United States constitutional sentencing law

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The United States Constitution contains several provisions related to criminal sentencing.

United States Constitution Supreme law of the United States of America

The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the United States. The Constitution, originally comprising seven articles, delineates the national frame of government. Its first three articles embody the doctrine of the separation of powers, whereby the federal government is divided into three branches: the legislative, consisting of the bicameral Congress ; the executive, consisting of the President ; and the judicial, consisting of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. Articles Four, Five and Six embody concepts of federalism, describing the rights and responsibilities of state governments, the states in relationship to the federal government, and the shared process of constitutional amendment. Article Seven establishes the procedure subsequently used by the thirteen States to ratify it. It is regarded as the oldest written and codified national constitution in force.

In the United States, sentencing law varies by jurisdiction. Since the US Constitution is the supreme law of the land, all sentences in the US must conform to the requirements of the Constitution, which sets basic mandates while leaving the bulk of policy-making up to the states.

Contents

The Excessive Fines Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit certain disproportionate sentences. Further, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes, for certain classes of defendants, and in the absence of certain procedures. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits increasing the maximum authorized sentence for an offense based on a fact not found by a jury. Mandatory minimums based on judicial fact-finding are not prohibited. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. The test of Blockburger v. United States (1932) is whether each crime contains an element that the other does not.

Cruel and unusual punishment is a phrase describing punishment that is considered unacceptable due to the suffering, pain, or humiliation it inflicts on the person subjected to it.

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the federal, state, and local governments of the United States, or any other government, or any corporation, private enterprise, group, or individual, from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments, in any part of the US, on US property, or against any US citizen, or any resident of the US. This amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791, along with the rest of the United States Bill of Rights. The phrases in this amendment originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution part of the Bill of Rights, which sets out rights of the accused in a criminal prosecution

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied most of the protections of this amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

[N]or [shall] excessive [be] fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. [1]

Excessive fines

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) is the first and only case in which the Supreme Court has declared a criminal fine constitutionally excessive. There, the government sought the forfeiture of $357,144 from Hosep Krikor Bajakajian solely as a penalty for not declaring that amount to Customs when leaving the country. [2]

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), is a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that asset forfeiture is unconstitutional when it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense", citing the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. It was the first time the Court struck down the federal government's "aggressive use of forfeiture" and the only time it has held that an imposed fine was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

Asset forfeiture form of confiscation of assets by the state

Asset forfeiture or asset seizure is a form of confiscation of assets by the state. In the United States, it is a type of criminal justice financial obligation. It typically applies to the alleged proceeds or instruments of crime. This applies, but is not limited, to terrorist activities, drug related crimes, and other criminal and even civil offenses. Some jurisdictions specifically use the term "confiscation" instead of forfeiture. The alleged purpose of asset forfeiture is to disrupt criminal activity by confiscating assets that potentially could have been beneficial to the individual or organization.

The Excessive Fines Clause applies to forfeitures of property, [3] but does not apply to punitive damages in civil suits. [4]

Punitive damages, or exemplary damages, are damages assessed in order to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct and/or to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar to that which formed the basis of the lawsuit. Although the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff will receive all or some of the punitive damages award.

Cruel and unusual punishments

Non-capital sentences

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause regulates non-capital sentences far less closely than capital sentences. As a threshold inquiry, the Court will not inquire into a non-capital sentence unless the gravity of the sentence is disproportionate, even after deferring to the legislature. [5] Next, the Court engages in a three-factor test, considering: (1) the gravity of offense, (2) an inter-jurisdictional comparison of the sentences for crime, and (3) an intra-jurisdictional comparison of the sentence given. [6]

For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the sentence of life without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders if they did not commit homicide, [7] or if automatically imposed by statute for homicide. [8]

Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have argued that the Court should not engage in Eighth Amendment proportionality review at all.

Capital sentences

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has more to say about capital sentences. First, the Clause entirely precludes the use of capital punishment for crimes other than murder. [9] Even with murder, the defendant must personally kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. [10] Second, the Clause entirely precludes the use of capital punishment against certain classes of defendants, such as the insane, [11] the mentally retarded, [12] juveniles at the time of the crime, [13] and those who are not competent at the time of the execution. [14]

Third, the Clause prevents the arbitrary and discriminatory use of the death penalty. [15] Nor can the death penalty be mandatory for those convicted of a certain offense. [16] Aggravating factors must be found by a jury. [17] Aggravating factors cannot be vague. [18] The sentencing decision-maker must have the authority to consider all mitigating factors. [19]

Fourth, the Clause requires certain additional procedural rules in capital cases. For example, the jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included offense. [20] Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) held that jurisdictions could permit prosecutors for-cause strikes of jurors who would never impose the death penalty, but not jurors who were merely opposed to the death penalty. [21] Such a jury is known as a death-qualified jury. Similarly, the defendant must be allowed to challenge for cause a juror who would impose the death penalty in every capital case. [22]

Facts not found by a jury

Article Three, Section Two of the United States Constitution provides:

Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . . [23]

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . . [24]

The Supreme Court has held that every fact that increases the maximum authorized sentence or minimum mandatory sentence must be named in the charging instrument, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubtwhether or not statutory law labels that fact as an element of the offense or a sentencing factor. [25] The only exception is the fact of prior conviction, which may be found by a judge. [26] Because the relevant maximum is the authorized sentences that arises from the fact of conviction alone, without additional fact-finding, this principle invalidates mandatory sentencing guidelines that are the equivalent of increasing the maximum authorized sentence. [27]

This principle does not prevent the judge from deciding whether the sentences stemming from a multi-count indictment will be concurrent or consecutive based on judicial fact-finding. [28]

This rule was not retroactively applied in habeas cases. [29] And, it is subject to the principles of harmless error analysis. [30]

Double jeopardy

U.S. Const. amend. V provides:

[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . [31]

The Double Jeopardy Clause, inter alia, prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense In Blockburger v. United States (1932), the Supreme Court announced the following test: the government may separately punish the defendant for two crimes if each crime contains an element that the other does not. [32] Blockburger is the default rule, unless the legislatively intends to depart; for example, Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) may be punished separately from its predicates, [33] as can conspiracy. [34]

Due process

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . [31]

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . [35]

In Williams v. New York (1949), the Supreme Court held that due process does not require the use of ordinary evidentiary rules at sentencing. [36]

Related Research Articles

Double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same charges and on the same facts, following a valid acquittal or conviction. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court in its unanimous decision concerning Ball v. United States 163 U.S. 662 (1896), one of its earliest cases dealing with double jeopardy, "the prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial."

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision with regard to aggravating factors in crimes. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maxima based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision has been a cornerstone in the modern resurgence in jury trial rights. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, the jury-trial right "has never been efficient; but it has always been free."

Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. Referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases and elsewhere referred to by the lead case Gregg, the Supreme Court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended the de facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), was a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of 18. The 5–4 decision overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, in which the court had upheld execution of offenders at or above age 16, and overturned statutes in 25 states.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), is the first decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution was interpreted to prohibit criminalization of particular acts or conduct, as contrasted with prohibiting the use of a particular form of punishment for a crime. In Robinson, the Court struck down a California law that criminalized being addicted to narcotics.

The People of the State of California v. Robert Page Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 6 Cal. 3d 628, was a landmark case in the state of California that outlawed the use of capital punishment. It was subsequently overruled by a state constitutional amendment, called Proposition 17.

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause allowed a state to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine.

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court. It is primarily notable as it pertains to the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. It is cited concerning the political and legal relationship between the United States and the Philippines, which at that time was considered a U.S. colony.

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution Amendment guaranteeing rights related to trials and due process

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses criminal procedure and other aspects of the Constitution. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to every level of the government, including the federal, state, and local levels, as well as any corporation, private enterprise, group, or individual, or any foreign government in regards to a US citizen or resident of the US. The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In criminal law, a mitigating factor, also known as extenuating circumstances, is any information or evidence presented to the court regarding the defendant or the circumstances of the crime that might result in reduced charges or a lesser sentence. Unlike a legal defense, it cannot lead to the acquittal of the defendant. The opposite of a mitigating factor is an aggravating factor.

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court was asked whether evidence of the defendant's low IQ in a death penalty trial had been adequately presented to the jury for full consideration in the penalty phase of his trial. The Supreme Court held that not considering a defendant's low IQ would breach his Eighth Amendment rights and constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, because of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty", the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already been convicted of and sentenced for in another state.

United States criminal procedure derives from several sources of law: the baseline protections of the United States Constitution, federal and state statutes; federal and state rules of criminal procedure ; and state and federal case law. Criminal procedures are distinct from civil procedures in the US.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The four essential protections included are prohibitions against, for the same offense:

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled, by a 6-2 vote, that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights for the prosecutor to comment to the jury on the defendant's declining to testify, or for the judge to instruct the jury that such silence is evidence of guilt.

United States constitutional criminal procedure

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.

Criminal law in the Taney Court

The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).

Crimes Act of 1790

The Crimes Act of 1790, formally titled An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, defined some of the first federal crimes in the United States and expanded on the criminal procedure provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Crimes Act was a "comprehensive statute defining an impressive variety of federal crimes."

References

  1. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
  2. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
  3. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
  4. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
  5. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
  6. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
  7. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
  8. Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
  9. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape of adult).
  10. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
  11. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
  12. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
  13. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (under 18), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (under 16).
  14. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
  15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), overruling McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
  16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
  17. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
  18. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
  19. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
  20. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
  21. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
  22. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
  23. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
  24. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
  25. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
  26. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
  27. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
  28. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
  29. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
  30. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006).
  31. 1 2 U.S. Const. amend. V.
  32. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
  33. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996).
  34. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
  35. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
  36. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).