United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.

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United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 10–11, 1952
Decided February 4, 1952
Full case nameUnited States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.
Citations342 U.S. 371 ( more )
72 S.Ct. 350; 96 L. Ed. 417; 1952 U.S. LEXIS 2811; 92 U.S.P.Q. 158
Holding
Patents give no protection from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act when the patent licensing agreements are used to restrain interstate commerce and fix prices of goods shipped in commerce.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter  · William O. Douglas
Robert H. Jackson  · Harold H. Burton
Tom C. Clark  · Sherman Minton
Case opinions
MajorityReed, joined by Vinson, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Minton
DissentNone
Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), [1] is a 1952 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that a claim of conspiracy to fix uniform minimum prices and to eliminate competition throughout substantially all of the wrinkle finish industry of the United States by means of patent license agreements was, if proved, a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. That one of the defendants, a patent-holding company, abstained from manufacturing activities, did not ship goods in commerce, and engaged solely in patent licensing did not insulate its activity from § 1. Making these license contracts for the purpose of regulating distribution and fixing prices of commodities in interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act, even though the isolated act of contracting for the licenses occurs within a single state. Patents give no protection from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act when the patent licensing agreements are used to restrain interstate commerce and fix prices of goods shipped in commerce.

Contents

Background

Before and during 1937, two paint companies, Kay & Ess and Chadeloid Chemical Co., were in patent litigation with each other. Each company claimed that it controlled the basic patents on wrinkle finish, [2] and each company contended that the patents of the other could not be used without infringing its own patents. In November 1937 they decided to settle the litigation by forming a new, jointly–owned company, New Wrinkle, to which they assigned their patents. They agreed that they would license the wrinkle–finish industry to make and sell at fixed prices. Kay & Ess and Chadeloid then worked together to induce all manufacturers of wrinkle finish products to accept the price-fixing patent licenses from New Wrinkle. The prospective licensees were assured that the other manufacturers were being dealt with on the same basis "in order to establish minimum prices throughout the industry." By September 1938 the leading manufacturing companies and some 200 other manufacturers—substantially all manufacturers of wrinkle finishes in the United States—held nearly identical ten-year extendable license agreements from New Wrinkle, fixing prices. These license agreements required that a licensee observe in all sales of products covered by the licensed patents a schedule of minimum prices, discounts, and selling terms. Unlike its organizers, Kay & Ess and Chadeloid, New Wrinkle does not manufacture and sell the patented products. It just owns and licenses the patents. [3]

The United States sued Kay & Ess, Chadeloid, and New Wrinkle in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, for conspiring to fix uniform minimum prices and to eliminate competition throughout the wrinkle–finish industry, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted without issuing any opinion. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Justice Reed delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court Stanley Forman Reed (cropped).jpg
Justice Reed delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court

Justice Stanley Reed delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. [4]

Because New Wrinkle, unlike Kay & Ess and Chadeloid, did not manufacture or sell the patented products, and just owned and licensed the pooled patents, New Wrinkle contended that it is not engaged in trade or commerce—and thus could not be held liable for restraining trade and commerce under § 1 of the Sherman Act. "These contentions leave out of consideration," the Court responded, the allegations that "the use of patent licenses as an essential part of the plan to restrain trade, a trade in enamels, varnishes, and paints that is alleged to be and obviously is interstate in character." Pointing to the price-fixing provisions of the licenses, the Court said that it is "beyond question that this making of license contracts for the purpose of regulating distribution and fixing prices of commodities in interstate commerce is subject to the Sherman Act, even though the isolated act of contracting for the licenses is wholly within a single state." [5]

New Wrinkle next argued that the doctrine of United States v. General Electric Co. [6] —the 1926 GE case—immunized the price fixing from the antitrust laws. The Court distinguished the GE case from the case at bar: In the GE case, a patentee licensed a single other manufacturer to make and sell the patented product with a price limitation controlled by the patentee. In the present case, a patentee, acting in concert with all members of an industry, issued substantially identical licenses to all members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is completely regimented in order to organize the industry and stabilize prices. The Court said the case was indistinguishable from United States v. Line Material Co. , [7] and United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , [8] which held such conduct illegal. [9]

Subsequent developments

In Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., [10] the Third Circuit held that price-fixing clauses in multiple patent licenses violated the Sherman Act. Newburgh entered into licensing agreements with three of the five manufacturers in the moire finish industry, containing price-fixing clauses. The court held that the fact that there was more than one price-fixing license (in contrast to the single such license in the General Electric case) made the licenses fall outside the range of protected behavior that the General Electric case allowed. The Third Circuit explained:

At worst, we think that the patent laws were not intended to empower a patentee to grant a plurality of licenses, each containing provisions fixing the price at which the licensee might sell the product or process . . . and that, if a plurality of licenses are granted, such provisions therein are prohibited by the antitrust laws. The course pursued by Newburgh in the case at bar transcends the authority of the General Electric decision. [11]

Despite the differences in the fact patterns (multiple licenses, pooling, cross-licensing), the court said it saw no difference between the General Electric and New Wrinkle cases, so that the latter must be regarded as overruling the former: "We can find no very strong basis for distinguishing between General Electric and New Wrinkle. The explanation probably lies more in history than in logic, for history is an untidy housekeeper." [12]

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States antitrust law</span> American legal system intended to promote competition among businesses

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In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), was a case that the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 1938. The decision upheld so-called field-of-use limitations in patent licenses: it held that the limitations were enforceable in a patent infringement suit in federal court against the licensee and those acting in concert with it—for example, a customer that knowingly buys a patented product from the licensee that is outside the scope of the license.

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United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court explaining the exhaustion doctrine and applying it to find an antitrust violation because Univis's ownership of patents did not exclude its restrictive practices from the antitrust laws. The Univis case stands for the proposition that when an article sold by a patent holder or one whom it has authorized to sell it embodies the essential features of a patented invention, the effect of the sale is to terminate any right of the patent holder under patent law to control the purchaser's further disposition or use of the article itself and of articles into which it is incorporated as a component or precursor.

United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a patentee who has granted a single license to a competitor to manufacture the patented product may lawfully fix the price at which the licensee may sell the product.

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Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that limited the doctrine of the Court's 1938 decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. Beginning with the 1926 decision in United States v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court made a sharp distinction between (i) post-sale restraints that a patentee imposed on purchasers of a patented product and (ii) restrictions (limitations) that a patentee imposed on a licensee to manufacture a patented product: the former being illegal and unenforceable under the exhaustion doctrine while the latter were generally permissible under a lenient "rule of reason." Thus, under the General Talking Pictures doctrine, a patent holder may permissibly license others to manufacture and then sell patented products in only a specified field (market), such as only a particular type of product made under the patent or only a particular category of customer for the patented product. The Ethyl decision held, however, that a patent licensing and distribution program based on both the sale of a patented product and licenses to manufacture a related product was subject to ordinary testing under the antitrust laws, and accordingly was illegal when its effect was to "regiment" an entire industry.

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the exhaustion doctrine in patent law in which the Court held that after the sale of a patented item, the patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement relating to further use of that item, even when in violation of a contract with a customer or imported from outside the United States. The case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Lexmark against Impression Products, Inc., which bought used ink cartridges, refilled them, replaced a microchip on the cartridge to circumvent a digital rights management scheme, and then resold them. Lexmark argued that as they own several patents related to the ink cartridges, Impression Products was violating their patent rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a 2016 decision of the Federal Circuit, held that the exhaustion doctrine prevented Lexmark's patent infringement lawsuit, although Lexmark could enforce restrictions on use or resale of its contracts with direct purchasers under regular contract law. Besides printer and ink manufacturers, the decision of the case could affect the markets of high tech consumer goods and prescription drugs.

<i>United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co.</i>

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<i>United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd.</i>

United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd. is a patent–antitrust case in which the United States Government eroded the doctrine of United States v. General Electric Co. permitting patentees to fix licensee prices, but failed to persuade the court to decree royalty-free licensing as a remedy.

United States v. United States Gypsum Co. was a patent–antitrust case in which the United States Supreme Court decided, first, in 1948, that a patent licensing program that fixed prices of many licensees and regimented an entire industry violated the antitrust laws, and then, decided in 1950, after a remand, that appropriate relief in such cases did not extend so far as to permit licensees enjoying a compulsory, reasonable–royalty license to challenge the validity of the licensed patents. The Court also ruled, in obiter dicta, that the United States had standing to challenge the validity of patents when a patentee relied on the patents to justify its fixing prices. It held in this case, however, that the defendants violated the antitrust laws irrespective of whether the patents were valid, which made the validity issue irrelevant.

<i>United States v. Westinghouse Electric Co.</i>

United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d 642, is a patent-antitrust case in which the United States unsuccessfully tried to persuade the court that a patent and technology licensing agreement between major competitors in the highly concentrated heavy electrical equipment market—Westinghouse, Mitsubishi Electric (Melco) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)—which had the effect of territorially dividing world markets, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Government had two principal theories of the case: (1) the arrangement is in unreasonable restraint of trade because its effect is to lessen competition substantially by precluding the Japanese defendant companies from bidding against Westinghouse on equipment procurements in the United States, when they are ready, willing, and able to do so; and (2) the arrangement is an agreement—explicit or tacit—to divide markets, which is illegal per se under § 1. Neither theory prevailed.

<i>United States v. Krasnov</i>

United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, was a 1956 district court patent–antitrust decision that the United States Supreme Court affirmed per curiam without opinion. The district court granted the Government's summary judgment motion because it concluded:

That the defendants in combination controlled the market and had the ability to and did drive competitors from the business of manufacturing knitted fabric slip covers is abundantly clear from the record. That the defendants in combination fixed and maintained prices is likewise crystal clear. That the defendants in combination and cross-licensing created a situation in the industry which, particularly by agreement for joint action respecting the patents, effectively hindered newcomers in the field, is also established beyond peradventure of doubt. That the harassing suits against competitors, previously discussed in some detail, were designed as and were actually only harassing suits is clear from an examination of the correspondence between the parties and the Court feels that such conclusion in inescapable from an objective analysis of the documents. All of these actions taken in concert constitute a clear violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Government has established to the satisfaction of the Court that the combination and conspiracy above referred to represents an unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce among the several states of the United States in the manufacture and sale of ready-made furniture slip covers, is unlawful, and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Further, the Government, in the opinion of the Court, has effectively demonstrated that the defendants combined and conspired not only to restrain trade unreasonably but also to monopolize trade and commerce among the several states of the United States in the manufacture and sale of ready-made furniture slip covers, in direct violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Court also feels that by documentary proof the Government has established that the defendants have used patent rights unlawfully in instituting, effectuating and maintaining the aforesaid combination and conspiracy which likewise constitutes a clear violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), is a United States Supreme Court decision that limited the scope of the 1926 Supreme Court decision in the General Electric case that had exempted patent licensing agreements from antitrust law's prohibition of price fixing. The Court did so by applying the doctrine of the Court's recent Interstate Circuit hub-and-spoke conspiracy decision.

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the doctrine of the 1926 General Electric decision, excusing price fixing in patent license agreements. The Line Material Court held that cross-licenses between two manufacturer competitors, providing for fixing the prices of the licensed products and providing that one of the manufacturers would license other manufacturers under the patents of each manufacturer, subject to similar price fixing, violated Sherman Act § 1. The Court further held that the licensees who, with knowledge of such arrangements, entered into the price-fixing licenses thereby became party to a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act § 1.

United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965), is the most recent patent-license price-fixing case to reach the United States Supreme Court. It was inconclusive, as the Court split 4–4 and affirmed the decision of the lower court without opinion.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. Wrinkle–finish enamels, varnishes, and paints are manufactured in a manner such that, when they are applied to metal or another material and allowed to dry, they form a hard, wrinkled surface on the metal or other material. The patents cover methods and chemicals for making such enamels, varnishes and paints. 342 U.S. at 372 n.3.
  3. 342 U.S. at 373–76.
  4. Justice Tom C. Clark, who had been Attorney General when the case was filed, recused himself.
  5. 342 U.S. at 377.
  6. United States v. General Electric Co. , 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
  7. United States v. Line Material Co. , 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
  8. United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
  9. 342 U.S. at 380.
  10. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237F.2d283 ( 3d Cir. 1956).
  11. 237 F.2d at 293-94.
  12. 237 F.2d at 293