Nancy Gallini

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Nancy T. Gallini is an economist, professor emeritus, researcher, and author. She is a professor emeritus at the Vancouver School of Economics based in the University of British Columbia. She has served on multiple editorial boards such as American Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Literature and the Journal of Industrial Economics. In 2008, Dr. Gallini was appointed as a member to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. From 2011-2014 Dr. Gallini served on the executive council for the Canadian Economic Association. Her research "focuses on the economics of intellectual property, competition policy, strategic alliances, licensing, and optimal patent policy". [1] She is the co-author of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy. She has won numerous awards and a fellowship throughout her career. She has received 8 research grants from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. These grants are one SSHRC Leave Fellowship, one SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship and six SSHRC Research Grants.

Contents

Education

Dr. Gallini obtained both her B.A in Mathematics (1973) and Master of Arts in Economics (1974) from the University of Missouri. She went to pursue her doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley, where she received her Ph.D. in Resource Economics.

Career

Academic positions

She started her economics career at the University of Toronto. She became a faculty member in the Department of Economics from 1979-2002. She then went onto become the Chair of the Economics department from 1995-2000. Upon leaving her position at the University of Toronto she moved to Vancouver and became the Dean of Arts at the University of British Columbia from 2002-2010.

She has been a visiting professor at numerous post-secondary institutions such as: "Hitotsubashi University (Japan), the University of New South Wales (Australia), the University of Auckland (New Zealand), Delhi School of Economics (India), the University of Geneva (Switzerland), the Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (France), and Yale Law School (United States of America)". [2]

Editorial boards

Editorial Board Membership
YearEconomic Journals
1998 - 2002 Journal of Economic Literature [3]
1993 - 1996International Journal of Industrial Organization [3]
1993 - 1996Journal of Industrial Economics [3]
1992 - 1995; 1995 - 1998 American Economic Review [3]

Memberships and appointments

Dr. Gallini was appointed President to the Canadian Council Dean of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences from 2005 to 2006. From 2006 to 2010, she was a member of the Women's Health Research Institute. In 2008, Dr. Gallini was appointed to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She was the leader representative for the University of British Columbia until 2010. She served on the Museum of Anthropology advisory board from 2011 to 2012. She was appointed to serve as a governing member on the Mitacs Research Council from 2011 to 2014. [4] From 2011 to 2014 she also served on the Canadian Economic Association executive council. [3] Dr. Gallini is also an Advisory Board member for the Neglected Global Disease Initiative [5] at the University of British Columbia.

Research and academic works

Select scholarships

The term Intellectual Property has various protection mechanisms that range from patents, copyrights, industrial design rights, trademarks and trade secrets. [6] Due to the differing protection mechanism, each one has their own protection duration, criteria and purpose. Dr. Gallini's paper "analyzes and compares two types of cooperative agreements that combine Intellectual Property: patent pools and copyright collectives". [6] Since each protection mechanism has its own protection duration, criteria and purpose, Dr. Gallini questions "what are those differences and specific circumstances that would require a different (e.g., more or less restrictive) approach toward patent pools and collectives?". [6] To answer the question she "evaluate[s] antitrust policy in three environments in which owners of the intellectual property: (1) are vertically integrated into the downstream (product) market; (2) face competition in the upstream (input) market and (3) own downstream products that do not require a license on the pooled IP but compete with products that do". [6]

Dr. Gallini's paper found that even though there were different antitrust concerns between patent pools and collectives, "the welfare consequences and... recommended antitrust treatment is surprisingly uniform". [6] In the first environment, patent pools and copyright collectives continue to be efficient for some members that are vertically integrated if they are welfare-enhancing when there is the absence of vertical integration. [6] Second, competition between firm in the "upstream market is mitigated if members retain the right to license separately outside of the pool or collective". [6] Finally, in the third environment, pools and collectives become welfare enhancing when they face downstream market competition, "even if some members have ownership stake in those competing products". [6]

"Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?" (2002)

Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer review the "economic reasoning that supports patent and other intellectual property over the alternatives". [7] Currently the argument against intellectual property is that it hinders future innovation. There are some inventions that do not fall under patents, but received "sui generis" protection. [7] Which raises the question: "are there natural market forces that protect investors so that formal protections or other incentives are not necessary?" [7] Or is intellectual property the best system?

Dr. Gallini and Dr. Scotchmer found that intellectual property is the best protection mechanism "when value and cost are not observable by the sponsor". [7] Their paper disregards the argument that intellectual property hinders innovation. Rather, intellectual property promotes innovation because it is conditional on the invention or product's success. [7] Their second conclusion is that "neither IP nor prizes can aggregate the information that is decentralized among firms". [7] Firms that obtain prizes or differ in prizes receive[d] can be improved "on a simple prize system or patent system". [7] But there should have been negotiations beforehand to select the favored firms. [7]

"Patent Policy and Costly Imitation" (1992)

Mukesh Eswaran and Nancy Gallini extend the "theory of optimal patents to allow for costly imitation of patented innovation". [8] Patents are designed to promote research and to encourage the creation of new inventions "so that others can use and build upon research results". [8] Therefore, patents have two outcomes: the invention is beyond the means of imitation and is not a threat to the innovator or the invention can easily be imitated and becomes a threat to the innovator. [8] The author's state that the more common case between the two is that the imitation is more costly but not prohibitively. [8] They conduct a study where they model optimal patent policy with costly imitation that endogenizes imitation. [8]

Their study found that innovations that have patent designs discourage all imitation because it is too costly. The second result they found was that an innovation that had a broad patent (meaning that there was no imitation) "adjusted to generate the desired return from research". [8] They make several recommendations to avoid costly imitations. The first being to give shorter patent life and "the innovator could license its innovation to discourage imitation". [8] They acknowledge the limitation of their model and call for the model to be "extended to examine a sequence of improvements of the original innovation or a sequence of applications of the original innovation in distinct markets". [8] The last recommendation is to try and examine the optimality of the patent when only a single uniform policy is applied to various innovations with different social values. [8]

"Producer-Consumer Trade-Offs in Export Cartels: The Wheat Cartel Case" (1980)

Due to the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), there has been a discussion to form a wheat cartel by the major wheat-producing countries: the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina. [9] Colin Carter, Nancy Gallini and Andrew Schmitz "consider a market in which the commodity in question has a relatively large domestic demand component" where there is a sharp distinction "between a producer export cartel and a government export cartel". [9] They state that in this model, the producer export cartel "may lose from a government cartel". [9] Their paper uses the model above to conduct a study on the world wheat economy and they find that the above outcome is true and that "there is a strong possibility that producers would lose from a government wheat cartel if there are decreasing returns in production". [9] The only way to make up for the lost profits for the producer export cartel is if the government was to tax the consumers. [9] If they do not, there is no welfare gain to the producers. They do warn that their model is under the free trade model and that there is the assumption that importers do not retaliate. [9] Consumers are the true winners in this model.

Publications

Selected journal publications

Book

  • Anderson, Robert D., Nancy T Gallini. Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 1998;2000;.

Grants and awards

Awards and Fellowships [3]
YearAward/FellowshipInstitution
2010Margaret Fulton Award University of British Columbia
2002, 2005, 2008Just Desserts AwardsThe Alma Mater Society at University of British Columbia
2001Distinguished Lecturer Industry Canada
1998 Olin Fellowship Yale Law School
Research Grants [3]
YearGrantInstitution
2001-2004SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1994-1997SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1991-1994SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1990-1991SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1988-1989SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1986-1987SSHRC Leave Fellowship Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1983-1984SSHRC Research Grant Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
1981-1982SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

Related Research Articles

Intellectual property Ownership of ideas and processes

Intellectual property (IP) is a category of property that includes intangible creations of the human intellect. There are many types of intellectual property, and some countries recognize more than others. The most well-known types are copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. The modern concept of intellectual property developed in England in the 17th and 18th centuries. The term "intellectual property" began to be used in the 19th century, though it was not until the late 20th century that intellectual property became commonplace in the majority of the world's legal systems.

An oligopoly is a market form wherein a market or industry is dominated by a small group of large sellers (oligopolists). For example, it has been found that insulin and the electrical industry are highly oligopolist in the US.

Patent Type of legal protection for an invention

A patent is a type of intellectual property that gives its owner the legal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention for a limited period of years in exchange for publishing an enabling disclosure of the invention. In most countries, patent rights fall under private law and the patent holder must sue someone infringing the patent in order to enforce their rights. In some industries patents are an essential form of competitive advantage; in others they are irrelevant.

Rent-seeking is the effort to increase one's share of existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through misallocation of resources, reduced wealth-creation, lost government revenue, heightened income inequality, and potential national decline.

Competition law is a law that promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies. Competition law is implemented through public and private enforcement. It is also known as anti-monopoly law in China and Russia. In previous years it has been known as trade practices law in the United Kingdom and Australia. In the European Union, it is referred to as both antitrust and competition law.

A cross-licensing agreement is a contract between two or more parties where each party grants rights to their intellectual property to the other parties.

The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is a Canadian federal research-funding agency that promotes and supports post-secondary research and training in the humanities and social sciences. It is one of three major federal granting agencies that together are referred to as "the tri-council".

In patent law, a patent pool is a consortium of at least two companies agreeing to cross-license patents relating to a particular technology. The creation of a patent pool can save patentees and licensees time and money, and, in case of blocking patents, it may also be the only reasonable method for making the invention available to the public. Competition law issues are usually important when a large consortium is formed.

The Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property is the result of a project commissioned by the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce, London, England, and is intended as a positive statement of what good intellectual property policy is. The Charter was issued in 2004.

Henry Isaac Ergas is an economist who has worked at the OECD, Australian Trade Practices Commission as well as at a number of economic consulting firms. He chaired the Australian Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee set up by the Australian Federal Government in 1999 to review Australia's intellectual property laws as they relate to competition policy.

Humanitarian use licenses are provisions in a license whereby inventors and technology suppliers protect in advance the possibility of sharing their technology with people in need. Thus, humanitarian use licenses set the conditions for the provision of access to innovations for people in need at a royalty free basis or at lower costs. Humanitarian use licenses assure that products of research and development stay publicly available and that at the same time the incentive function of exclusive intellectual property rights are maintained.

A patent thicket is "an overlapping set of patent rights" which requires innovators to reach licensing deals for multiple patents. This concept is associated with negative connotations and has been described as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology".

The Arrow information paradox, and occasionally referred to as Arrow's disclosure paradox, named after Kenneth Arrow, American economist and joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks, is a problem faced by companies when managing intellectual property across their boundaries. It occurs when they seek external technologies for their business or external markets for their own technologies. It has implications for the value of technology and innovations as well as their development by more than one firm, and for the need for and limitations of patent protection.

Legal scholars, economists, activists, policymakers, industries, and trade organizations have held differing views on patents and engaged in contentious debates on the subject. Critical perspectives emerged in the nineteenth century that were especially based on the principles of free trade. Contemporary criticisms have echoed those arguments, claiming that patents block innovation and waste resources that could otherwise be used productively, and also block access to an increasingly important "commons" of enabling technologies, apply a "one size fits all" model to industries with differing needs, that is especially unproductive for industries other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals and especially unproductive for the software industry. Enforcement by patent trolls of poor quality patents has led to criticism of the patent office as well as the system itself. Patents on pharmaceuticals have also been a particular focus of criticism, as the high prices they enable puts life-saving drugs out of reach of many people. Alternatives to patents have been proposed, such Joseph Stiglitz's suggestion of providing "prize money" as a substitute for the lost profits associated with abstaining from the monopoly given by a patent.

Daniele Archibugi Italian economic and political theorist

Daniele Archibugi is an Italian economic and political theorist. He works on the economics and policy of innovation and technological change, on the political theory of international relations and on political and technological globalisation.

TRIPS Agreement International treaty on intellectual property protections

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international legal agreement between all the member nations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It establishes minimum standards for the regulation by national governments of different forms of intellectual property (IP) as applied to nationals of other WTO member nations. TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1989 and 1990 and is administered by the WTO.

The Intellectual Property Issues in Cultural Heritage (IPinCH) Project is a seven-year international research initiative based at Simon Fraser University, in British Columbia, Canada. IPinCH's work explores the rights, values, and responsibilities of material culture, cultural knowledge, and the practice of heritage research. The project is directed by Dr. George P. Nicholas, co-developed with Julie Hollowell and Kelly Bannister and is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada's (SSHRC) major collaborative research initiatives (MCRI) program.

Suzanne Scotchmer was an American professor of law, economics and public policy at the University of California, Berkeley and also a noted author on many economic subjects. She earned her B.A. from University of Washington magna cum laude in 1970, her M.A. in statistics from UC Berkeley in 1979, and her PhD in economics from UC Berkeley in 1980.

Richard J. Gilbert is an American Economist, professor at UC Berkeley from 1976 to 2000, and founder of LECG Corp.. Richard ('Rich') Gilbert served as Deputy Assistant General in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in the White House from 1993 to 1995, and author of Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the Knowledge Economy, published by M.I.T. Press. While serving for the United States Justice Department, Richard Gilbert led the development of Joint Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. Currently Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley, Richard Gilbert was president of the Industrial Organization Society at University of California, Berkeley during his tenure and from 2002 to 2005 the Chair of the Economics department there. Professor Gilbert has taken special interest in Innovation, Organizational behavior, and Energy economics. Richard J. Gilbert now works as Emeritus from the University, as a consultant for Compass Lexicon and was on the Board of the East Bay College Fund Oakland Promise Association.

Lynne Pepall is a Canadian-American economist, academic and researcher. She is an Economics Professor and currently chairs the Department of Community Health at Tufts University.

References

  1. "Nancy Gallini | Vancouver School of Economics". economics.ubc.ca. Retrieved 2019-11-26.
  2. Canada, Employment and Social Development (2013-06-20). "Dr. Nancy Gallini Appointed Member to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada". gcnws. Retrieved 2019-11-26.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 "Curriculum Vitae | Nancy Gallini" . Retrieved 2019-11-26.
  4. chelsea (2015-11-03). "Mitacs announces new members to Research Council". Mitacs. Retrieved 2019-11-26.
  5. Government of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (2012-05-11). "Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council". www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca. Retrieved 2019-11-26.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Gallini, Nancy (2011-12-31). "Competition Policy, Patent Pools and Copyright Collectives". Rochester, NY. SSRN   2024560 .Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Gallini, Nancy; Scotchmer, Suzanne (2002). "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?". Innovation Policy and the Economy. 2: 51–77. doi: 10.1086/653754 . ISSN   1531-3468. JSTOR   25054489.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Gallini, Nancy T. (1992). "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation". The RAND Journal of Economics. 23 (1): 52–63. doi:10.2307/2555432. ISSN   0741-6261. JSTOR   2555432.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Carter, Colin; Gallini, Nancy; Schmitz, Andrew (1980). "Producer-Consumer Trade-Offs in Export Cartels: The Wheat Cartel Case". American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 62 (4): 812–818. doi:10.2307/1239786. ISSN   0002-9092. JSTOR   1239786.