Legal and judicial opinions |
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A dissenting opinion (or dissent) is an opinion in a legal case in certain legal systems written by one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment.
Dissenting opinions are normally written at the same time as the majority opinion and any concurring opinions, and are also delivered and published at the same time. A dissenting opinion does not create binding precedent nor does it become a part of case law, though they can sometimes be cited as a form of persuasive authority in subsequent cases when arguing that the court's holding should be limited or overturned. In some cases, a previous dissent is used to spur a change in the law, and a later case may result in a majority opinion adopting a particular understanding of the law formerly advocated in dissent. As with concurring opinions, the difference in opinion between dissents and majority opinions can often illuminate the precise holding of the majority opinion.
The dissent may disagree with the majority for any number of reasons: a different interpretation of the existing case law, the application of different principles, or a different interpretation of the facts. Many legal systems do not provide for a dissenting opinion and provide the decision without any information regarding the discussion between judges or its outcome.
A dissent in part is a dissenting opinion which disagrees selectively with one or more parts of the majority holding. In decisions that require holdings with multiple parts due to multiple legal claims or consolidated cases, judges may write an opinion "concurring in part and dissenting in part".
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In some courts, such as the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority opinion may be broken down into numbered or lettered parts, which allows those judges "dissenting in part" to easily identify the parts in which they join with the majority, and the parts in which they do not.
In the mid-20th century, it became customary for the members of the U.S. Supreme Court and many state supreme courts to end their dissenting opinions with a variation on the phrase "I respectfully dissent." In turn, the omission of the word "respectfully" or of the entire phrase altogether is now taken as a signal that the dissenting justice is particularly furious at the majority over the issue dissented upon. [1]
It was more common in the past for Justices to dissent without authoring dissenting opinions. Between the Chase Court and the Hughes Court the dissents were often silent. Dissent began to increase with the Stone Court. William Brennan was known for telling clerks that the majority on the Court could do anything it wanted with five votes. By the Warren Court simple majorities had replaced consensus building. [2] William Rehnquist, the most conservative justice on the Burger Court, became known as the "Lone Ranger" for being the lone dissent in so many cases. [3]
In the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), the fourth amendment to the Federal Constitutional Court Act of 21 December 1970 - in Section 30 (2) BVerfGG - introduced the possibility of a special vote. Since then, the decisions of the BVerfG can be accompanied by a minority opinion with the signature of the differing judge votes. The aim of the reform was to achieve greater transparency in court decisions and to strengthen the position of the individual judge. Special votes are also possible at some state constitutional courts in Germany. For example, Section 12 (1) of the Lower Saxony Law on the State Court provides for the corresponding application of Section 30 (2) BVerfGG. The Hessian State Court Law provides for an independent regulation on the possibility of a special vote in section 16 (3). Special votes are also permitted in arbitration proceedings.
The special vote is only permitted at constitutional courts. A minority opinion may not be published in all other courts. A judicial confidentiality obligation arises from § 43 DRiG, which protects the confidentiality of advice. The introduction of special votes in all courts was discussed in detail at the 47th German Lawyers' Day in 1968.
A minority opinion cannot be published in judgments of Italian courts. In Constitutional Court a minority vote can be just guessed in case of "showy, not negligible distinction between the reporteur and the editor". [4] According to Sabino Cassese, the absence of the dissenting opinion penalizes the potential that the process of constitutional review of the laws would have arouse debates and awareness in the country. [5]
Dissenting opinions are not permitted by the Dutch legal system, but the wording of a published decision may reflect the divergent opinions of the judges involved. [6]
Dissenting opinions do not have a long history in the Czech Republic due to its tradition of continental and socialist law. However, there has been an effort to encourage them in recent years and they are permitted for the judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. Whereas, the dissenting opinions of judges of the Constitutional Court have been published ever since its creation in 1993 and some of them have had an significant effect on the subsequent case law and legal theory, judges of the Supreme Administrative Court can publish their dissenting opinions only since an 2012 amendment to the Code of Administrative Justice Procedure and this practice has not yet become significantly prevelant or influential. [7]
Even though Europe has a civil law tradition, the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly states that judges of the European Court of Human Rights may attach their dissenting opinion to the judgment at hand. [8]
Susan Kiefel, Chief Justice of Australia, has expressed concern at the frequency of judicial dissents and the attention given to them by law students and legal commentators. She believes that they should be reserved for only the most important cases, and has described judges who frequently dissent as "somewhat self-indulgent". She further observed that "humorous dissent may provide the author with fleeting popularity, but it may harm the image the public has of the court and its judges". [9]
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court on December 12, 2000, that settled a recount dispute in Florida's 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. On December 8, the Florida Supreme Court had ordered a statewide recount of all undervotes, over 61,000 ballots that the vote tabulation machines had missed. The Bush campaign immediately asked the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the decision and halt the recount. Justice Antonin Scalia, contending that all the manual recounts being performed in Florida's counties were illegitimate, urged his colleagues to grant the stay immediately. On December 9, the five conservative justices on the Court granted the stay, with Scalia citing "irreparable harm" that could befall Bush, as the recounts would cast "a needless and unjustified cloud" over Bush's legitimacy. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that "counting every legally cast vote cannot constitute irreparable harm." Oral arguments were scheduled for December 11.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court upheld the right to have an abortion as established by the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade (1973) and issued as its "key judgment" the restoration of the undue burden standard when evaluating state-imposed restrictions on that right. Both the essential holding of Roe and the key judgment of Casey were overturned by the Supreme Court in 2022, with its landmark decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the Constitution of the United States protects the liberty of married couples to use contraceptives without government restriction. The case involved a Connecticut "Little Comstock Act" that prohibited any person from using "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception". The court held that the statute was unconstitutional, and that its effect was "to deny disadvantaged citizens ... access to medical assistance and up-to-date information in respect to proper methods of birth control." By a vote of 7–2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on the grounds that it violated the "right to marital privacy", establishing the basis for the right to privacy with respect to intimate practices. This and other cases view the right to privacy as "protected from governmental intrusion".
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld, in a 5–4 ruling, the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults, in this case with respect to homosexual sodomy, though the law did not differentiate between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy. It was overturned in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), though the statute had already been struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1998.
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, formerly Andersen v. Sims, is a Washington Supreme Court case in which eight lesbian and gay couples sued King County and the state of Washington for denying them marriage licenses under the state's 1998 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage as between a man and a woman. The court ruled that banning same-sex marriage is constitutional since the legislature could reasonably believe it furthers the government's interest in promoting procreation.
In law, a concurring opinion is in certain legal systems a written opinion by one or more judges of a court which agrees with the decision made by the majority of the court, but states different reasons as the basis for their decision. When no absolute majority of the court can agree on the basis for deciding the case, the decision of the court may be contained in a number of concurring opinions, and the concurring opinion joined by the greatest number of judges is referred to as the plurality opinion.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, formerly known as the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, is the highest court in the U.S. state of Connecticut. It consists of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. The seven justices sit in Hartford, across the street from the Connecticut State Capitol. The court generally holds eight sessions of two to three weeks per year, with one session each September through November and January through May. Justices are appointed by the governor and then approved by the Connecticut General Assembly.
David Stephen Tatel is an American lawyer who served as a United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In law, a majority opinion is a judicial opinion agreed to by more than half of the members of a court. A majority opinion sets forth the decision of the court and an explanation of the rationale behind the court's decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. The procedures of the Court are governed by the U.S. Constitution, various federal statutes, and its own internal rules. Since 1869, the Court has consisted of one chief justice and eight associate justices. Justices are nominated by the president, and with the advice and consent (confirmation) of the U.S. Senate, appointed to the Court by the president. Once appointed, justices have lifetime tenure unless they resign, retire, or are removed from office.
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), is a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court ruled that only District 23 of the 2003 Texas redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act. The Court refused to throw out the entire plan, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a sufficient claim of partisan gerrymandering.
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that in cases involving allegations of improper racial gerrymandering, where the evidence was "equally, or more, persuasive" that racial considerations had not motivated the state legislature, the court will give deference to the findings of the district court.
A judicial opinion is a form of legal opinion written by a judge or a judicial panel in the course of resolving a legal dispute, providing the decision reached to resolve the dispute, and usually indicating the facts which led to the dispute and an analysis of the law used to arrive at the decision.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that state juries may convict a defendant by a less-than-unanimous verdict in a felony criminal case. The four-justice plurality opinion of the court, written by Justice White, affirmed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals and held that there was no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. Although federal law requires federal juries to reach criminal verdicts unanimously, the Court held Oregon's practice did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and so allowed it to continue. In Johnson v. Louisiana, a case decided on the same day, the Court held that Louisiana's similar practice of allowing criminal convictions by a jury vote of 9–3 did not violate due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 was a California Supreme Court case where the court held that laws treating classes of persons differently based on sexual orientation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and that an existing statute and initiative measure limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate the rights of same-sex couples under the California Constitution and may not be used to preclude them from marrying.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an Indiana law requiring voters to provide photographic identification did not violate the United States Constitution.
Dubitante is used in law reports of a judge who is doubtful about a legal proposition but hesitates to declare it wrong. E.g., "Justice X acquiesces in the Court's opinion and judgment dubitante on the question of Constitutional preemption."
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that an Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous campaign literature is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects the freedom of speech. In a 7–2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the First Amendment protects the decision of an author to remain anonymous.
Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), also known as Fisher I, is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Texas at Austin. The Supreme Court voided the lower appellate court's ruling in favor of the university and remanded the case, holding that the lower court had not applied the standard of strict scrutiny, articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), to its admissions program. The Court's ruling in Fisher took Grutter and Bakke as given and did not directly revisit the constitutionality of using race as a factor in college admissions.
Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. 291 (2014), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning affirmative action and race- and sex-based discrimination in public university admissions. In a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does not prevent states from enacting bans on affirmative action in education.