Rudolf Lingens

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Rudolph Lingens is a fictional character often used by contemporary analytic philosophers as a placeholder name in a hypothetical scenario which illustrates some feature of the indexicality of natural language. He was created by the logician Gottlob Frege in the course of one of the earliest systematic discussions of indexicals. A number of philosophers picking up on Frege's discussion of indexicals, notably John Perry, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker, have adopted Lingens to make their own points about indexicals.

De se attitudes

Lingens first appeared in Frege's influential essay 'Thought' ('Der Gedanke', published in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918–19), pp. 58–77). [1] Mr. Lingens appears in the company of Leo Peter. Both are concerned with Dr. Gustav Lauben's having been wounded, and are later joined by Herbert Garner who is possessed of the knowledge that Gustav Lauben was born on 13 September 1875. Frege's discussion is concerned with how proper names and indexicals like 'I' function and how they are connected with the sense (or mode of presentation) that, on his account, each speaker who uses them associates with them.

Rudolph Lingens makes a number of appearances in the subsequent literature on Frege and on indexicals. Notably, he occurs in an influential 1977 paper by John Perry ('Frege on Demonstratives'), in which Perry asks us to imagine Lingens as an amnesiac in Main Library at Stanford who comes to read a complete biography of himself. By reading the biography, Lingens comes to have a rich body of factual information about Rudolph Lingens, but he still fails to realize that (as we would put it) he himself is Lingens. Here we resort to natural language indexicals—he himself—to try to express what knowledge it is Lingens lacks; and our resort to such indexicals for expressing this knowledge seems to be ineliminable. Much of the philosophical literature on indexicality is concerned with trying to explicate the apparently "essentially indexical" character of the information Lingens lacks in Perry's imagined scenario. [2]

Attitudes that essentially require indexical reference to oneself to express—such as the belief Lingens would express by saying 'I am Rudolph Lingens'—are often called de se attitudes.

Philosophers David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker pick up on Perry's discussion. Lingens reappears in David Lewis's 1979 paper on the topic ('Attitudes de dicto and de se') [3] and also in a 1981 paper by Robert Stalnaker ('Indexical Belief'). [4] In his paper, Stalnaker suggests that Lingens is the cousin of Bernard J. Ortcutt, a character originally created by W.V. Quine to illustrate the distinction between de dicto and de re attitude ascriptions. [5]

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In the philosophy of language, a proper name – examples include a name of a specific person or place – is a name which ordinarily is taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning, and it has become a central problem in analytic philosophy. The common-sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic (1843), where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and nonexistent entities, without becoming meaningless, and he showed that sometimes more than one proper name may identify the same entity without having the same sense, so that the phrase "Homer believed the morning star was the evening star" could be meaningful and not tautological in spite of the fact that the morning star and the evening star identifies the same referent. This example became known as Frege's puzzle and is a central issue in the theory of proper names.

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References

  1. Frege, Gottlob (1956-01-01). "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry". Mind. Oxford University Press. 65 (1): 289–311. doi:10.1093/mind/65.1.289. ISSN   0026-4423 via JSTOR.
  2. Perry, John (October 1977). "Frege on Demonstratives". The Philosophical Review. 86 (4): 474–497. doi:10.2307/2184564. ISSN   0031-8108. JSTOR   2184564.
  3. Lewis, David (1983-08-18), "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se", Philosophical Papers Volume I, Oxford University Press, pp. 133–156, doi:10.1093/0195032047.003.0010, ISBN   978-0-19-503204-8 , retrieved 2022-07-24
  4. Stalnaker, Robert C. (1999-04-08), "Indexical Belief", Context and Content, Oxford University Press, pp. 130–149, doi:10.1093/0198237073.003.0008, ISBN   978-0-19-823707-5 , retrieved 2022-07-24
  5. Quine, W. V. (March 1, 1956). "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes". The Journal of Philosophy. 53 (5): 177–187. doi:10.2307/2022451. JSTOR   2022451 . Retrieved July 24, 2022 via JSTOR.

(Standard philosophical references for de se that discuss Lingens' predicament)