Good-faith exception

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In United States constitutional law and criminal procedure, the good-faith exception (also good-faith doctrine) is one of the limitations on the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment. [1]

Contents

For criminal proceedings, the exclusionary rule prohibits entry of evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure, such as one executed under an invalid search warrant. [2] However, the good-faith exemption allows evidence collected by law enforcement officers pursuant to a defective search warrant if the officers reasonably relied on the validity of the warrant in good faith (bona fides). [3]

Background

In the 1914 case Weeks v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited the admissibility of evidence obtained through unreasonable searches or seizures in federal criminal prosecutions, thereby establishing the exclusionary rule. In 1961, the Court, then led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ruled in Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule also applies to state criminal prosecutions under the doctrine of incorporation. In Mapp, the majority gave three rationales for enforcing the exclusionary rule under the Constitution: protecting a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, promoting judicial integrity, and deterring improper searches and seizures. [4]

However, the successor to Chief Justice Warren, Chief Justice Burger, was a vocal opponent of the exclusionary rule. [5] In a series of cases, the Burger Court (1969-1986) effectively limited the applicability of the exclusionary rule to criminal trial processes

Jurisprudence of the Exception

In 1984, the Supreme Court established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon [6] and its companion case Massachusetts v. Sheppard . [7] The Court reasoned that excluding evidence obtained through the police's good-faith reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate or judge that is later found to be deficient does not serve to deter any misconduct on the part of the police, and therefore such evidence is admissible. Said reasonableness of the reliance is determined under an objective standard. [8] Furthermore, the Leon majority enumerated specific instances where the exception would not apply:

In Illinois v. Krull (1987), [10] the Court extended the good-faith exception where an officer reasonably relied on a statute authorizing warrantless searches that was later found to be unconstitutional, citing the same lack of deterrent effect as Leon. The dissent argued that the majority improperly conflated searches which are authorized by judicial action and those which are authorized through legislation. [11]

In Arizona v. Evans (1995), [12] the Court held that evidence gathered because of a clerical error (here, a search warrant that was not properly removed from the police database) was admissible under the good-faith exception. The majority explained that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, not punish mistakes made by court employees. [13]

In Herring v. United States (2009), [14] the Court considered whether the exception applied to evidence obtained because of a warrant that was not removed from a database because of a mistake by the police (unlike in Evans, where a court clerk made the error). The majority held that it did when the police mistake was due to a simple, isolated incident of negligence rather than systemic error or a deliberate or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. [15]

In Davis v. United States (2011), [16] the Court ruled that evidence gathered from a search performed in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that was later overruled as being unconstitutional (here, a vehicle search that was rendered unconstitutional in view of Arizona v. Gant) was admissible under the good-faith exception. [17]

Attempt at federal legislative codification

Prior to the decision of Arizona v. Evans, Representative Bill McCollum introduced the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 (H.R. 666) to the House of the 104th Congress. The Act would have codified the ruling in United States v. Leon and expanded the good-faith exception to warrantless searches. [18] Under the Act, evidence would be admissible as long as the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that their actions were constitutional at the time of the search. [19] Opponents of the bill argued that this new test excessively broadened the scope of the good-faith exception by removing the requirement that the officer base their good-faith belief of constitutionality on an external authority (e.g., a neutral judge or magistrate, or a statute). [20] Upon passing the House with a 289 - 142 vote, it ultimately did not progress through the Senate.

Criticisms

The good-faith exception has been subject to significant criticism from civil rights groups and legal scholars. The American Civil Liberties Union has claimed that the exception enables dubious searches and limits the ability of defendants to contest the legality of a search. [21] University of Tennessee Professor Thomas Y. Davies argues that Leon's objectively reasonable reliance test allows for evidence obtained from all but the most grossly deficient warrants, thereby obviating the Fourth Amendment's mandate that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause", and that courts have commonly foregone performing an analysis as to the validity of a warrant in favor of simply applying the exception. [22]

Herring v. United States, which held that negligent actions by the police in some circumstances may still fall under the good-faith exception, has also invited scrutiny. Prominent Fourth Amendment scholar Wayne LaFave argues that the degree of culpability (e.g., negligent vs. intentional) has not previously been within the calculus of deterring police misconduct, and that a constitutional violation does not merit less scrutiny because it was the result of merely negligent behavior. [23]

State law

The exclusionary rule was held enforceable against state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio . Not all states, however, have adopted the federal good-faith exception as held in United States v. Leon. [24]

States that recognize the good-faith exception

States that do not recognize the good-faith exception

States that have not decided whether to adopt the good-faith exception

See also

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Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that created an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule makes most evidence gathered through violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, inadmissible in criminal trials as "fruit of the poisonous tree". In Nix, the Court ruled that evidence that would inevitably have been discovered by law enforcement through legal means remained admissible.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was a US Supreme Court decision that held the "silver platter doctrine", which allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally gathered by state police, to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

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Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), was a United States Supreme Court decision that created the modern "independent source doctrine" exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule makes most evidence gathered through violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution inadmissible in criminal trials as "fruit of the poisonous tree". In Murray, the Court ruled that when officers conduct two searches, the first unlawful and the second lawful, evidence seized during the second search is admissible if the second search "is genuinely independent of [the] earlier one."

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), was decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that limited which claims of Fourth Amendment violations could be made by state prisoners in habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. Specifically, a claim that the exclusionary rule had been broken would be barred if state courts had already given it a full and fair hearing. The decision combined two cases that were argued before the Supreme Court on the same day with similar issues, one filed by Lloyd Powell and the other, titled Wolff v. Rice, filed by David Rice.

References

  1. ↑ "good faith exception to exclusionary rule". Wex Legal Dictionary and Encyclopedia. Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 30 November 2023.
  2. ↑ "exclusionary rule". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 2024-03-11.
  3. ↑ Hauhart, Robert C.; Choi, Courtney Carter (2012). "The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule". Criminal Law Bulletin. 48 (2).
  4. ↑ Lee, Donald Winfred, & Manning, Johann Ray Jr. (1984). Exclusionary rule and good-faith exception: is it time for change. Mercer Law Review, 35(2), 699-724.
  5. ↑ Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964).
  6. ↑ United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
  7. ↑ Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
  8. ↑ United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 898-99 (1984).
  9. ↑ United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
  10. ↑ Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
  11. ↑ Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 364 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
  12. ↑ Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
  13. ↑ Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).
  14. ↑ Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
  15. ↑ Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009).
  16. ↑ Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
  17. ↑ Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011).
  18. ↑ H.R. Rep. No. 104-17 at 2 (1995).
  19. ↑ H.R. Rep. No. 104-17 at 6 (1995).
  20. ↑ H.R. Rep. No. 104-17 at 17 (1995).
  21. ↑ "The Police's Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card | ACLU". American Civil Liberties Union. 2014-10-29. Retrieved 2024-04-19.
  22. ↑ Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 933 at 1011-12 (2010).
  23. ↑ Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 757 at 787 (2008-2009).
  24. ↑ Holley, Dannye R. (2021). "Leon and the State Supreme Courts, 1984–2019". Criminal Law Bulletin. 57 (4): 453–483.
  25. ↑ Ex Parte Morgan, 641 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1994).
  26. ↑ State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67, 434 P.3d 578 (2019).
  27. ↑ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3925
  28. ↑ Echols v. State, 2016 Ark. 225, 492 S.W.3d 846 (2016).
  29. ↑ People v. Willis, 28 Cal. 4th 22, 46 P.3d 898 (2002).
  30. ↑ People v. Seymour, 2023 CO 53, 536 P.3d 1260 (Colo. 2023).
  31. ↑ Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-308.
  32. ↑ State v. Peterson, 739 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1999).
  33. ↑ People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, 129 N.E.3d 1141 (Ill. 2018).
  34. ↑ 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-12.
  35. ↑ Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270 (Ind. 2020).
  36. ↑ State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 511 P.3d 883 (2022).
  37. ↑ King v. Com., 302 S.W.3d 649 (Ky. 2010), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011).
  38. ↑ State v. Varnado, 675 So. 2d 268 (La. 1996).
  39. ↑ State v. Johndro, 2013 ME 106, 82 A.3d 820 (2013).
  40. ↑ Richardson v. State, 481 Md. 423, 282 A.3d 98 (2022).
  41. ↑ People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 668 N.W.2d 602 (2003).
  42. ↑ State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015).
  43. ↑ Sutton v. State, 238 So. 3d 1150 (Miss. 2018).
  44. ↑ State v. Bales, 630 S.W.3d 754 (Mo. 2021).
  45. ↑ State v. McGovern, 311 Neb. 705, 974 N.W.2d 595, cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 404, 214 L. Ed. 2d 201 (2022).
  46. ↑ State v. Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 69 P.3d 232 (2003).
  47. ↑ State v. Pogue, 2015 ND 211, 868 N.W.2d 522 (2015).
  48. ↑ State v. Harrison, 2021-Ohio-4465, 166 Ohio St. 3d 479, 187 N.E.3d 510 (2021).
  49. ↑ State v. Haliburton, 2018 OK CR 28, 429 P.3d 997 (2018).
  50. ↑ State v. Breedwell, 323 Or. App. 172, 522 P.3d 876 (2022), review denied, 371 Or. 106, 530 P.3d 487 (2023)
  51. ↑ State v. German, 439 S.C. 449, 887 S.E.2d 912 (2023), reh'g denied (June 28, 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5826, 2024 WL 759834 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2024).
  52. ↑ State v. Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108, 688 N.W.2d 193 (2004).
  53. ↑ State v. McElrath, 569 S.W.3d 565 (Tenn. 2019).
  54. ↑ Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
  55. ↑ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23.
  56. ↑ State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d 650 (2010).
  57. ↑ Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 207, 824 S.E.2d 485 (2019).
  58. ↑ State v. Prado, 2021 WI 64, 397 Wis. 2d 719, 960 N.W.2d 869 (2021).
  59. ↑ Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1995).
  60. ↑ State v. Brown, 331 Conn. 258, 202 A.3d 1003 (2019).
  61. ↑ Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282 (Del. 2016).
  62. ↑ Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d 426 (1992), abrogated by Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 834 S.E.2d 785 (2019).
  63. ↑ State v. Rothman, 70 Haw. 546, 779 P.2d 1 (1989).
  64. ↑ State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012).
  65. ↑ State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).
  66. ↑ Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 121 N.E.3d 166 (2019).
  67. ↑ State v. Schulz, 164 N.H. 217, 55 A.3d 933 (2012).
  68. ↑ State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 180 A.3d 1110 (2017).
  69. ↑ State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
  70. ↑ People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985).
  71. ↑ State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
  72. ↑ Commonwealth v. Myers, 640 Pa. 653, 164 A.3d 1162 (2017).
  73. ↑ State v. McManis, 2010 VT 63, 188 Vt. 187, 5 A.3d 890 (2010).
  74. ↑ State v. Mayfield, 192 Wash. 2d 871, 434 P.3d 58 (2019).
  75. ↑ Deemer v. State, 244 P.3d 69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
  76. ↑ State v. Deeg, 2000 MT 107N, 300 Mont. 544, 8 P.3d 123 (2000).
  77. ↑ State v. McGuire, 273 A.3d 146 (R.I. 2022).
  78. ↑ State v. Adkins, 176 W. Va. 613, 346 S.E.2d 762 (1986).
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