Philosophy of conspiracy theories

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Philosophy of conspiracy theories is the academic study by philosophers of the phenomenon and history of conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory has been defined as an explanation for an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful groups, often political in motivation, [1] [2] or more narrowly a conspiracy where other explanations are more probable. [3] [4] The term has a negative connotation, implying that the appeal to a conspiracy is based on prejudice or insufficient evidence. [5]

Contents

Psychologists attribute finding a conspiracy where there is none to a mental illness called illusory pattern perception. [6] [7]

History

The debate in analytic philosophy regarding conspiracy theories began in the mid-1990s when Charles Pigden challenged Karl Popper's position. [8] Popper, an influential philosopher of science, described what he called the "conspiracy theory of society", according to which history is a product of conspiracy, intended by some individuals or groups. Popper argues that this view must be wrong because not everything is intended. [9] [10] Although Popper's critique has been and continues to be influential, [11] Pigden has maintained that Popper's argument does not apply to most conspiracy theories, which do not posit complete control of events. [12] [13] Pigden also points out that when a conspiracy fails in some way, a theory about the conspiracy is still a conspiracy theory and may still play an explanatory role. [14]

Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories", which originally appeared in The Journal of Philosophy , prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a prima facie case against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted.

In 2007, a special issue of Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge", argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with prima facie scepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities. [15] [16] Charles Pigden frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief". He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory". [17] More recently, philosophers and social scientists engaged in arguing over the nature of conspiracy theories and pejorative implications over policies and funding, to the extent this debate has been classified as a "cross-disciplinary disagreement". [18]

Pejorative implications

Philosophers M Dentith and Brian Keeley have argued that defining conspiracy theories as being prima facie unlikely may result in prematurely dismissing theories that posit conspiracies. [19] Dentith, Keeley, and Basham favor minimalist definitions, defining "conspiracy theories" as theories involving conspiracies as a significant cause. [20] This has been criticized by Coady as capturing too many false positives, including, for example, the official account of 9/11. [21] Coady has suggested that a characteristic feature of conspiracy theories is their opposition to some official account. [21] [22]

The term "conspiracy theory" typically implies oppressive or sinister intent. [23] The following philosophers have argued that such language overstates the case: [24] [25] [26]

Susan Feldman has pointed out that beliefs designated as conspiracy theories may purport to explain, not events that have occurred or facts that are widely known, but "hidden facts". [30]

Coady suggests that the phrase "conspiracy theory" should not be used, while Dentith and Keeley maintain that it should continue to be used and to be discussed. [31]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Conspiracy theory</span> Attributing events to secret plots instead of more probable explanation

A conspiracy theory is an explanation for an event or situation that asserts the existence of a conspiracy by powerful and sinister groups, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable. The term generally has a negative connotation, implying that the appeal of a conspiracy theory is based in prejudice, emotional conviction, or insufficient evidence. A conspiracy theory is distinct from a conspiracy; it refers to a hypothesized conspiracy with specific characteristics, including but not limited to opposition to the mainstream consensus among those who are qualified to evaluate its accuracy, such as scientists or historians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Epistemology</span> Branch of philosophy concerning knowledge

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemology is considered a major subfield of philosophy, along with other major subfields such as ethics, logic, and metaphysics.

Foundationalism concerns philosophical theories of knowledge resting upon non-inferential justified belief, or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises. The main rival of the foundationalist theory of justification is the coherence theory of justification, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.

Historicism is an approach to explaining the existence of phenomena, especially social and cultural practices, by studying their history, that is, by studying the process by which they came about. The term is widely used in philosophy, anthropology, and sociology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Karl Popper</span> Austrian-British philosopher of science (1902–1994)

Sir Karl Raimund Popper was an Austrian-British philosopher, academic and social commentator. One of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, Popper is known for his rejection of the classical inductivist views on the scientific method in favour of empirical falsification. According to Popper, a theory in the empirical sciences can never be proven, but it can be falsified, meaning that it can be scrutinised with decisive experiments. Popper was opposed to the classical justificationist account of knowledge, which he replaced with critical rationalism, namely "the first non-justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy".

Social epistemology refers to a broad set of approaches that can be taken in epistemology that construes human knowledge as a collective achievement. Another way of characterizing social epistemology is as the evaluation of the social dimensions of knowledge or information.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philosophy of science</span> Study of foundations, methods, and implications of science

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pragmatism</span> Philosophical tradition

Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that considers words and thought as tools and instruments for prediction, problem solving, and action, and rejects the idea that the function of thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics—such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science—are all best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes.

Scientism is the opinion that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.

In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting natural phenomena. According to instrumentalists, a successful scientific theory reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's unobservable objects, properties or processes. Scientific theory is merely a tool whereby humans predict observations in a particular domain of nature by formulating laws, which state or summarize regularities, while theories themselves do not reveal supposedly hidden aspects of nature that somehow explain these laws. Instrumentalism is a perspective originally introduced by Pierre Duhem in 1906.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Applied philosophy</span> Branch of philosophy

Applied philosophy is a branch of philosophy that studies philosophical problems of practical concern. The topic covers a broad spectrum of issues in environment, medicine, science, engineering, policy, law, politics, economics and education. The term was popularised in 1982 by the founding of the Society for Applied Philosophy by Brenda Almond, and its subsequent journal publication Journal of Applied Philosophy edited by Elizabeth Brake. Methods of applied philosophy are similar to other philosophical methods including questioning, dialectic, critical discussion, rational argument, systematic presentation, thought experiments and logical argumentation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Positivism</span> Empiricist philosophical theory

Positivism is a philosophical school that holds that all genuine knowledge is either true by definition or positive—meaning a posteriori facts derived by reason and logic from sensory experience. Other ways of knowing, such as intuition, introspection, or religious faith, are rejected or considered meaningless.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">William Sweet</span> Canadian philosopher (1955–)

William Sweet is a Canadian philosopher, and a past president of the Canadian Philosophical Association and of the Canadian Theological Society.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Infinite regress</span> Philosophical problem

An infinite regress is an infinite series of entities governed by a recursive principle that determines how each entity in the series depends on or is produced by its predecessor. In the epistemic regress, for example, a belief is justified because it is based on another belief that is justified. But this other belief is itself in need of one more justified belief for itself to be justified and so on. An infinite regress argument is an argument against a theory based on the fact that this theory leads to an infinite regress. For such an argument to be successful, it has to demonstrate not just that the theory in question entails an infinite regress but also that this regress is vicious. There are different ways in which a regress can be vicious. The most serious form of viciousness involves a contradiction in the form of metaphysical impossibility. Other forms occur when the infinite regress is responsible for the theory in question being implausible or for its failure to solve the problem it was formulated to solve. Traditionally, it was often assumed without much argument that each infinite regress is vicious but this assumption has been put into question in contemporary philosophy. While some philosophers have explicitly defended theories with infinite regresses, the more common strategy has been to reformulate the theory in question in a way that avoids the regress. One such strategy is foundationalism, which posits that there is a first element in the series from which all the other elements arise but which is not itself explained this way. Another way is coherentism, which is based on a holistic explanation that usually sees the entities in question not as a linear series but as an interconnected network. Infinite regress arguments have been made in various areas of philosophy. Famous examples include the cosmological argument, Bradley's regress and regress arguments in epistemology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fallibilism</span> Philosophical principle

Originally, fallibilism is the philosophical principle that propositions can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified, or that neither knowledge nor belief is certain. The term was coined in the late nineteenth century by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, as a response to foundationalism. Theorists, following Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, may also refer to fallibilism as the notion that knowledge might turn out to be false. Furthermore, fallibilism is said to imply corrigibilism, the principle that propositions are open to revision. Fallibilism is often juxtaposed with infallibilism.

Alan Musgrave is an English-born New Zealand philosopher.

Inductivism is the traditional and still commonplace philosophy of scientific method to develop scientific theories. Inductivism aims to neutrally observe a domain, infer laws from examined cases—hence, inductive reasoning—and thus objectively discover the sole naturally true theory of the observed.

Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope (limitations) of knowledge. It addresses the questions "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?", and "Why do we know what we know?". Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Applied epistemology</span> Application of epistemology in specific fields

Applied epistemology refers to the study that determines whether the systems of investigation that seek the truth lead to true beliefs about the world. A specific conceptualization cites that it attempts to reveal whether these systems contribute to epistemic aims. It is applied in practices outside of philosophy like science and mathematics.

References

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  2. "conspiracy theory" . Oxford English Dictionary (Online ed.). Oxford University Press.(Subscription or participating institution membership required.)"the theory that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of a conspiracy between interested parties; spec. a belief that some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible for an unexplained event"
  3. Brotherton, Robert; French, Christopher C.; Pickering, Alan D. (2013). "Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale". Frontiers in Psychology. 4: 279. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279 . ISSN   1664-1078. PMC   3659314 . PMID   23734136. A conspiracist belief can be described as 'the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable'.
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Further reading