Accidentalism (philosophy)

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In philosophy, accidentalism denies the causal closure of physical determinism and maintains that events can succeed one another haphazardly or by chance (not in the mathematical but in the popular sense). Opponents of accidentalism maintain that what seems to be a chance occurrence is actually the result of one or more causes that remain unknown due only to a lack of investigation. Charles Sanders Peirce used the term tychism (from τύχη, chance) for theories that make chance an objective factor in the process of the Universe. [1]

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In ethics the term is used, like indeterminism, to denote the theory that mental change cannot always be ascribed to previously ascertained psychological states, and that volition is not causally related to the motives involved. An example of this theory is the doctrine of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae ("liberty of indifference"), according to which the choice of two or more alternative possibilities is affected neither by contemporaneous data of an ethical or prudential kind nor by crystallized habit (character). [1]

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Reductionism</span> Philosophical view explaining systems in terms of smaller parts

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Synchronicity</span> Jungian concept of the meaningfulness of acausal coincidences

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Incompatibilism</span> View of free will and determinism as incompatible and precluding each other

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Libertarianism (metaphysics)</span> Term in metaphysics

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philosophy of mind</span> Branch of philosophy

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In evolutionary biology, function is the reason some object or process occurred in a system that evolved through natural selection. That reason is typically that it achieves some result, such as that chlorophyll helps to capture the energy of sunlight in photosynthesis. Hence, the organism that contains it is more likely to survive and reproduce, in other words the function increases the organism's fitness. A characteristic that assists in evolution is called an adaptation; other characteristics may be non-functional spandrels, though these in turn may later be co-opted by evolution to serve new functions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Naturalism (philosophy)</span> Belief that only natural laws and forces operate in the universe

In philosophy, naturalism is the idea or belief that only natural laws and forces operate in the universe.

References

  1. 1 2 Wikisource-logo.svg One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain : Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Accidentalism". Encyclopædia Britannica . Vol. 1 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 114.

Further reading

Mann, William E. (2015). "Accidentalism". In Audi, Robert (ed.). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Third ed.). New York City: Cambridge University Press. p. 6. ISBN   978-1-139-05750-9. OCLC   927145544.