State Reserves Bureau copper scandal

Last updated
Price of copper 1959-2022 Price of Copper.webp
Price of copper 1959-2022
A copper nugget Kupfer Nugget.jpeg
A copper nugget

The State Reserves Bureau copper scandal refers to a loss of approximately US$150 million as a result of trading LME Copper futures contracts at the London Metal Exchange (LME) by rogue trader Liu Qibing, who was the chief trader for the Import and Export Department of the State Regulation Centre for Supply Reserves (SRCSR), the trading agency for the State Reserve Bureau (SRB) of China in 2005. [1]

Contents

Unauthorized trading

After obtaining a bachelor in economics, Liu Qibing started working for the SRCSR, and was sent to the LME for training in 1995. Liu became the director of Import and Export Department at SRCSR, in 1999, and was authorized to place orders on LME and the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE). In 2002, Liu was promoted again to be the chief trader of SRCSR. Between 2002 and 2004, Liu had traded long positions on copper to bet that China's construction boom at the time would lead to price increases. [2] Starting around 2003, Liu started to arbitrage copper prices between the SHFE and the LME by holding opposite positions simultaneously on the SHFE and the LME. Liu was typically long copper futures on the SHFE and short LME copper contracts on the LME. Since foreign investors are not allowed to access the SHFE, Liu found disparities between SHFE and LME copper prices that he exploited. [3] Liu's trading activities earned approximately US$300 million for the Chinese government between 2002 and 2004. [4]

2005 trades

Liu began shorting copper in the spring of 2005, allegedly because he observed that the SRB will be selling copper on the spot market, and that the Chinese central bank was preventing state banks from lending to real estate developers to prevent inflation, which would reduce demand for copper. These central bank policies proved to be temporary, however, and lending for real estate construction resumed, leading to copper price increases. According to sources published by the Washington post, as Liu suffered trading losses, his supervisors apparently pressured him to double his bets hoping to recover his losses and avoid reporting those losses to higher authorities. According to China Daily, Liu's position grew to a short 130,000 metric tonnes of copper in July and August 2005 for delivery in December 2005. [5] By early September, Liu's position grew to a short 220,000 metric tonnes of copper, with an average price of US$3500 per metric tonnes, due for delivery mostly on December 21 and the rest in 2006. LME traders at the time, who thought they were dealing with the SRB through Liu, apparently did not believe that the SRB had enough copper stocks to execute those contracts, and they bought copper contracts against Liu's position. When copper prices continued falling, Liu Qibing disappeared from public view on November 14, 2005. [6] [7]

SRB Response

Immediately after Liu's disappearance, officials at the SRB denied knowing Liu Qibing and stated that the SRB was not involved in short selling copper. However, other traders at the London Metals Exchange stated that they knew him as China's main metals trader. The confusion stems from the fact that the SRB is a Chinese government entity that acts through the SRCSR, which is a separately registered government-owned nonprofit organization with its own registered capital. Both the SRB and the SRCSR are owned by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China, which means that SRCSR is not the subsidiary of SRB, rather that SRCSR is acting as an agent for the SRB. SRCSR can participate in market trading, but the commodities underlying those trading activities belong to the SRB. SRCSR's separate capital pool also implies that exposure to losses by the NDRC is limited by its invested capital. Contrary to Western press reports, Liu Qibing was not an employee at the SRB, but a senior official at the SRCSR, which explains SRB's first denials of the incident. [8]

The SRB eventually acknowledged knowing Liu Qibing, stated that he had been on leave, and later announced that the trader had acted on his own, without authorization. [9] This raised the possibility that the SRB might not settle Liu's positions, and leave LME brokers who executed trades for Liu with losses. The UK Financial Services Authority warned the LME that if the SRB could prove that Liu was not authorized to trade futures, they do not have to honour his trades. The LME stated that the SRE was not a clearing member of the exchange, and that other clearing members were liable for the SRB's positions on the exchange should the SRB default on their positions. [10]

Eventually, the SRB did take ownership of Liu's trades, and tried to manage the loss they incurred rather than immediately close the Liu's positions. The SRB announced copper stockpiles of 1.3 million tonnes that greatly exceeded market estimates of SRB stock at the time, which were about 250,000 tonnes. On November 16, 2005 and November 23, 2005, the SRB auctioned 20,000 tonnes of copper, and auctioned more copper on November 30, 2005. These actions led to copper price declines during this period, but LME traders ultimately did not believe SRB's new stockpile data and drove prices even higher; LME copper prices increased from $4100 before the first SRB auction to $4400 after the fourth SRB auction. On December 21, LME copper warehouse stocks in Korea increased by around 50,000 tonnes, most of which were sent from China. Consensus among LME traders then was that these additional stocks were sent by the SRB to settle part of Liu's positions, at a realized loss of an estimated US$45 million, while the rest of those short positions had been extended to 2006 and 2007. [11]

Lax controls

The incident highlights the lax trading controls of Chinese government entities at the time. Between 2002 and 2004, Liu made US$300 million for the Chinese government speculating on copper prices, even though the SRCSR had no mandate to speculate for profit. [12] By June 2004, Liu Qibing was the only authorized trader in SRCSR's futures and forwards trading group down from an originally larger group of traders, and this situation persisted for more than a year until the trading incident. The lack of personnel implied a lack of human resources for internal controls at the SRCSR. The SRB denial of knowing Liu Qibing implies that the organization was unaware of activities at the SRCSR and the state of its trading group. Additionally, the Chinese derivatives supervisor, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), did not supervise the derivatives trading of other government agencies such as the SRB. The lack of controls at the SRB, the SRCSR, and at the CSRC over Liu Qibing's trading activities allowed him to build his large trading position. [13]

Aftermath

In March 2008, Liu Qibing and his supervisor both went on trial in China, accused of breaking various regulations. Liu Qibing was sentenced to seven years in prison. [14]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Normal backwardation</span>

Normal backwardation, also sometimes called backwardation, is the market condition where the price of a commodity's forward or futures contract is trading below the expected spot price at contract maturity. The resulting futures or forward curve would typically be downward sloping, since contracts for further dates would typically trade at even lower prices. In practice, the expected future spot price is unknown, and the term "backwardation" may refer to "positive basis", which occurs when the current spot price exceeds the price of the future.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Contango</span> Situation when futures prices are above the expected spot price at maturity

Contango is a situation where the futures price of a commodity is higher than the expected spot price of the contract at maturity. In a contango situation, arbitrageurs or speculators are "willing to pay more [now] for a commodity [to be received] at some point in the future than the actual expected price of the commodity [at that future point]. This may be due to people's desire to pay a premium to have the commodity in the future rather than paying the costs of storage and carry costs of buying the commodity today." On the other side of the trade, hedgers are happy to sell futures contracts and accept the higher-than-expected returns. A contango market is also known as a normal market, or carrying-cost market.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Speculation</span> Engaging in risky financial transactions

In finance, speculation is the purchase of an asset with the hope that it will become more valuable shortly.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Day trading</span> Buying and selling financial instruments within the same trading day

Day trading is a form of speculation in securities in which a trader buys and sells a financial instrument within the same trading day, so that all positions are closed before the market closes for the trading day to avoid unmanageable risks and negative price gaps between one day's close and the next day's price at the open. Traders who trade in this capacity are generally classified as speculators. Day trading contrasts with the long-term trades underlying buy-and-hold and value investing strategies. Day trading may require fast trade execution, sometimes as fast as milli-seconds in scalping, therefore a direct-access day trading software is often needed.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Futures contract</span> Standard forward contract

In finance, a futures contract is a standardized legal contract to buy or sell something at a predetermined price for delivery at a specified time in the future, between parties not yet known to each other. The asset transacted is usually a commodity or financial instrument. The predetermined price of the contract is known as the forward price. The specified time in the future when delivery and payment occur is known as the delivery date. Because it derives its value from the value of the underlying asset, a futures contract is a derivative.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Futures exchange</span> Central financial exchange where people can trade standardized futures contracts

A futures exchange or futures market is a central financial exchange where people can trade standardized futures contracts defined by the exchange. Futures contracts are derivatives contracts to buy or sell specific quantities of a commodity or financial instrument at a specified price with delivery set at a specified time in the future. Futures exchanges provide physical or electronic trading venues, details of standardized contracts, market and price data, clearing houses, exchange self-regulations, margin mechanisms, settlement procedures, delivery times, delivery procedures and other services to foster trading in futures contracts. Futures exchanges can be organized as non-profit member-owned organizations or as for-profit organizations. Futures exchanges can be integrated under the same brand name or organization with other types of exchanges, such as stock markets, options markets, and bond markets. Non-profit member-owned futures exchanges benefit their members, who earn commissions and revenue acting as brokers or market makers. For-profit futures exchanges earn most of their revenue from trading and clearing fees.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hedge (finance)</span> Concept in investing

A hedge is an investment position intended to offset potential losses or gains that may be incurred by a companion investment. A hedge can be constructed from many types of financial instruments, including stocks, exchange-traded funds, insurance, forward contracts, swaps, options, gambles, many types of over-the-counter and derivative products, and futures contracts.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Cornering the market</span> Commerce phenomenon

In finance, cornering the market consists of obtaining sufficient control of a particular stock, commodity, or other asset in an attempt to manipulate the market price. One definition of cornering a market is "having the greatest market share in a particular industry without having a monopoly".

In finance, a contract for difference (CFD) is a legally binding agreement that creates, defines, and governs mutual rights and obligations between two parties, typically described as "buyer" and "seller", stipulating that the buyer will pay to the seller the difference between the current value of an asset and its value at contract time. If the closing trade price is higher than the opening price, then the seller will pay the buyer the difference, and that will be the buyer’s profit. The opposite is also true. That is, if the current asset price is lower at the exit price than the value at the contract’s opening, then the seller, rather than the buyer, will benefit from the difference.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Financial risk</span> Any of various types of risk associated with financing

Financial risk is any of various types of risk associated with financing, including financial transactions that include company loans in risk of default. Often it is understood to include only downside risk, meaning the potential for financial loss and uncertainty about its extent.

An energy derivative is a derivative contract based on an underlying energy asset, such as natural gas, crude oil, or electricity. Energy derivatives are exotic derivatives and include exchange-traded contracts such as futures and options, and over-the-counter derivatives such as forwards, swaps and options. Major players in the energy derivative markets include major trading houses, oil companies, utilities, and financial institutions.

The Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) is a Chinese futures exchange based in Dalian, Liaoning province, China. It is a non-profit, self-regulating and membership legal entity established on February 28, 1993.

The Shanghai Futures Exchange was formed from the amalgamation of the national level futures exchanges of China, the Shanghai Metal Exchange, Shanghai Foodstuffs Commodity Exchange, and the Shanghai Commodity Exchange in December 1999. It is a non-profit-seeking incorporated body regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

The 2000s commodities boom or the commodities super cycle was the rise of many physical commodity prices during the early 21st century (2000–2014), following the Great Commodities Depression of the 1980s and 1990s. The boom was largely due to the rising demand from emerging markets such as the BRIC countries, particularly China during the period from 1992 to 2013, as well as the result of concerns over long-term supply availability. There was a sharp down-turn in prices during 2008 and early 2009 as a result of the credit crunch and sovereign debt crisis, but prices began to rise as demand recovered from late 2009 to mid-2010.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sumitomo copper affair</span>

The Sumitomo copper affair refers to a metal trading scandal in 1996 involving Yasuo Hamanaka, the chief copper trader of the Japanese trading house Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo). The scandal involves unauthorized trading over a 10-year period by Hamanaka, which led Sumitomo to announce US$1.8 billion in related losses in 1996 when Hamanaka's trading was discovered, and more related losses subsequently. The scandal also involved Hamanaka's attempts to corner the entire world's copper market through LME Copper futures contracts on the London Metal Exchange (LME).

Seasonal spread traders are spread traders that take advantage of seasonal patterns by holding long and short positions in futures contracts simultaneously in the same or a related commodity markets, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange and the London Metal Exchange among others.

LME Aluminium stands for a group of spot, forward, and futures contracts, trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME), for delivery of primary Aluminium that can be used for price hedging, physical delivery of sales or purchases, investment, and speculation. Producers, semi-fabricators, consumers, recyclers, and merchants can use Aluminium futures contracts to hedge Aluminium price risks and to reference prices. Notable companies that use LME Aluminium contracts to hedge Aluminium prices include General Motors, Boeing, and Alcoa.

LME Copper stands for a group of spot, forward, and futures contracts, trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME), for delivery of Copper, that can be used for price hedging, physical delivery of sales or purchases, investment, and speculation.

LME Nickel stands for a group of spot, forward, and futures contracts, trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME), for delivery of primary Nickel that can be used for price hedging, physical delivery of sales or purchases, investment, and speculation. Producers, semi-fabricators, consumers, recyclers, and merchants can use Nickel futures contracts to hedge Nickel price risks and to reference prices. As of December 31, 2019, LME Nickel is associated with 153,318 tonnes of physical Nickel stored in 500 LME approved warehouses around the world. This is 5.67% of the 2019 global estimated mined Nickel production of 2.7 million tonnes. Despite the low share of physical Nickel associated with LME Nickel contracts, global physical Nickel transactions are usually based on LME Nickel prices. This practice began in the 1970s to 1982, when producer Nickel prices, especially Canadian producer prices collapsed, and the industry switched to LME prices.

LME Zinc stands for a group of spot, forward, and futures contracts, trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME), for delivery of special high-grade Zinc of 99.995% purity minimum that can be used for price hedging, physical delivery of sales or purchases, investment, and speculation. Producers, semi-fabricators, consumers, recyclers, and merchants can use Zinc futures contracts to hedge Zinc price risks and to reference prices.

References

  1. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–103, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  2. Goodman, Peter S. (2005-11-25), "New China Stumbles Into Old-Fashioned Trade Scandal", Washington Post, retrieved 2020-06-12
  3. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, p. 104, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-06-15
  4. Goodman, Peter S. (2005-11-25), "New China Stumbles Into Old-Fashioned Trade Scandal", Washington Post, retrieved 2020-06-12
  5. Goodman, Peter S. (2005-11-25), "New China Stumbles Into Old-Fashioned Trade Scandal", Washington Post, retrieved 2020-06-12
  6. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–103, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  7. Goodman, Peter S. (2005-11-25), "New China Stumbles Into Old-Fashioned Trade Scandal", Washington Post, retrieved 2020-06-12
  8. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, p. 103, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  9. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–103, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  10. Zwick, Steve; Collins, Daniel P., Yes. China. There Is a Liu Qibing: Will China Honor Bad Trades?, Modern Trader, retrieved 2020-06-15
  11. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–106, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  12. Goodman, Peter S. (2005-11-25), "New China Stumbles Into Old-Fashioned Trade Scandal", Washington Post, retrieved 2020-06-12
  13. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–106, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23
  14. Poitras, Geoffrey (2013-03-05), Commodity Risk Management: Theory and Application, Routledge, pp. 102–103, ISBN   9781136262609 , retrieved 2020-05-23