Papua New Guinea has exported liquefied natural gas (LNG) since 2014. [1] The LNG sector is important to PNG's economy with US$2.95 billion in exports in 2020, and accounting for 5.25% of the GDP in 2019. [2] On a global scale, PNG is a minor player, with 0.08% of world reserves [2] In 2020, PNG was ranked 16th on the list of gas exporting countries. [3]
There are five LNG projects in PNG; only the Hides Project is fully operational. An agreement was made between the PNG government and a consortium of companies to develop the second project: the "Elk/Antelope" field. These companies cooperate under the Papua-LNG project. The development of the third project, the "Pn’yang Gas Field", is in an advanced planning stage. The fourth LNG project in development is the "Western Gas" field. The fifth Gasca gasfield is offshore. The benefits of LNG development for the country is a controversial issue. Government participation in the projects is controversial and has been a dominant theme in PNG politics in the past decade. It became a major issue in the events leading to the resignation of Peter O'Neill as prime minister.
The Hides gas field is the main field operated by PNG LNG and was discovered in 1987 by BP, who sold it to Oil Search. Originally, the idea was to transport the gas through a pipeline to Australia. Chevron was the big fossil fuel company that would carry it forward. It came close to a production phase but the project was dropped in 2007 after Australian customers dropped out of the conditional sales agreements. [4] At present Australia exports a manifold of LNG compared to PNG and the project would not be of interest for that market anymore. In 2008 ExxonMobil assumed leadership to develop a gas project sourcing the Hides gas field to export LNG to the Asian market. The project was completed in 2014 after rapidly completing planning and construction phases: [5]
When the proposals for an LNG facility in PNG were raised there were two factions in the cabinet: one headed by Prime Minister Michael Somare who advocated a partnership with InterOil to develop the Elk-Antelope gas field, and the other by his son Arthur Somare, who advocated a partnership with ExxonMobil/Oil Search to develop the Hides gas fields. [61] Somare's son won, but once PNG/LNG became operational, attention went to Interoil's Elk-Antelope Gas Field. The fields are located in a marshy area in the eastern margin of the Papuan Basin to the west of Port Moresby (90 km from the Gulf of Papua coast). [62] [63] The size of the gas field is certified at about 6.5 trillion cubic feet, compared to the estimated 7.1 trillion cubic feet in Hides and associated fields. [64] While planning and implementation of the LNG PNG project did not encounter problems, the Elk-Antelope gas field project was mired in political and technical controversies.
Two relatively small oil and gas companies were major players in the Elk-Antelope gas field: Interoil and Oil Search. Interoil was a minor company in the gas and oil industry that acquired exploration licenses for oil and gas in PNG in 2005. The driving force in Interoil was its founder: Phil E. Mulacek, who announced in 2007 the discovery of a large gas field on the edge of the Gulf of Papua in the south of the country. "The InterOil Corporation, made the kind of announcement investors crave: explorations near the refinery had uncorked a vast pool of natural gas potentially larger than the United States' total residential consumption of the fossil fuel in 2005. The size of the discovery was so large, Phil E. Mulacek, chairman and chief executive, informed an analyst, that simply controlling its output 'was sort of like trying to stop the Mississippi.'" [65] An agreement was made between Interoil and the PNG government to proceed towards exploitation on one condition: Interoil had to partner with a company that had experience the development and management of a gas field. [66] Shell and ExxonMobil were mentioned as possible partners when Interoil entered negotiations. [67] The investment bank Merrill Lynch (now called Merrill (company) was also involved. [68] However, at the end of 2012 Interoil did not manage to find a partner to reach a Final Investment Decision (FID) and were in danger of losing the licence. [69] A proposal suggested that the PNG government would become a 50 percent shareholder instead of taking the proposed equity of 22.3 percent. [70] It was denied because the government did not have the money and it would not solve the problem of expertise. The French multinational Total SE is a major company in the oil and gas industry and they filled the void by buying a 60 percent interest in the gasfield. [71] Oil Search Company entered negotiations around the same time. It was already a stakeholder in the LNG PNG project and it extended its interests by buying into the Elk-Antelope gas fields, and they bought the Pac LNG group that had a 22.8% stake in the gasfields [72] and paid about US$900 million for participation. The money was sourced from equity bought by the PNG government and financed from a loan from the Swiss bank UBS. [73] Oil Search contested Total's participation before a London court of arbitration. Oil Search claimed to have priority rights (pre-emptive rights) in buying into Interoil because of its acquisition of Pac LNG. [74] Total continued to be present in Papua-LNG but at a reduced rate of 40% instead of 60%. [75] Interoil remained with an interest of about 40% in the Elk-Antelope gas field. Oil Search made a bid for Interoil's remaining shares in the gas field for US$3 billion. [76] OilSearch had to concede to ExxonMobil: they offered US$2.2.billion for the remaining shares of Interoil in the gasfield. [77] However, Mulacek had been replaced by Michael Hession as CEO in 2013. [78] Nevertheless, Mulacek challenged the deal in courts and in the shareholders meeting, but was defeated in both instances. [79]
The pattern of fierce competition and shifting alliances resulted in the following shareholding and proposed structure for the project: Total is the largest shareholder of the Elk-Antelope fields with a 31.1% interest. The partners are ExxonMobil (28.3%) and Oil Search (17.7%). The plan assumed that construction is 70% debt financed. [80]
Oil Search had the management contract for the upstream facilities while ExxonMobil managed the gas liquefaction plant and loading bay. The latter facilities would be built at the same place near Port Moresby as installations serving LNG/PNG. [81]
The agreement contained an obligation to provide gas for domestic use (a reserved 5%) so that PNG is for 70 percent self-sufficient for electricity supply in 2030. The State and landowners are not obliged to pay for their equity (US$900 million) before revenues start coming in. Payment for the Interoil shares by ExxonMobil is partly deferred until the FID and first shipments are made. Interoil retains residual rights to income from the gasfield if it performs above certain expectations. [82] Pac-LNG has retained residual rights to income if the output is beyond a certain expectation. [83] Total deferred cash payments for equity to the date of the FID (US$230 million). [84]
The Memorandum of Understanding between the PNG government and the companies involved in the Elk-Antelope field was announced at the end of the A Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in 2018. Its intent was to support PNG's international status, [85] and it was followed by an agreement in April 2019 to start the Front End Engineering Design process. The Final Investment Decision (FID) that makes construction possible is expected in 2020. Output is expected to flow in 2024. [86]
In 2011 the FID was expected in the same year. [87] In 2017 the first LNG exports were expected in either late 2020 or early 2021 [88] The new dates are also speculative because the financial underpinning of the announced agreement is virtually absent. There is only a commitment of a small proportion of the necessary cash for construction. The cash paid for the gas field is for the shareholders of Interoil and is not working capital for Papua-LNG. Nothing has been built or constructed with that money: it is merely a sum paid in the expectation of predicted income, which contrasts with investing in a company that started from scratch. The project is expected to be financed from loans for 70%; where the loan capital would come from is undetermined. [80]
The agreement was also politically controversial. Authoritative voices had argued that the mistakes of LNG PNG should have been avoided. O’Neill agreed, though he also said that there should be an "environment for our development partners to maximise returns on their investment". [89] He was under pressure from a comment in the March Monetary Policy Statement from the Bank of Papua New Guinea, which urged the government to be less generous with tax concessions. The policies with respect of tax and natural resource projects had led to less availability of foreign exchange and had not strengthened tax revenues. In 2018, PNG had a strong positive balance on the current account, which should have led to an increase in foreign exchange that never happened. [90] Deputy Prime Minister Charles Abel criticised the benefits of natural resource projects for PNG. [91] [92] Abel collaborated with Minister of Mining Fabian Pok on the government negotiating team for the Papua-LNG project. He was content about the agreement: "We made compromises, but he considered it a significant improvement over the PNG LNG project: this Agreement provides earlier, less risky flows to the State, reduces the States financing burden to buys its shares, and provides some gas for domestic use at a discounted and fixed price. There are strong provisions for third party access to infrastructure and national content." [93]
However, the agreement was immediately controversial. Some of the initial criticism came from Hela province, the locus of LNG PNG where benefits should have appeared. Philip Undialu, Governor of Hela Province, submitted a long list of critical questions. [94] Minister of Finance James Marape, who was from Hela, resigned. [95] More MPs followed him and resigned from the governing party (PNC). Four out of five resigning MPs originated from resource-rich areas [96]
Former Prime Minister Late Sir Mekere Morauta criticised three areas in the agreement: first, the agreement was created without the necessary and required consultation. Landowner groups have not been properly identified in the PNG LNG project after ten years of operation. The government claimed that the money was reserved for when the process of identification is complete, without clarifying where the money was. It was seen as a cardinal mistake in the PNG LNG project that this identification was not completed before the start of the project. Therefore, landowner groups should have been identified before the APDL (Application for a Petroleum Development Licence) was submitted. Abel defended it as the agreement is provisional; [97] there was no APDL at the time. None of the members of the SNT (State Negotiating Team) publicly broke ranks with government, but there were strong statements claiming that this team, as well as the Department of Petroleum, have been sidelined. Morauta distributed a letter from the Department of Energy to the Secretary of the Government, which demanded that a proper APDL be made with the necessary documentation about the field's size and its economic viability. [98] Total should have provided ten documents that were absent or deficient, but they did not follow up on requests. The necessary information for decision making was not there and the required procedure was not followed. [99]
Second, the tax arrangements are similar to the ones in LNG PNG. The State agreed with the ongoing operational and depreciation costs. Depreciation in the project was tied to the repayment of loans. Profitability was predicted to be low until the loans were repaid with interest. If the participating partners furnished the loan capital themselves they would have assured themselves of a steady income stream irrespective of profitability. The faster the depreciation the less profit would have been made. Tax on interest or dividends would not be withheld, which meant the companies could export their income to a destination where little or no tax was paid without any taxation by the PNG government. Two of the participating companies – Total and ExxonMobil – would also have a steady income stream from the management contract. The companies would also have been exempt from paying GST, import, duties, and taxes on project goods and consumables. The management of the project was virtually tax free which made the management contract more profitable. Morauta argues that nothing was learnt from the LNG PNG project and mentions two specific instances: first, there was no proper taxation for windfall profits and there was no mention of taxing the oil that came out of the well mixed with gas (condensate). The oil was sold to Oilsearch, which could have been seen as compensation for Oilsearch losing out on the management contract. [99] [100]
The third area of criticism concerned the domestic gas obligations of the project. The domestic provision of gas was an option to 5% of the output in the agreement. The agreement was also in contravention to the National Energy Policy which demanded that 15% of all gas output was available for domestic use. The agreement mentions the only provision of gas for electricity supply ignores possible wider industrial use. Gas would also have been expensive as it would be indexed from a high base to the world market price while it is domestically supplied. [101]
At the time of the agreement's conclusion, doubts returned in regards to the field's value. [102] Interoil had always presented the Elk-Antelope gas field as their own original find. That is not true; there is an earlier explorative team in the area that found gas, but doubted whether the field was exploitable. A whistleblower in the Department of Energy has brought this in the open again at the time of signing the agreement. [103] According to the report, the field had five major problems: the gas was probably not as extensive as predicted, not easily extractable, high water content, low quality gas, required expensive treatment, and the field's geology is suspect. [104]
Fok, the Minister of Mining, replied to the Governor of Hela province, Philip Undialo, who had a concern about the gas agreement. He denied all accusations and considered them lies for political purposes. He stressed that none of the members of the State Negotiating Team had publicly spoken negatively about the agreement. [105]
The agreement on the Elk-Antelope gas field became the core of political controversies about PNG's policies with respect to natural resources. It led to Peter O'NeillO'Neill's resignation. [106] His successor, James Marape, announced changes in the management of PNG's natural resources in his maiden speech, though at the same time he was keen to reassure investors: "He did not intend to chase industry away, but asserting that reforms were needed to ensure benefits are spread more evenly." [107] Oil Search's Peter Botten proclaimed immediately after Marape's appointment that it was likely that nothing would change and arrangements would remain the same when the third gas field Pn'yang came into production. Botten did not expect any significant new concessions on the dea,. [108] which led to a bristling reply from Marape, yet he remained vague as regards to envisioned changes. [109] Minister for Petroleum and Energy Kerenga Kua announced two months after the change of government that a revision of the "regulatory and commercial terms of the so called LNG agreement was ready for political approval". The companies involved were unsympathetic to proposed changes. Total declared that no change in the agreement would be entertained. Oil Search warned that revisions may push back the FID to 2021 and projects elsewhere in the world may take precedence over Papua-LNG [110] Three government-backed lenders – Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the US Overseas Private Investment Corporationt(OPIC) and Export Australia Finance otherwise named Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) – announced an initial commitment to lend to Papua-LNG. [110] Kua negotiated with Total in Singapore in August 2019 to receive better terms, which resulted in a number of non-binding statements of intent. His most important statement was that in the future, contracts would be made on the basis of a Production sharing agreement which would lead to early free cash flows in petroleum and mining contracts. [111] Kua stated on return from Singapore that The Papua-LNG project would proceed as planned.In fact notiations were Broken off and preparation for the project was suspended.
The suspension lasted til May 2021. Collaboration was resumed after a delay of three years as the result of a meeting in Paris between the CEO of Total and Sam Basil, as deputy prime minister of PNG. They announced the remobilisation of the project teams and other required resources, At the meeting there was a reconfirmation of the Papua LNG Gas Agreement in 2019 which had been the contentious issue in the fall of the O’Neill/Abel government. [112] The signing of a Fiscal Stability Agreement in February may in this respect be more important as this concerns the most crucial issue: government income from the project. Government has given in more through withdrawing the amendments 2020 to the Mining Act. These amendments gave among others greater powers to the minister in determining a PDL (Petroleum Development License) and abolished the option of arbitration in case of a conflict. [113] The minister stressed in parliament that these withdrawals were only applicable to Papua/LNG. [114] A Petroleum Retention License extension was also awarded in February 2021. Such a license allows for project financing activities and also strategic market studies, which will be done separately by the participating companies or with other participants. The work programme for the Extension includes technical activities in preparation for the front-end engineering and design work. [115] A pre-Front End Engineering Design (FEED) program does not guarantee a permission for a FEED. The aim remains to announce a FEED in 2022 and a Final Investment Decision (FID) in 2023. Production is expected in 2017. [116] The agreements reached have a peculiar mixture of being definite and being provisional. This was made evident by Petroleum Minister Kerenge Kua when he stressed that the issues involved remained political at a meeting with a senior visitor from Total in France. [117]
The Pn’yang gas field is the third project for PNG Gas. It is situated in the lowlands to the northwest of the Hides gas field. It was originally thought to be a relatively small gas field, but a certification exercise revised this as composing of 4.37 trillion cubic feet of gas. [118] For comparison, Hides is estimated to be at 7.1 trillion cubic feet and Elk-Antelope at 6.43 trillion cubic feet. [64] The development of this gas field would require relatively fewer expenses: the pipeline from Hides to the coast would only need to be extended inland. At the Caution Bay loading point it would need one extra train to condense the gas for shipping, which would mean building one extra train besides the two extra trains for the Elk-Antelope gas field. Synergies are expected. [119]
ExxonMobil has been the main actor in this field and as lead operator owns 49% That is including its subsidiary Ampolex. Oil Search was originally a partner in the project before it was bought by Santos. Santos has after absorbing Oil Search 28% interest. JX Nippon operates through Merlin Petroleum company, its subsidiary ,has a12.5% interest respectively. Exxon Mobil will work with the PNG government regarding their interest in additional equity in the project. [120]
Negotiations with the government broke down in 2019, but were resumed in 2021 Agreement was reached in February 2022: three years after breaking off negotiations. The PNG government considered the deal reached very favourably. Prime Minister Marape claimed a government take of 63% in this deal as compared to 49% in the PNG/LNG project and 51% in the Papua LNG project. The agreement gives 34.5 per cent of the equity in the project to the PNG State, significantly more than the 22.5 per cent for the TotalEnergies-led Papua LNG project or the 19.6 per cent for PNG's first gas project, PNG LNG. Exxon said it will work with the PNG government regarding their interest in additional equity in the project. [121] It will offload shares to provide for landowner interests, Construction is expected to begin when the construction of Papua LNG is completed in 2228 and production could then start in 2232. Exxon Mobil declared that the agreement sets a clear framework for development, but it is not a guarantee that the project will go ahead. [122]
The Western Gas Project is the fourth LNG development. Central in this proposal are four drilled gas fields in the Western Province. Horizon oil is the major partner in these. Most of these interests have been bought from Repsol, a Spanish company. The Chinese company Balang also bought interests in the fields from Repsol. Repsol maintained interest in the field. after selling off shares. Kumul Petroleum holdings, the PNG state company is another partner. Brent Emmer, the chief Executive Officer of Horizon declared in 2017 that pre-Feed studies (concept engineering and design were ready. It entails the construction of a processing (conditioning) plant at the wellheads to separate the oil (condense) from the gas, a separate pipe line to Daru, and the construction of a liquefaction plant in Daru. ( [123] [124] There has been no significant follow up. It is a mooted point whether it should be a stand alone project or whether it should be integrated in the operations of LNG-PNG and Oil Search in the highlands.The expectation is that the project will generate also much condensate, oil that comes with the gas extraction. The project has been the subject of a conflict with the government because permits were cancelled. [125] This was solved amidst allegations of corruption. [126] An inquiry concluded that nothing inappropriate had happened and the PNG government did not follow up the accusations. [127]
Pasca gas field is the first offshore gas project in the Gulf of Papua New Guinea. It entails a production platform as well as loading capacities offshore. Twinza oil holds the licence. The field is known since 1988 but the technical capacity to develop the field is according to Twinza recent. A prospecting permit was issued in 2011.The company has been very optimistic about the stage of preparation: pre FEED work is completed in 2020. [128] Negotiations with the PNG government for a Petroleum Development License (PDL) started in May 2020 and were concluded with a non binding agreement in September 2020. It was non binding because there was still fundamental disagreement on the government off take of the benefits. [129] Negotiations were again protracted: an expected signing of a contract was cancelled in July 2021. [130] Kua, the minister in charge then demanded a non disclosure agreement with Twinza oil. He also insisted that the top management of the company would be resident in Port Moresby instead of flying in from Australia. The deadline was set at 9 September 2021. Twinza oil was not willing to comply. [131] The CEO of Twinza oil left his job because of frustration with government negotiations in October 2021. [132] The proposed benefits for the PNG government vary between 50 and 60% and are multifarious including corporation tax, production retained for local consumption, development levy etc. There are no precise indications of the subject for further negotiations. The expectation was in July 2021 before negotiations broke down again to reach final investment decision in 2022 and first production in 2025. That is now certainly to be considerably delayed. [133] Another contentious issue appeared at the Pandora Gasfield. Twinza oil wanted to align the Pasca Gas field with neighbouring Pandora Gasfield. However government retrieved the licence for the Pandora Garfield and gave it to the parastatal Kumul Petroleum Holdings. [134]
The projection of equity participation finances in LNG projects is a major issue in the politics surrounding LNG projects. The Mining Act in PNG allowed government participation to be involved to have a share of a maximum of 30 percent in natural resources projects; In the case of PNG LNG this was projected as a 19.4% share. About US$800 million was contributed to the construction of the project and the mining rights. This payment was to be made following the FID. A concurrent phase in the project was the front end engineering Design (FEED) which raised the project's cost, which required the share to be financed by equity. As a result, the PNG government had to find US$1 billion when the FID was made on 12 August 2008. [135] In early March 2009 the PNG government acquired the sum through a loan from IPIC (International Public Investment Corporation; part of Mubadala Investment Company), a sovereign fund from the government of Abu Dhabi. It was not an ordinary loan, but an Exchangeable bonde. IPIC acquired the right to either be repaid in cash or through the security in the loan: PNG's equity in Oil Search Limited. These shares ideally would, at the time of redemption, equal at least the value of the loan which was designated at a share value of A$8.55. If the value of the shares was lower than the loan, the PNG government would have to pay out the missing cash. If the value of the shares was higher than the loan and IPIC wanted to buy the shares, the PNG government was entitled to the extra value in cash. The loan was expected to mature after five years, but IPIC could opt for a shorter period. The interest was 5%. [136] [137] When the loan matured in 2014 the share price was around A$8.55 and IPIC wanted the shares as repayment for the loan. The PNG government sent a delegation to Abu Dhabi in an attempt to dissuade them and accept cash. They refused and the Oil Search shares were transferred from the PNG government to IPIC. The share price also fell back and PNG had to add US$70.8 million. [138] This financial construction was defended by Arthur Somare when the deal was concluded. He argued that the government did not want the loan to add to government indebtedness. It was fundamentally the sale of an asset – the Oil Search shares – in the first place. 2008 was also the year of the worldwide financial crisis which made it difficult to raise money. [138] "The exchangeable bond effectively involved a future swap in shares held in Oil Search for immediate funding for a direct equity stake in the LNG venture." [139] The latter was expected to be much more profitable: The government also expected to raise more money from the equity participation in LNG-PNG than from Oil Search dividends. It was expected that the revenue stream from the LNG project would redeem the loan. Arthur Somare was the government minister in charge of public companies (IPBC) and the LNG project. Morauta challenged Somare when the IPIC loan concluded; he criticised Arthur Somare's position as minister in charge of IPBC and the use of his position to monopolise negotiations about the loan. From the beginning, he criticised the mortgages of national assets (the government's shares in Oil Search). [140] Morauta became the minister of IPBC in 2011 and reiterated his criticisms: "A loan in which Treasury was not involved; a loan which never had NEC approval; a loan which was never tabled in Parliament. It was negotiated and signed behind closed doors by people with no experience in the complex world of international high finance." He criticised technicalities of the loan: "The loan was drawn half a year before it was needed for financing and this led to a loss of interest. Currency risk was not hedged either. The most fundamental criticism was that A longer running time of the loan could have resulted in financing it from the income stream of PNG/LNG. That was due to early maturing of the loan not realistic." [141]
The government of PNG lost its equity in Oil Search after the IPIC loan was redeemed and had exchanged it for equities in LNG PNG. O’Neill wanted to redress this situation with a new shareholder in Oil Search, [142] who was looking for fresh capital to buy a stake in the next LNG project: the Elk-Antelope gas field. They needed US$900 million to buy the share of Pac LNG group in that field. Oil Search issued new share capital to finance this acquisition. These shares were bought by the government of PNG and financed with a loan from the Australian branch of the UBS bank. [143] This loan was similar to the IPIC loan to finance shares in LNG PNG: the shares that PNG bought in Oil Search were security for the loan; it was a "collared loan", which implied hedging one's bets on the movement of share prices – the high and low were the collar – in order to guarantee a loan purchasing the shares. [144] The risks for the bank were reduced because the loan was to be serviced directly from an Escrow account in Singapore where PNG's income from LNG PNG was paid. UBS had a first claim to the money, [145] [146]
The finances were controversial since its inception and were similar to the debate around the IPIC loan. First, the loan concluded by bypassing the legally required channels and the little consultation that took place was careless. For example, the board of the State Petroleum organization was presented with a decision that they were expected to follow and concerns were ignored. [144] PNG's National Executive Council (NEC) was also confronted with a prepared statement. The treasurer, Don Polye, refused to sign and was fired as a result. [147] However, there were more ministers who opposed the decision. [148] The decision has probably passed in some form through the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, but prominent PNG economists argued from its inception that "the UBS loan was sought outside of sound fiscal management laws and legal governance". [149] This was confirmed by an Ombudsman Commission report that recommended a leadership tribunal for Marape and O'Neill. The Commission found fifteen breaches of procedure. [150] The most important breach may be that parliament was not asked to approve the loan as this was constitutionally required. [151]
Much of the loan was shrouded in mystery and there suspicions about parties benefiting themselves. The suspicions were warranted as there was a bridging loan of A$335 million covering the costs of acquiring the shares besides the substantive collared loan of A$904 million to cover the price of the Oil Search shares. [152] The Ombudsman Commission's report found that "it involved different contracts being signed between at least eight different parties including the PNG State, UBS AG, UBS Nominees Pty Ltd, UBS Securities Australia Limited, the National Petroleum Company of PNG (Kroton) Limited and its parent, the Independent Public Business Corporation, the Papua New Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas Global Company LDC and, finally, Oil Search Limited". [153] The Commission of inquiry into the UBS loan would pay attention to the fees paid to brokers and negotiators. [154]
Third, the loan was supposed to be redeemed for a long time before one could expect revenues from the Elk-Antelope gas field to repay it. It was expected to be serviced from the income from PNG LNG. However, according to the treasury secretary Diari Vele, the PNG government could only expect revenues to flow after 2020 when investment costs were recouped. The investment costs had to be settled out of depreciation charges to pay off the loans to the highly geared project. [155] The loan had to be repaid in 2016 and Morauta wondered how that had to be repaid. [156] Ultimately, the loan was repaid by the transfer of shares to Oil Search. The repayment was made at a loss: the government of PNG had bought these at A$8.20 and the price was A$6,70 at the time of redemption. When the deal concluded the PNG government expected the share price to double which would have resulted in a windfall for the PNG government. Kumul Petroleum Holdings, the state owned company that owned the shares estimated the loss at US$254 million. [157] [158]
Income from natural resources in PNG projects were far below international standards, according to authoritative institutions (OECD, IMF and IETI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). [159] [160] [161] [162] It was thus understandable that renegotiation of the Papua/LNG agreement was a priority for the Marape government after coming to power. Kua reopened negotiations. However, the energy companies were only willing to grant minor concessions. Kua had to accept the terms of the Papua-LNG agreement, but he insisted that the agreement for the P’nyang gas field should offer considerably better terms: "In the P’nyang talks, the government appears to be seeking a better tax take, more local content and jobs opportunities, more project information from the operator, and a firm commitment to development of P’nyang in a defined timeframe." [163] The energy companies were not willing to take that into consideration and talks broke down between government and the companies on 31 January 2020. [164] Prime Minister Marape sounded confident that progress on the Papua LNG project with lead developer ExxonMobil would continue. [165] Three new trains to convert natural gas into LNG were planned to treat the gas from Papua-LNG as well as from P’nyong. The energy companies wanted to only proceed with preliminary engineering and design for the expansion of its PNG LNG plan with new trains after a Petroleum Development Licence was given for the P’nyang field. [166] The result was a stalemate.
Landowner interests are a further complicating factor. An umbrella organisation of landowners groups covering the area of operation of Papua/LNG went to the courts in order to ask for a temporary injunction against the continuation of developing Papua-LNG. The court allowed the landowners to delay the issue of a Production Development Licence until a new agreement was negotiated and a new Petroleum and Gas Act was in place. Among the landowners' demands were production sharing and at least 50% PNG ownership. [167] [168]
Policies did not reflect much on the attempts to gain equity in the projects. The PNG government has lost its shareholding in Oil Search and exchanged them in practice for a shareholding in LNG PNG. This exchange came at a substantial cost of contracting and servicing a loan and an additional payment. The government of PNG has not acquired a shareholding in Papua-LNG through Oil Search despite the cost of contracting and servicing a loan plus unknown extra payments. The energy companies benefited from a capital injection in PNG LNG through the government's shareholding. Oil Search has benefitted from a capital injection through the botched attempt to gain shares through the UBS loan. The agreement on Papua-LNG expected a shareholding of 22.25 percent in Papua LNG that is expected to be paid from the project's income. Ken Ail Kaepai of PNG University of Technology sketched the dilemma as follows: “Under this arrangement, the dividends will be delayed over more extended periods required for allowing the State to repay the equity capital sourced from external lending institutions or will enable the investor to recoup its equivalent equity capital cost internally using future positive cash flows from the project.” [169] Kerenge Kua, the minister of mines gave the most comprehensive statement on mining policies so far to a webinar of the PNG Chamber of Mines. He advocated moving from a concessionary statement to a policy of production sharing. He deplored the borrowing for equity from the past, but did not come out against equity ownership of the government. On the contrary: the statement left the possibility of 100% state ownership open. [170] The Chamber of Mines deplored the proposals. It also queried whether government debt was due to participation in mining. [171] It seemed that government policy on natural resources was becoming less confrontational when Prime Minister Marape announced “a binding framework” agreement with Barrick Niugini gold mine in Porgera after a serious confrontation. This new deal includes 51% shareholding in the company. [172] Charles Abel, entered the fray again. He was the deputy chairman on the government negotiating team on Papua/LNG and maintained that the deal struck by the O’Neill government with Papua LNG was wrongly portrayed It was much better than came across to the public. That deal also included 51% ownership of the project. However despite this mention Abel said: “The objective should be a more heavily weighted royalty system based on export value as it is much easier to monitor and is not subject to net profit as is dividends and tax. [173] He reiterated in 2021: it is unwise for the PNG government to rely on equity participation but should instead mobilise an income stream through royalties and taxation. “As the major shareholder we will have to meet capital calls when required and bear operating risks like other shareholders.We don't need to do this”. [174]
Papua New Guinea, officially the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, is a country in Oceania that comprises the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and its offshore islands in Melanesia. Its capital, located along its southeastern coast, is Port Moresby. The country is the world's third largest island country, with an area of 462,840 km2 (178,700 sq mi).
Sir Mekere Morauta was a Papua New Guinean politician and economist who served as the 7th Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2002. Inheriting a depressed economy and a fractious legislature, he embarked on fundamental reforms of the country's economy and political system.
The Kikori River is a major river in southern Papua New Guinea on the island of New Guinea. The river has a total length of 445 km (277 mi) and flows southeast into the Gulf of Papua, with its delta at the head of the gulf. The settlement of Kikori lies on the delta.
Arthur Somare is a former Member of the National Parliament of Papua New Guinea (PNG). He represented the electorate of Angoram Open in East Sepik province for the National Alliance Party from 1997 until he lost in the 2012 general elections.
The Papua New Guinea National Rugby League Competition is a semi-professional rugby league competition held annually in Papua New Guinea. Changes in sponsorship have meant it was Formerly known as the SP Inter-City Cup or SP Cup (1990–2008) and later the Bemobile Cup (2009–2010). The current competition is sponsored by pacific telecommunications giant Digicel and new co-naming rights sponsor ExxonMobil which joined in 2023 and so it is currently called the Digicel-ExxonMobil Cup.
Oil Search was the largest oil and gas exploration and development company incorporated in Papua New Guinea, which operated all of the country's oilfields. In December 2021, it merged with the Australian company Santos.
Qatargas is the world's largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) company. It produces and supplies the globe with 77 million metric tonnes of LNG annually from across its seven ventures—Qatargas 1, Qatargas 2, Qatargas 3, Qatargas 4, RL1, RL2 and RL3. It is headquartered in Doha, Qatar, and maintains its upstream assets in Ras Laffan, Qatar. Natural gas is supplied to Qatargas's LNG trains from Qatar's North Field, by far the world's largest non-associated gas field. It reached a record LNG production of 77 million tonnes per year in December 2010. According to Brand Finance, Qatargas is the world's fastest growing oil and gas brand in 2023.
QatarEnergy, formerly Qatar Petroleum (QP), is a state owned petroleum company of Qatar. The company operates all oil and gas activities in Qatar, including exploration, production, refining, transport, and storage. The President & CEO is Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, Minister of State for Energy Affairs. The company's operations are directly linked with state planning agencies, regulatory authorities, and policy making bodies. Together, revenues from oil and natural gas amount to 60% of the country's GDP. As of 2018 it was the third largest oil company in the world by oil and gas reserves. In 2022, the company had total revenues of US$52bn, a net income of US42.4bn, and total assets of US$162bn. In 2021, QatarEnergy was the fifth largest gas company in the world.
GAIL (India) Limited is a central public sector undertaking under the ownership of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India. It has the following business segments: natural gas, liquid hydrocarbon, liquefied petroleum gas transmission, petrochemical, city gas distribution, renewable Energy including Solar & Wind, exploration and production, Petrochemicals, GAILTEL and electricity generation. GAIL was given the MahaRatna status on 1 Feb 2013 by the Government of India. Only 11 other Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) enjoy this coveted status amongst all Central PSUs.
Liquid Niugini LNG is a natural gas liquefaction project in Papua New Guinea. It is developed by Liquid Niugini Gas Ltd, and owned by PNG LNG Inc., a Bahamas-based parent holding company.
Prior to its acquisition by Exxon, InterOil Corporation was an oil and gas company with a primary focus on Papua New Guinea. InterOil's assets included one of Asia's largest undeveloped gas fields, Elk-Antelope, in the Gulf Province. The company employed more than 2000 staff and contractors. Its main offices were in Singapore and Port Moresby. InterOil was formed in 1997 and was incorporated in Canada. The company was listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Port Moresby Stock Exchange. It had a market capitalization of $2.8 billion.
The Gorgon gas project is a multi-decade natural gas project in Western Australia, involving the development of the Greater Gorgon gas fields, subsea gas-gathering infrastructure, and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant on Barrow Island. The project also includes a domestic gas component. Construction was completed in 2017.
Exxon Mobil Corporation is an American multinational oil and gas corporation and the largest direct descendant of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil. The company, which took its present name in 1999 per the merger of Exxon and Mobil, is vertically integrated across the entire oil and gas industry, and within it is also a chemicals division which produces plastic, synthetic rubber, and other chemical products. ExxonMobil is headquartered in the Houston suburb of Spring, Texas, though officially incorporated in New Jersey.
Peter Charles Paire O'Neill is a Papua New Guinean politician who served as the seventh Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from 2011 to 2019. He has been a Member of Parliament for Ialibu-Pangia since 2002. He was a former cabinet minister and the leader of the People's National Congress between 2006 and 2022. He resigned his position as prime minister to avoid a vote of no confidence and he was succeeded by James Marape. O'Neill won re-election to the National Parliament of Papua New Guinea in 2022 in the first round with a large majority, which is unusual in the country.
Havila Kavo is a Papua New Guinean politician. He was Governor of the Gulf Province from 2007 to 2017 as a member of the People's National Congress. He briefly lost office in 2010 following a June attempt by opponents in the provincial assembly to oust him; the National Court recognised Pitom Bombom as interim governor in July before reinstating Kavo in August.
The Kikori Gas Pipeline Landowner Association (KGPLA) is a Papua New Guinea landowner association which received PGK 17.6 million [$6.5 million] in funding in 2009 and 2010 from the government for local infrastructure developments in Kikori, Gulf Province, as part of the benefits the country is receiving from ExxonMobil’s $16 billion Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project in Hides.
The Arun gas field is a natural gas field located in the Aceh province on north Sumatra, Indonesia. It was discovered by Mobil Oil Corporation in 1971 and has been described as "the most lucrative LNG operation in the twentieth century." The field began production of natural gas and condensates in 1975.
Anderson Pawa Agiru was a Papua New Guinean politician. He was the Governor of Southern Highlands Province from 1997 to 2002 and 2007 to 2012 and the Governor of Hela Province from its creation in 2012 until his death. His position had been disputed for the final five months of his life, with a December 2015 attempt to oust him by members of the Hela assembly - posthumously decided in Agiru's favour - still being determined in the National Court at the time of his death.
The Papua New Guinea earthquake was a magnitude 7.5 earthquake that occurred in the Hela Province of Papua New Guinea on 26 February 2018, at 3:44 a.m. local time. The earthquake's epicenter was 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) west of the town of Komo. The maximum felt intensity was IX (Violent) on the Mercalli intensity scale. A total of 160 people were killed and many others were injured. An aftershock of M6.0 killed 11 people on 4 March, while another aftershock of M6.7 occurred at 00:13 local time on 7 March, killing at least 25 more. A 6.3 aftershock killed another 4 people on 7 April, more than a month after the first tremors hit the area.
Jane Mogina is a Papua New Guinea biodiversity specialist. After working as a lecturer at the University of Papua New Guinea, she became the executive director of the Mama Graun Conservation Trust before, in 2012, joining ExxonMobil as a biodiversity adviser. In 2017, a previously unknown damselfly was discovered as a result of her company's biodiversity monitoring and was named Nososticta moginae, after her.
