Murray v. Giarratano

Last updated
Murray v. Giarratano
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 22, 1989
Decided June 23, 1989
Full case nameEdward W. Murray, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections v. Joseph M. Giarratano
Citations492 U.S. 1 ( more )
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorJudgment for plaintiff, 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va., 1986); reversed on appeal, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988); district court affirmed in en banc rehearing, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988)
Holding
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires States to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction relief. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
ConcurrenceO'Connor
ConcurrenceKennedy (in judgment), joined by O'Connor
DissentStevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that capital defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel in state collateral postconviction proceedings. [1]

Contents

Background

The case originated in a § 1983 class action lawsuit brought by death row inmate Joseph M. Giarratano in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Giarratano alleged that he and other death row inmates had a constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings challenging their convictions and sentences, and that the state of Virginia was not meeting its obligations to guarantee this right. The District Court agreed that Virginia was not meeting its constitutional obligations and ordered it to appoint postconviction counsel for indigent death row inmates who sought to file habeas corpus petitions. On appeal, a divided three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. This panel's ruling, in turn, was reversed by the full Fourth Circuit sitting en banc . [2]

Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court voted 5–4 to reverse the en banc Fourth Circuit on the grounds that, under the circumstances of the case, Virginia had taken adequate steps to make counsel available to indigent death row inmates. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment only, stating that

While Virginia has not adopted procedures for securing representation that are as far reaching and effective as those available in other States, no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison system is staffed with institutional lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for postconviction relief. I am not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution. [2]

Because all four dissenting justices argued that there was a right to government-appointed counsel in capital postconviction proceedings, and because Kennedy's concurrence also endorsed the existence of this right, some legal commentators have argued that Giarratano did not rule that there was no right to counsel in such proceedings. For example, Eric M. Freedman states that "[t]o read Giarratano as holding that states have no obligation to provide postconviction counsel to death row inmates is to misread it. On the contrary, five, and perhaps six, Justices plainly believed that states do have such an obligation." [2]

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References

  1. McGill, Alice (1990-01-01). "Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases". UC Law Constitutional Quarterly. 18 (1): 211. ISSN   0094-5617.
  2. 1 2 3 Freedman, Eric (2006-01-01). "Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital Postconviction Proceedings". Cornell Law Review. 91: 1079.