Inevitable discovery

Last updated

Inevitable discovery is a doctrine in United States criminal procedure that permits admission of evidence that was obtained through illegal means if it would "inevitably" have been obtained regardless of the illegality. [1] It is one of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, or the related fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine, which prevent evidence collected in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights from being admitted in court. [1]

Contents

Origin of the doctrine

Nix v. Williams

The inevitable discovery doctrine was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams in 1984. [2] [3] In that case, Williams, the defendant, challenged the admissibility of evidence about the location and condition of the victim's body, given that it had been obtained from him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court held that the evidence was admissible because law enforcement would "inevitably" have discovered the body even without Williams' statements, because a massive search had been underway in the very location where the body was ultimately found. [4] Prior to Nix v. Williams, an inevitable discovery rule had been recognized in the "vast majority" of both state and federal courts. [4] In its opinion, the Court formally adopted the rule as part of its own jurisprudence.

Rationale for the doctrine

In adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix, the Supreme Court discussed the basic reasoning underlying the doctrine. The rationale behind the inevitable discovery exception is the flip side to that underlying the exclusionary rule—the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter police from violating constitutional and statutory rights. In other words, it functions to make sure the police are not put in a better place than they would have been had they refrained from illegal conduct. At the same time, there are countervailing interests on the other side of the balance—most importantly, the public interest in having access to all probative evidence of a crime and not allowing guilty individuals to go free. The inevitable discovery doctrine gives force to that other side of the balance by rendering evidence admissible when it would simply put police in the same position they would have been in had they exclusively used lawful means. [2] If the government can establish that the illegal act was irrelevant to its ability to ultimately obtain the evidence, then "the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received." [5]

Applicability of and limitations on the inevitable discovery doctrine

Burden and standard of proof

In Nix, the Court established that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discovery of the evidence would have been inevitable.

The defendant had argued for the higher clear and convincing evidence standard, but the plaintiff explained that the of the evidence is the normal burden of proof applied when it comes to admissibility of evidence, and there was no reason to depart from that for inevitable discovery. [6]

In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that even though only a preponderance of the evidence is required for the independent source rule to apply, that the government should have to present clear and convincing evidence to avail itself of the inevitable discovery exception. He pointed out that when the prosecution seeks to use the independent source exception, they have in fact, obtained the evidence by lawful means after having obtained it first by unlawful means. Meanwhile, with inevitable discovery, it is merely hypothetical whether the officers could have obtained the evidence by lawful means. Given the inherently speculative nature of inevitable discovery, Justice Brennan would have demanded that the prosecution satisfy a clear and convincing standard before being allowed to use the evidence. [7] (See below for a more detailed discussion of the relationship bet the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines.)

Relevance of good/bad faith

The Court also took Nix as an opportunity to resolve a point of contention with regard to the relevance of bad faith to applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

In the lower court proceedings in Nix, the Eighth Circuit had adopted a version of the rule that would require the state to not only show that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered, but also that the police did not act in bad faith, i.e., with the intention of committing misconduct. It reasoned that without an absence-of-bad-faith requirement (in other words, a "good faith" requirement), "the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the Sixth Amendment would be too great." [5]

The Court rejected that view, holding that no showing of good faith is required for the state to take advantage of the inevitable discovery exception. The Court reasoned that it is unrealistic to think that a police officer faced with the possibility of obtaining evidence illegally would, in the moment, make the calculation of whether a court would conclude that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered; it also noted that the risk of civil liability and departmental discipline would also disincentivize police from engaging in such misconduct. [8]

Applicability to primary vs. derivative evidence

Nix itself concerned the admissibility of "derivative evidence," or evidence that was not the direct result of an illegal act, but that was the product of a chain of events beginning with the illegal act—also known as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Evidence that was directly obtained via the illegal act is referred to as "primary evidence."

The Court in Nix did not make explicit whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to just derivative evidence or primary evidence as well, and in the years immediately following Nix, the lower courts diverged greatly on this issue. [9] In 1988, however, the Supreme Court held in Murray v. United States that the related independent source exception applies to not only derivative but also primary, evidence. [10] Since then, most lower courts have held that the inevitable discovery doctrine also applies to both primary and derivative evidence. [11] [12] A few, however, have maintained that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not extend to evidence obtained directly as a result of the unconstitutional act—for example, in United States v. Polanco, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Nix as implying that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not "allow admission of the unconstitutional inculpatory statement itself." [13]

Debate over active pursuit requirement

There is a split among the lower federal courts as to whether the inevitable discovery doctrine can only be applied when the investigation that inevitably would have led to the discovery was already underway when the illegality occurred or whether the government's claim that they would have initiated such an investigation is sufficient. [14] [15] For instance, the Eighth Circuit has required that "the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation" for the exception to apply. [16] [17] Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit has established that "the inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence, whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police conduct." [18] [19] In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Cunningham, the defendant objected that evidence obtained from his house indicating that he was guilty of counterfeit check-writing should be suppressed because the police had no warrant and his consent to the search was coerced. Even though the police were not in the process of getting a warrant at the time of the search (they had abandoned plans to obtain a warrant in favor of continuing surveillance), the court held that the officers inevitably would have been able to obtain a warrant to search the house and thus, were entitled to the exception. [20]

Routine vs. non-routine investigatory procedures

Lower federal courts have most readily applied the inevitable discovery doctrine in cases where the means the police claim would have inevitably led to the evidence are routine procedures, like an inventory search. [3] For example, in United States v. Almeida, the defendant objected that the counterfeit bills seized from his wallet were the product of an illegal search; the First Circuit concluded that the bills would inevitably have been discovered according to routine procedure, as the defendant had already been arrested for presenting false identification and it was the jail's standard practice to remove and fully search any arrestee's possessions. [21] And in United States v. Melgar, the Fourth Circuit held that even though the defendant had revealed his illegal alien status in an interrogation that violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the government would inevitably have discovered his illegal status via a routine computer check on his false identification card. [22]

More difficult cases arise when law enforcement claims that they would have come across the evidence via a non-routine investigatory procedure. [3] For instance, in United States v. Infante-Ruiz, the defendant sought to suppress evidence of a firearm that officers had found while searching a briefcase in the trunk of a rental car he was a passenger in, after arresting him on outstanding, unrelated narcotics charges. The First Circuit held that the police would not have inevitably discovered the firearm because there was no routine or policy of seizing and searching a rental car in which the arrestee was merely a passenger. [23]

Applicability across amendments

Most commonly, the inevitable discovery doctrine is used to bring in evidence despite an illegal search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [24] But it may also may apply to unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination [25] [26] or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. [27] Nix itself was a Sixth Amendment case, but the Supreme Court did not suggest in any way that the inevitable discovery doctrine was limited to the Sixth Amendment, and lower courts quickly extended the holding to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. [28]

Relationship to the independent source exception

In Nix, the Court adopted not only the inevitable discovery doctrine but also the closely related independent source doctrine. [29] That doctrine provides that evidence obtained through illegal means may still be admissible if it was also obtained through independent, legal means. [1] The difference between an independent source and an inevitable discovery is that the former focuses on what actually happened, while the latter focuses on a hypothetical counterfactual. Under the independent source rule, police did in fact "rel[y] upon an untainted source" (in addition to the tainted one), while under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the theory is that police would inevitably have been able to find an untainted source. [3]

An illustration of the difference between the two is captured in the case of Somer v. United States. [3] [30] There, federal agents conducted an illegal search of the defendant's apartment in violation of the Fourth Amendment and learned from his wife that he was out but would be back shortly. Acting on that information, they waited out on the curb for the defendant, and when he arrived, they smelled an alcoholic odor on his breath, arrested him, and legally searched the car, uncovering illicit alcohol. The Court held that the independent source exception could not apply, as the only reason why police decided to wait outside and then conduct their legal search of their car was because of the information they had learned via their illegal search; thus, their claimed legal means were not truly independent of the illegal means. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the evidence may still be admissible if the government were able to show that "independently of what Somer's wife told them, the officers would have gone to the street, waited for Somer, and arrested him, exactly as they did"—in other words, if in a counterfactual world, they would have inevitably discovered the contraband anyway. [30]

The independent source rule dates all the way back to the Supreme Court's 1920 case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , [31] well before the adoption of the inevitable discovery doctrine. But in Nix, the Court explicitly noted that the rationale underlying the independent source rule—balancing competing interests by putting police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in absent the illegality–applied with equal force to justify the inevitable discovery exception. [4]

Application in state court

In addition to federal courts, every state other than Texas and Washington recognizes some version of the inevitable discovery doctrine. [32] But the states vary in how closely they follow the federal standard set out in Nix and the specific requirements they impose for application of the doctrine.

For example, Alaska has required that the prosecution be able "to prove exactly how" the evidence would have been discovered, and that the defendant would have been asked the exact same questions and would have given the exact same answers. [33] And Arizona has held that the inevitable discovery doctrine cannot be applied to the illegal search and seizure of items from a private home. [34]

Some states have declined to follow the Supreme Court's prescription in Nix that good faith is not a prerequisite to applicability of the doctrine. [35] Others have held that the inevitable discovery exception only applies to derivative evidence and cannot be used to bring in primary evidence obtained illegally. [36]

Most states have followed the Supreme Court's lead on the standard of proof and applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to inevitable discovery. [32] But some states have chosen to impose the more rigorous, clear and convincing standard, siding with Justice Brennan's dissent in Nix. The Hawaii Supreme Court explained this choice of a higher standard of proof as a product of the fact that its state constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy than does the federal constitution; thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court wanted to ensure that "speculation regarding whether evidence obtained in violation of one's individual privacy would have been inevitably discovered be 'as close to correct as possible.'" [37]

In Mobley v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court highlighted the way in which the inevitable discovery doctrine might interact with the increasing breadth of state protections against unreasonable search and seizure in the digital context. In that case, officers seized data from the defendant's car system, which revealed that he had been driving at nearly 100 miles per hour and was likely responsible for the deaths of the two people in the car with which he collided. They did not obtain a warrant for the data until after the fact. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to get a warrant before accessing the vehicle's data and that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply: it reasoned that the police had not shown any indication of plans to get a warrant before the data was removed and that the police department had no policy or practice of obtaining such data after a fatal crash. [38] [39]

Criticisms of the doctrine

Various scholars and practitioners have criticized the inevitable discovery doctrine and its sister exceptions as undermining the constitutional protections embodied by the exclusionary rule.

Many have argued that, despite the Court's assurances to the contrary in Nix, the inevitable discovery rule not only permits but encourages, law enforcement to engage in misconduct by, for example, creating an easy "I could have gotten a warrant" excuse for a warrantless search. [12] Professor Robert Bloom critiques the Nix Court as having improperly minimized the "negative effect that the inevitable discovery exception would have on the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule"; he posited that the Supreme Court neglected the immense incentives the exception would create to conduct unconstitutional searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment context because Nix itself is a Sixth Amendment case. [40]

These scholars have especially emphasized how the expansion of the inevitable discovery doctrine to primary evidence and the lack of an active pursuit rule in some circuits have rendered it a more dangerous threat to constitutional rights. [12] Bloom warns that application of the doctrine to primary evidence "could well signal the de facto elimination of the exclusionary rule." [40] One state court judge has opined that the Supreme Court was wrong in Nix to reject the lower court's requirement that the officers have acted in good faith, positing that "a good faith requirement would curtail constitutional abuse" and "would exclude evidence obtained via willful violations" without "punish[ing] officers acting honestly." [41] But others have suggested that at least some of the conservative members of the Court would be happy to see the elimination of the exclusionary rule, with Nix and the inevitable discovery doctrine as merely examples of a longstanding distaste for the exclusionary rule. [42]

Other commentators have expressed concern that the inevitable discovery doctrine might undercut new Fourth Amendment protections the Supreme Court has established to account for changes in technology, in cases such as United States v. Jones , Riley v. California , and Carpenter v. United States . Mark Rasch has argued that the Supreme Court's ruling in Carpenter, requiring law enforcement to get a warrant to access cell-site location information (data about what cell towers a phone has pinged), has been rendered meaningless by a combination of the good-faith exception and the inevitable discovery doctrine. [43] He observes that as long as the government can argue that they inevitably would have been able to uncover an individual's data by subpoenaing them from a cell-phone provider or other third-party entity, then inevitable discovery will provide a convenient loophole around modern Fourth Amendment protections. [43]

Related Research Articles

<i>Miranda</i> warning Notification given by U.S. police to criminal suspects on their rights while in custody

In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "The father of Miranda."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Fruit of the poisonous tree is a legal metaphor used to describe evidence that is obtained illegally. The logic of the terminology is that if the source of the evidence or evidence itself is tainted, then anything gained from it is tainted as well.

In criminal procedure law of the United States, an exigent circumstance allows law enforcement to enter a structure without a search warrant, or if they have a "knock and announce" warrant, allows them to enter without knocking and waiting for the owner's permission to enter. It must be a situation where people are in imminent danger, evidence faces imminent destruction, or a suspect's escape is imminent. Once entry is obtained, the plain view doctrine applies, allowing the seizure of any evidence or contraband discovered in the course of actions consequent upon the exigent circumstances.

In the United States, the exclusionary rule is a legal rule, based on constitutional law, that prevents evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights from being used in a court of law. This may be considered an example of a prophylactic rule formulated by the judiciary in order to protect a constitutional right. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment's command that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held 6—3 that, while the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states, the exclusionary rule was not a necessary ingredient of the Fourth Amendment's right against warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that as a matter of judicial implication the exclusionary rule was enforceable in federal courts but not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Wolf Court decided not to incorporate the exclusionary rule as part of the Fourteenth Amendment in large part because the states which had rejected the Weeks Doctrine had not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. However, because most of the states' rules proved to be ineffective in deterrence, the Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). That landmark case made history as the exclusionary rule enforceable against the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the same extent that it applied against the federal government.

In the United States, the plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement that allows an officer to seize evidence and contraband that are found in plain view during a lawful observation. The doctrine is also regularly used by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers while screening persons and property at U.S. airports.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the matter of whether wiretapping of private telephone conversations, obtained by federal agents without a search warrant and subsequently used as evidence, constituted a violation of the target’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Constitutional rights of a wiretapping target have not been violated. This decision was overturned by Katz v. United States in 1967.

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that police officers knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering a private residence does not require suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating due process rights

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 14, 2009. The court decided that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when a police officer makes an arrest based on an outstanding warrant in another jurisdiction, but the information regarding that warrant is later found to be incorrect because of a negligent error by that agency.

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court reversed a district court's suppression of evidence in the criminal prosecution of an Ohio businessman charged with tax evasion. The case concerned both issues of criminal procedure and the application of the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment. By a 6–3 margin the Court both reaffirmed its earlier rulings' holding that only the party whose Fourth Amendment protections may have been violated has standing to challenge the evidence seized in the search, and barred lower courts from exercising their supervisory power to exclude such evidence at the trial of third parties.

<i>United States v. Warshak</i>

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 is a criminal case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that government agents violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by compelling his Internet service provider (ISP) to turn over his emails without first obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause. However, constitutional violation notwithstanding, the evidence obtained with these emails was admissible at trial because the government agents relied in good faith on the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court further declared that the SCA is unconstitutional to the extent that it allows the government to obtain emails without a warrant.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that created an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule makes most evidence gathered through violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, inadmissible in criminal trials as "fruit of the poisonous tree". In Nix, the Court ruled that evidence that would inevitably have been discovered by law enforcement through legal means remained admissible.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was a US Supreme Court decision that held the "silver platter doctrine", which allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally gathered by state police, to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), was a United States Supreme Court decision that created the modern "independent source doctrine" exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule makes most evidence gathered through violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution inadmissible in criminal trials as "fruit of the poisonous tree". In Murray, the Court ruled that when officers conduct two searches, the first unlawful and the second lawful, evidence seized during the second search is admissible if the second search "is genuinely independent of [the] earlier one."

<i>United States v. Davis</i> (2014)

United States v. Quartavious Davis is a United States federal legal case that challenged the use in a criminal trial of location data obtained without a search warrant from MetroPCS, a cell phone service provider. Mobile phone tracking data had helped place the defendant in this case at the scene of several crimes, for which he was convicted. The defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which found the warrantless data collection had violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but declined to order a new trial because the evidence was collected in good faith. The Eleventh Circuit has since vacated this decision pending a rehearing by the Eleventh Circuit en banc. United States v. Davis, 573 Fed. Appx. 925. On 5 May 2015, the en banc order upheld the use of the information. On 9th Nov 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear this case on appeal.

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against the introduction of evidence obtained in an illegal arrest is not attenuated by reading the defendant their Miranda Rights.

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that clarified the relationship of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to other constitutional rights in criminal procedure. In this case, evidence against the defendant was probably seized illegally, violating the Fourth Amendment, but he lost the chance to argue that point due to his lawyer's ineffectiveness. The prosecution argued that the defendant's attempt to make a Sixth Amendment argument via a habeas corpus petition was really a way to sneak his Fourth Amendment argument in through the back door. The Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the Fourth Amendment issue and the Sixth Amendment issue represented different constitutional values, and had different requirements for prevailing in court, and therefore were to be treated separately by rules of procedure. Therefore, the habeas corpus petition could go forward. In its opinion, the Court also gave guidance on how to apply its decisions in Stone v. Powell and Strickland v. Washington.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), was decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that limited which claims of Fourth Amendment violations could be made by state prisoners in habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. Specifically, a claim that the exclusionary rule had been broken would be barred if state courts had already given it a full and fair hearing. The decision combined two cases that were argued before the Supreme Court on the same day with similar issues, one filed by Lloyd Powell and the other, titled Wolff v. Rice, filed by David Rice.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Garner, Bryan, ed. (2019). Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.).
  2. 1 2 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 LaFave, Wayne (2009). Criminal Procedure. West. p. 636.
  4. 1 2 3 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 436-44.
  5. 1 2 Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1169 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983).
  6. ↑ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 444 & n.5.
  7. ↑ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 458-60.
  8. ↑ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 445-46.
  9. ↑ Jessica Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 Ford. L. Rev. 1221, 1224-25 (1987).
  10. ↑ Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540-41 (1988).
  11. ↑ See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. White, 326 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994).
  12. 1 2 3 Troy E. Golden, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 97 (1998).
  13. ↑ United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1996).
  14. ↑ 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 174
  15. ↑ Stephen E. Hessler, Establishing Inevitability Without Active Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 244-45 (2000).
  16. ↑ United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997).
  17. ↑ See also United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984) (Eleventh Circuit applying the active pursuit rule).
  18. ↑ United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1997).
  19. ↑ See also United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1995) (Sixth Circuit rejecting the active pursuit rule).
  20. ↑ United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203-05 (10th Cir. 2005).
  21. ↑ United States v. Almeida, 748 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 2014).
  22. ↑ United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998).
  23. ↑ United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1994).
  24. ↑ U.S. Const. amend. IV.
  25. ↑ U.S. Const. amend. V.
  26. ↑ See, e.g., United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight Dollars, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
  27. ↑ U.S. Const. VI.
  28. ↑ See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1985) (Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martinez-Gallegos, 807 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1987) (Fifth Amendment).
  29. ↑ Chemerinsky, Erwin; Levenson, Laurie L. (2018). Criminal Procedure (3d ed.). Wolters Kluwer. p. 501. ISBN   978-1-4548-8299-2.
  30. 1 2 Somer v. United States, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
  31. ↑ Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
  32. 1 2 Miller, Marc L.; Wright, Ronald F. (2007). Criminal Procedures: Cases, Statutes, and Executive Materials (3d ed.). Wolters Kluwer. pp. 406–07. ISBN   978-0-7355-6324-7.
  33. ↑ Hazelwood v. State, 912 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997).
  34. ↑ State v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1986).
  35. ↑ See, e.g., State v. Holly, 833 N.W.2d 15, 32 (N.D. 2013).
  36. ↑ See, e.g., People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987).
  37. ↑ State v. Rodrigues, 286 P.3d 809, 822-24 (Haw. 2012).
  38. ↑ Mobley v. State, 834 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 2019).
  39. ↑ Zucker, Rachel (November 5, 2019). "Landmark Decision on Vehicle Data Privacy Issued by Georgia Supreme Court". Lexology.
  40. 1 2 Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception beyond the Fruits, 20 Am. J. Crim. L. 79, 95-96 (1992).
  41. ↑ Hon. John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need for a Good Faith Requirement, 17 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1085 (1991).
  42. ↑ Amar, Akhil (September 16, 2016). "The Court after Scalia: The despicable and dispensable exclusionary rule (Corrected)". SCOTUSblog.
  43. 1 2 Rasch, Mark (June 18, 2019). "Supreme Court Cell Privacy Ruling Thwarted". Security Boulevard.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.