and Equality 0-521-54890-X
1997Hobbes and the Paradoxes of Political Origins 978-0-312-16549-9
1998A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries 0-198-29899-4
1999In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy: Critical Encounters 0-333-74325-3
1999In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings 0-199-26483-X
2001Rights, Wrongs, and Responsibilities 1-349-42757-8
2003The Quality of Freedom 0-199-54573-1
2004Where Law and Morality Meet 0-199-54613-4
2007Objectivity and the Rule of Law 0-521-67010-1
2009Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine
2011The Ethics of Capital Punishment 0-199-64218-4
2014Torture and Moral Integrity: A Philosophical Enquiry 0-198-71420-3
2017Liberalism with Excellence 0-198-77796-5
2018H.L.A. Hart: The Nature of Law
2021Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint 0-198-86865-0
2022Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer 0-198-86886-3
2024Rights and Right-Holding: A Philosophical Investigation 0–198-89122–2  Parameter error in {{ISBNT}}: invalid character

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References

  1. KRAMER, Prof. Matthew Henry, Who's Who 2014, A & C Black, 2014; online edn, Oxford University Press, 2014
  2. Cambridge Faculty of Law
  3. Churchill College
  4. "Advisory Board". Bolognalawreview.unibo.it. Retrieved 29 August 2016.
  5. "British Academy announces 42 new fellows". Times Higher Education. 18 July 2014. Retrieved 18 July 2014.