Adams v. Williams | |
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Argued April 10, 1972 Decided June 12, 1972 | |
Full case name | Frederick E. ADAMS, Warden, Petitioner, v. Robert WILLIAMS. |
Docket no. | 70-5015 |
Citations | 407 U.S. 143 ( more ) 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Case history | |
Prior | Certiorari denied from the Supreme Court of Connecticut. District Court denied federal habeas corpus. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. |
Holding | |
A tip from an informant who is known to an officer forms reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect for weapons. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, Burger |
Dissent | Marshall |
Dissent | Brennan |
Dissent | Douglas |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amends. IV |
Adams v. United States, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), is a United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that tips from a known informant can create enough reasonable suspicion to justify a patdown under Terry v. Ohio .
On October 30, 1966, Bridgeport, Connecticut police sergeant, John Connolly, was driving as part of his early morning patrol duty. At approximately 2:15 AM, an informant who Connolly knew told him that a person in a nearby vehicle possessed drugs with a gun in his waist. After calling for backup, Connoly approached the car, tapped on the window, and asked Robert Williams to open the door. Williams rolled down the window instead; Connoly then reached inside and removed a loaded revolver from his waistband. Williams was arrested for illegally carrying a handgun; a search incident to arrest revealed heroin both inside the car and on his person. Other weapons included a second revolver and a machete inside the vehicle.
During trial, Williams attempted to suppress the evidence on the basis that the State of Connecticut could not demonstrate the reliability of the informant, and that Connoly did not observe him in plain view outside the car. The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the conviction. [1]
The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision due to taking Conolly's experience and the corroboration of the informant's facts. However, an en banc hearing from the latter court reversed Williams' conviction because Conolly did not have reasonable suspicion to reach into his waistband. [2] [3]
Delivered by Justice William Rehnquist, the majority opinion reversed the Court of Appeals. As opposed to an anonymous tip, the informant was known to Officer Connolly. Additionally, a known informant can be arrested for making a false report. Furthermore, the gun's location lined up with the tip, and Williams' action of rolling down the window increased the chance of him being a threat. Rehnquist concluded that probable cause depends on general circumstances observed by ordinary people rather than specific elements of evidence. [4] As opposed to Aguilar and Spinelli, the informant was well known to Connolly and the circumstances lined up with the tip.
Justice William Douglas dissented by arguing that Connecticut law does not allow police officers to frisk people on suspicion of not having a valid firearms permit; he further opines that persons possessing narcotics can have permits (provided that those people do not have a record for drug possession). He concludes the dissent by postulating that the arrest would've stuck if it happened in a state with stricter gun laws. Therefore, he would rather have the Second Amendment watered down rather than have "possessory offenses" used as a pretext to intrude on the Fourth Amendment. [5]
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. dissented that Williams' act of rolling down the window was not enough to satisfy the "armed and dangerous" requirement to justify Connoly's stop.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented by focusing on the reliability of the informant. Previous interactions with Connolly and the informant concerned "public homosexual activities" at a railway station where a followup investigation resulted in no arrests. In addition, the informant did not specify the type of narcotics, nor did he state whether Williams was carrying the gun legally. Even if the initial frisk was legal, Connolly did not ask him if he had a legal reason to carry the weapon. Thus Connolly essentially acted on a hunch based on the word of an informant with questionable veracity.
Frederick D. Lewis Jr., a former Dean for the University of Miami School of Law, [6] [7] criticized the majority opinion for potentially deviating from Carroll v. United States and Chimel v. California by declaring a vehicle as an area to be searched incident to arrest. [8]
While the majority decision in Adams differentiated Williams' circumstances from the events in the Aguilar and Spinelli cases, the latter two were later overturned under Illinois v. Gates. Navarette v. California further upheld that anonymous 911 calls can be used as reasonable suspicion for traffic stops. However, the majority decision of Florida v. J.L. echoed the sentiments of Marshall and Douglas as J.L. was not seen committing crimes other than the possession of a gun (on the basis of an anonymous tip). [9]
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.
A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.
Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof that in United States law is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk, they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), is a Fourth Amendment case. Gates overruled Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, thereby replacing the Aguilar–Spinelli test for probable cause with the "totality of the circumstances" test.
United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), was a U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the Fourth Amendment's border search exception and balloon swallowing.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing police dog during a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even if the initial infraction is unrelated to drug offenses.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), is a case decided before the United States Supreme Court involving U.S. criminal procedure regarding searches and seizures.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that "[a]lthough an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information and some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information reliable." Along with Spinelli v. United States (1969), Aguilar established the Aguilar–Spinelli test, a judicial guideline for evaluating the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tip. The test developed in this case was subsequently rejected and replaced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), is a United States Supreme Court criminal law decision holding that a police officer ordering a person out of a car following a traffic stop and conducting a pat-down to check for weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The stop-question-and-frisk program, or stop-and-frisk, in New York City, is a New York City Police Department (NYPD) practice of temporarily detaining, questioning, and at times searching civilians and suspects on the street for weapons and other contraband. This is what is known in other places in the United States as the Terry stop. The rules for the policy are contained in the state's criminal procedure law section 140.50 and based on the decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of Terry v. Ohio.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that, based on the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not conduct a warrantless search of a third party's home in an attempt to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant, absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state statute providing employees with an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Ybarra v. Illinois was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that a warrant can not be used to search an unnamed individual unless the warrant mentions that unnamed parties are involved or exigent circumstances are shown to exist.
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when police officers may make arrests or conduct temporary detentions based on information provided by anonymous tips. In 2008, police in California received a 911 call that a pickup truck was driving recklessly along a rural highway. Officers spotted a truck matching the description provided in the 911 call and followed the truck for five minutes, but did not observe any suspicious behavior. Nevertheless, officers conducted a traffic stop and discovered 30 pounds (14 kg) of marijuana in the truck. At trial, the occupants of the car argued that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the tip was unreliable, and officers did not personally observe criminal activity. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that the 911 call was reliable, and that officers need not personally observe criminal activity when acting upon information provided by an anonymous 911 call.
In the law, the totality of the circumstances test refers to a method of analysis where decisions are based on all available information rather than bright-line rules. Under the totality of the circumstances test, courts focus "on all the circumstances of a particular case, rather than any one factor". In the United States, totality tests are used as a method of analysis in several different areas of the law. For example, in United States criminal law, a determination about reasonable suspicion or probable cause is based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.
Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held when a police officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is driving a vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after running a vehicle's license plate and learning that the registered owner's driver's license has been revoked is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court held that officers could order passengers out a car during a traffic stop, extending Pennsylvania v. Mimms.
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998), was a case before the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that property damage during a no-knock warrant is irrelevant as long as law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be a dangerous move.
Alabama v. White, 496 US 325 (1990), is a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Fourth Amendment. The majority opinion ruled that anonymous tips can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop provided that police can factually verify the circumstances asserted by the tip.