Nuclear detonation detection system

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A nuclear detonation detection system (NDDS) is a device or a series of devices that are able to indicate, and pinpoint a nuclear explosion has occurred as well as the direction of the explosion. The main purpose of these devices or systems was to verify compliance of countries that signed nuclear treaties such as the Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 (PTBT) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Contents

There are many different ways to detect a nuclear detonation, these include seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound detection, air sampling, and satellites. They have their own weaknesses and strengths, as well as different utilities. Each has been used separately, but at present the best results occur when data is used in tandem, since the energy caused by an explosion will transfer over to different mediums. [1]

Seismic

Seismic networks are one of the possibilities of detonation detection. During an above ground nuclear explosion, there will be a blooming mushroom in the sky, but there will also be a vibration through the ground that spreads for a long distance. [2] In the 1980s, nuclear weapons testing was moved below ground. Even then, it is hard to detect, and especially tricky when the explosion has a small yield. With a seismic network, detection of these nuclear tests is possible.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. The U.S. developed many different devices to ensure the Soviet Union was upholding its part of the treaty. The PTBT aimed to ban underground testing as well, but at the time the technology could not detect detonations very well with seismographs, let alone differentiate them from earthquakes [3] making underground tests more difficult to identify than detonations in the atmosphere or underwater. Larger yields could be differentiated but the smaller ones could not be. Even then larger explosions could be dampened by a larger cavity in the ground. [4] With the threat of the Soviet Union conducting underground detonations the U.S. pumped money into seismology research.

A major advance was made by Sheridan Speeth who changed the seismographs data into audible files. One could differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions just by listening to the difference. [5] However, due to his political beliefs his work was ignored.[ citation needed ] The main system for detecting underground detonations continued to require large numbers of monitoring stations. Due to the difficulty in creating technology and the number of stations needed the PTBT allowed underground testing.[ citation needed ]

Hydroacoustic

There are 11 hydroacoustic stations that are set up to monitor any activity in the oceans. They were developed to ensure the ban on underwater testing, and because of water’s ability to carry sound they are very efficient. [6] These stations collect data in real time, work 24 hours a day for 365 days a year. However, hydroacoustics have difficulties pinpointing the location of an explosion or event, so they must be used with another method of detection finding (such as the ones previously mentioned). [7] Other problems that hydroacoustics face are the difficulties caused by the structure of the sea floor, as well as islands that can block sound. Sound travels the best through deep ocean, so events near shallow water will not be detected as well. [8] However, hydroacoustic devices also serve different purposes and are used as a unique resource for research on ocean phenomena. [9]

Infrasound

Infrasound works by having multiple stations that use microbarometers to listen for infrasonic waves caused by explosions, volcanoes or other natural occurring events. [10] As with other detection methods, infrasound was developed during the Cold War. [11] These stations were designed to detect explosions with forces as low as 1 kiloton. But after the PTBT, atmospheric detonation detection was left to satellites. [12] Although infrasound waves could travel across the earth multiple times they are very prone to being influenced by the wind and by temperature variations. [13] Sources of long range infrasonic waves are difficult to differentiate (e.g. chemical explosion vs. nuclear explosion).[ citation needed ]

Air sampling

Another way of detecting a nuclear detonation is through air sampling; after a nuclear explosion, radioactive isotopes that get released into the air can be collected by plane. These radionuclides include americium-241, iodine-131, caesium-137, krypton-85, strontium-90, plutonium-239, tritium and xenon. [14] Sending planes over or near an area can reveal if there was a recent nuclear detonation, though most air samples are taken at one of many radionuclide stations set throughout the world. Even underground detonations will eventually release radioactive gases (most notably xenon) which can also be detected via these methods. Issues with air-sampling detection instruments include sensitivity, convenience, reliability, accuracy and power requirements. [15]

One weakness of the air sampling method is that air currents can move the gases or radionuclides in unpredictable ways, depending on where the explosion was and the weather conditions at the time. [1] The detection process involves taking air samples with a filter paper which collects the radioactive material which can then be counted and analyzed by a computer. Outside “noise” such as other forms of radiation, like those released from factories or nuclear plants, can throw off the results. [16] Another weakness of this method is that special media must be used for certain radionuclides. [15] Radioactive iodine is an example of this, as it exists in many chemical forms, combined with an array of many different gases that are not suitable for direct reading methods using absorption or collection of a fixed volume in containers. [15]

An example of how air currents can easily disperse radioactive particles is the Chernobyl disaster; as the reactor started failing, a large amount of radionuclides were released into the air. Spread by air currents, this led to radiation that could be detected as far as Sweden and other countries hundreds of miles away from the plant within a few days; [17] the same occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. The spread of radioactive xenon gas, iodine-131, and caesium-137 could be detected on different continents many miles away. [18]

Satellites

Satellites rely on sensors to monitor radiation from nuclear explosions that always produce gamma rays, x-rays, and neutrons. [3] Nuclear explosions release a massive burst of x-rays that occur repeatedly with an interval of less than 1 microsecond that could be detected by the satellite. [19] Groups of satellites can pick up on these signals, and can triangulate the location of the explosion. Satellites were first used in 1963 and throughout the Cold War to ensure no nuclear testing was conducted. A minor drawback to the satellite detection method is that there are some cosmic rays that emit neutrons and could give false signals to the sensor. [20]

Starting in October 17, 1963, in the USA, dedicated Vela Satellites were first used by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission, which is a predecessor organization to the current Department of Energy. [19] The Vela satellite was created following the PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty), which was signed in August 1963. [5] Vela's purpose was to respond to the PTBT, as a nuclear detonation detector. Vela is considered as a GPA satellite, while the Department of Energy operates the sensors. [19] The project consisted of 12 satellites, each equipped with x-ray, neutron, and gamma ray detectors. [21] and also was equipped to measure physical outputs: light(via a photodiode), and radio waves.

Satellites are now also equipped with cameras measuring the complete visible light spectrum that are able to capture above ground explosions.[ citation needed ] With the advent of Global Position System (GPS) satellites being launched with nuclear detection systems, satellites have become an important method of detonation detection. [22]

Satellites with improved Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS) equipment were launched after 2018 with such equipment increasing reliability, reducing size and improving nuclear detonation detection capabilities. [23]

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banned all forms of nuclear testing in an attempt to disarm and move away from nuclear weapons, but with it came old challenges, such as how to ensure members would not cheat on the treaty. To that end the International monitoring system (IMS) was born, having 321 stations, which use all of the sensor types previously described. Using collected data from each source to calculate detonations, the IMS employs hydroacoustic, infrasound, and seismic wave detection systems, as well as air samplers for radionuclides. All of this information is collected by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) which is stationed in Vienna, Austria. [24]

Effectiveness

One of the first occasions when the CTBTO and its detection systems showed itself effective was when it was able to identify nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in May 1998. [25]

Another notable example is the detection of North Korean testing. As most countries have given up nuclear detonation tests, North Korea has attempted to create a powerful nuclear warhead. [26] Due to North Korea’s secrecy it is up to IMS to give researchers the information needed to evaluate North Korea’s threats. Even their low yield (0.6 Kiloton) first attempt at a nuclear weapon was picked up and isolated in 2006. [27]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</span> 1996 treaty banning all nuclear weapons testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996, but has not entered into force, as eight specific nations have not ratified the treaty.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</span> 1963 international agreement

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), formally known as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground. It is also abbreviated as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), though the latter may also refer to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which succeeded the PTBT for ratifying parties.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Infrasound</span> Vibrations with frequencies lower than 20 hertz

Infrasound, sometimes referred to as low frequency sound, describes sound waves with a frequency below the lower limit of human audibility. Hearing becomes gradually less sensitive as frequency decreases, so for humans to perceive infrasound, the sound pressure must be sufficiently high. Although the ear is the primary organ for sensing low sound, at higher intensities it is possible to feel infrasound vibrations in various parts of the body.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear weapons testing</span> Controlled detonation of nuclear weapons for scientific or political purposes

Nuclear weapons tests are experiments carried out to determine the performance, yield, and effects of nuclear weapons. Testing nuclear weapons offers practical information about how the weapons function, how detonations are affected by different conditions, and how personnel, structures, and equipment are affected when subjected to nuclear explosions. However, nuclear testing has often been used as an indicator of scientific and military strength. Many tests have been overtly political in their intention; most nuclear weapons states publicly declared their nuclear status through a nuclear test.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Vela (satellite)</span> Group of satellites to detect nuclear detonations

Vela was the name of a group of satellites developed as the Vela Hotel element of Project Vela by the United States to detect nuclear detonations and monitor Soviet Union compliance with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Project Vela</span>

Project Vela was a United States Department of Defense project to monitor Soviet Union compliance with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. The treaty banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, but permitted underground testing.

A bhangmeter is a non-imaging radiometer installed on reconnaissance and navigation satellites to detect atmospheric nuclear detonations and determine the yield of the nuclear weapon. They are also installed on some armored fighting vehicles, in particular NBC reconnaissance vehicles, in order to help detect, localise and analyse tactical nuclear detonations. They are often used alongside pressure and sound sensors in this role in addition to standard radiation sensors. Some nuclear bunkers and military facilities may also be equipped with such sensors alongside seismic event detectors.

The Vela incident was an unidentified double flash of light detected by an American Vela Hotel satellite on 22 September 1979 near the South African territory of Prince Edward Islands in the Indian Ocean, roughly midway between Africa and Antarctica. Today, most independent researchers believe that the flash was caused by a nuclear explosion—an undeclared joint nuclear test carried out by South Africa and Israel.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is an international organization that will be established upon the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a Convention that outlaws nuclear test explosions. Its seat will be in Vienna, Austria. The organization will be tasked with verifying the ban on nuclear tests and will operate therefore a worldwide monitoring system and may conduct on-site inspections. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, and its Provisional Technical Secretariat, were established in 1997 and are headquartered in Vienna, Austria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Air Force Technical Applications Center</span> Military unit

The Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), based at Florida's Patrick Space Force Base, is an Air Force surveillance organization assigned to the Sixteenth Air Force. Its mission is to monitor nuclear treaties of all applicable signatory countries. This is accomplished using seismic, hydroacoustic and satellite-detection systems alongside ground based and airborne materials collection systems.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Tumbler–Snapper</span> Series of 1950s US nuclear tests

Operation Tumbler–Snapper was a series of nuclear weapons tests conducted by the United States in early 1952 at the Nevada Test Site. The Tumbler–Snapper series of tests followed Operation Buster–Jangle and preceded Operation Ivy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Underwater explosion</span> Chemical or nuclear explosion that occurs underwater

An underwater explosion is a chemical or nuclear explosion that occurs under the surface of a body of water. While useful in anti-ship and submarine warfare, underwater bombs are not as effective against coastal facilities.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2006 North Korean nuclear test</span> 2006 test detonation of a nuclear weapon in North Korea

The 2006 North Korean nuclear test was the detonation of a nuclear device conducted by North Korea on October 9, 2006.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Underground nuclear weapons testing</span> Test detonation of nuclear weapons underground

Underground nuclear testing is the test detonation of nuclear weapons that is performed underground. When the device being tested is buried at sufficient depth, the nuclear explosion may be contained, with no release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

The International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) was formed in 1999 as an informal expert's group of developers of radioactive xenon measurement systems for the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The group originally consisted of research and development groups from Germany, France, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, as well as personnel from Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization CTBTO.

National technical means of verification (NTM) are monitoring techniques, such as satellite photography, used to verify adherence to international treaties. The phrase first appeared, but was not detailed, in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) between the US and USSR. At first, the phrase reflected a concern that the "Soviet Union could be particularly disturbed by public recognition of this capability [satellite photography]...which it has veiled.". In modern usage, the term covers a variety of monitoring technologies, including others used at the time of SALT I.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</span> Intergovernmental organization for nuclear-test banning

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, or CTBTO Preparatory Commission, is an international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is tasked with building up the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The organization was established by the States Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

Forensic seismology is the forensic use of the techniques of seismology to detect and study distant phenomena, particularly explosions, including those of nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2013 North Korean nuclear test</span> Test detonation on 12 February 2013

On 12 February 2013, North Korean state media announced it had conducted an underground nuclear test, its third in seven years. A tremor that exhibited a nuclear bomb signature with an initial magnitude 4.9 was detected by the China Earthquake Networks Center, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the United States Geological Survey. In response, Japan summoned an emergency United Nations meeting for 12 February and South Korea raised its military alert status. It is not known whether the explosion was nuclear, or a conventional explosion designed to mimic a nuclear blast; as of two days after the blast, Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean investigators had failed to detect any radiation.

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