Chimel v. California

Last updated
Chimel v. California
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 27, 1969
Decided June 23, 1969
Full case nameTed Chimel v. State of California
Citations395 U.S. 752 ( more )
89 S. Ct. 2034; 23 L. Ed. 2d 685; 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1166
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorConviction affirmed, People v. Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1967); affirmed, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333 (1968); cert. granted, 393 U.S. 958(1968).
SubsequentRehearing denied, 396 U.S. 869(1969).
Holding
An arresting officer may search only the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Any other search of the surrounding area requires a search warrant.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II  · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
MajorityStewart, joined by Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Marshall
ConcurrenceHarlan
DissentWhite, joined by Black
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), was a 1969 United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that police officers arresting a person at his home could not search the entire home without a search warrant, but that police may search the area within immediate reach of the person without a warrant. [1] The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest within the home is now known as the Chimel rule. [2]

Contents

Ronald M. George, the young deputy attorney general who unsuccessfully argued California's case, ultimately became chief justice of the Supreme Court of California. [3]

Background

Police officers with a warrant authorizing Chimel's arrest on counts of burglary from a coin shop [4] were allowed into his home by Chimel's wife, where they awaited his return in order to serve him with the warrant. Upon receiving his warrant for arrest, "Chimel denied the request of officers to look around" [5] his home for further evidence. Ignoring Chimel, the police officers continued their search of Chimel's home "on the basis of the lawful arrest," [5] and the police "instructed Chimel's wife to remove items from drawers," [4] where she eventually found coins and metals. Later at Chimel's trial for burglary charges, "items taken from his home were admitted over objection from Chimel that they had been unconstitutionally seized." [5] However, a number of these items including the coins and medals that were taken from his home, were used to convict Chimel. [6]

The state courts upheld the conviction [7] despite his claim that the arrest warrant was invalid. [5] Prior to Chimel, the court's precedents permitted an arresting officer to search the area within an arrestee's "possession" and "control" for the purpose of gathering evidence. Based on the "abstract doctrine," it had sustained searches that extended far beyond an arrestee's area of immediate reach.

Decision and significance

The Supreme Court ruled 6–2 in favor of Chimel. [7] It held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search for and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, police were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the arrestee latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a similar rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is no comparable justification, I however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.

Justice Stewart, delivering the opinion of the Court

The ruling overturned the trial-court conviction by stating that the officers could reasonably search only "the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him." [8]

Criticism

In his concurring opinion in Riley v. California (2014), citing his dissent in Arizona v. Gant (2009), justice Samuel Alito called Chimel's reasoning "questionable", saying: "I think it is a mistake to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these that concern the search of the person of arrestees." [9]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A search warrant is a court order that a magistrate or judge issues to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct a search of a person, location, or vehicle for evidence of a crime and to confiscate any evidence they find. In most countries, a search warrant cannot be issued in aid of civil process.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that without a search warrant, police had no constitutional right to search a house where one resident consents to the search while another resident objects. The Court distinguished this case from the "co-occupant consent rule" established in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), which permitted one resident to consent in absence of the co-occupant.

Search incident to a lawful arrest, commonly known as search incident to arrest (SITA) or the Chimel rule, is a U.S. legal principle that allows police to perform a warrantless search of an arrested person, and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, in the interest of officer safety, the prevention of escape, and the preservation of evidence.

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), was a 1983 case before the US Supreme Court determining that a warrantless home arrest without exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure.

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), is a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that the traditional, common-law-derived "knock and announce" rule for executing search warrants must be incorporated into the "reasonableness" analysis of whether the actual execution of the warrant is/was justified under the 4th Amendment. The high court thus ruled that the old "knock and announce" rule while not a hard requirement, was also not a dead letter.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law-enforcement officers to demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent occupants have been arrested and secured.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Therefore, Belton extended the so-called "Chimel rule" of searches incident to a lawful arrest, established in Chimel v. California (1969), to vehicles. The Supreme Court sought to establish bright line rules to govern vehicle search incident to eliminate some confusion in the cases.

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobile's occupant, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution allows the officer to search the vehicle's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest. Thornton extended New York v. Belton, ruling that it governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle. Thornton also suggests a separate justification for an evidentiary search "when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment."

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States handed down in 1990. In the case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a murder conviction notwithstanding a challenge that the evidence upon which guilt was based was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court held that in view of the station-house detention upon probable cause, the very limited intrusion of scraping the defendant's fingernails for blood and other material, undertaken to preserve highly evanescent evidence, did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 244 P.3d 501, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105 was a Supreme Court of California case, which held that police are not required to obtain a warrant to search information contained within a cell phone in a lawful arrest. In a sting operation conducted by local police, the defendant, Gregory Diaz, was arrested for the sale of the illicit drug ecstasy and his cellphone, containing incriminating evidence, was seized and searched without a warrant. In trial court proceedings, Diaz motioned to suppress the information obtained from his cellphone, which was denied on the grounds that the search of his cellphone was incident to a lawful arrest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the court's decision and was later upheld by the California Supreme Court. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court overruled that position in Riley v. California and held that without a warrant, police may not search the digital information on a cellphone that has been seized incident to arrest.

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning search and seizure. A 6–3 decision reversed the weapons conviction of a Long Island man who had been detained when police followed his vehicle after he left his apartment just before it was to be searched. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and Antonin Scalia filed a concurrence. Stephen Breyer dissented.

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court which held that a cheek swab of an arrestee's DNA is comparable to fingerprinting and therefore, a legal police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of the digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), was decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that limited which claims of Fourth Amendment violations could be made by state prisoners in habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. Specifically, a claim that the exclusionary rule had been broken would be barred if state courts had already given it a full and fair hearing. The decision combined two cases that were argued before the Supreme Court on the same day with similar issues, one filed by Lloyd Powell and the other, titled Wolff v. Rice, filed by David Rice.

References

  1. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
  2. "Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California". Minnesota Law Review: 1101. 1970. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
  3. "U.S. Reports: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)". Library of Congress. Retrieved 2021-10-01.
  4. 1 2 "Chimel v. California". Quimbee. 2017. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
  5. 1 2 3 4 "Chimel v. California". FindLaw. 2017. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
  6. "Search Incident to Arrest: A Line is Drawn". Missouri Law Review. 35: 231. Spring 1970. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
  7. 1 2 "Chimel v. California". Oyez. Retrieved May 26, 2017.
  8. Chimel v. California, 395U.S.752 , p. 768(U.S. Sup. Ct.).
  9. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).