Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Last updated
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 19,28, 1973
Decided June 21, 1973
Full case nameAlmeida-Sanchez v. United States
Citations413 U.S. 266 ( more )
93 S. Ct. 2535; 37 L. Ed. 2d 596; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 44
Case history
PriorUnited States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971); cert. granted, 406 U.S. 944(1972).
Holding
Searches of automobiles must still have probable cause even in the absence of a warrant.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William O. Douglas  · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
Case opinions
MajorityStewart, joined by Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Powell
ConcurrencePowell
DissentWhite, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. [1] The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. [2] The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine [3] because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.

Contents

Background

Condrado Almeida-Sanchez was a Mexican citizen who held a valid American work permit. Shortly after midnight, Border Patrol officers stopped Almeida-Sanchez and thoroughly searched his vehicle. The officers stopped Almeida-Sanchez on California Highway 78 at a point twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican border. Highway 78 ran East to West and did not connect to the border. At the time, Border Patrol efforts to identify individuals who have recently entered the United States without authorization included the following: permanent checkpoints, temporary checkpoints, and roving patrols. Almeida-Sanchez was stopped by a roving patrol. The Border Patrol officers did not have a warrant to stop Almeida-Sanchez, and the United States conceded that the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the stop or the subsequent vehicle search. [4]

In searching behind and under the back seat of the vehicle, the officers found marijuana and arrested Almeida-Sanchez. Almeida-Sanchez moved to suppress the marijuana because the officers found it through an unconstitutional search, violating the Fourth Amendment. The United States argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(a)(3) authorizes warrantless searches of vehicles within a reasonable distance of the land border. The United States further noted that regulations adopted by the Attorney General define this distance to be within 100 miles. [5]

The District Court for the Southern District of California denied Almeida-Sanchez's motion to suppress. The evidence of the marijuana was admitted and he was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing and facilitating the transportation of a large quantity of unlawfully imported marijuana. He was sentenced to five years in prison. Almeida-Sanchez appealed his conviction arguing that the search of his car violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction. [6] Almeida-Sanchez appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court reversed.

Supreme Court Opinion

Justice Stewart's majority

Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Court held that the roving patrol's warrantless search of Almeida-Sanchez's car without probable cause or Almeida-Sanchez's consent violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although there are exceptions to the requirement to get a warrant, the Court held that none of the exceptions applied in this case. [7]

First, the Carroll exception did not apply here. In Carroll v. United States , the Court permitted a warrantless search of a vehicle because officers risked losing evidence if the car left their jurisdiction while they try to secure a warrant. [3] But the officers in Carroll still had probable cause to stop the vehicle and to search it. In this case, the United States conceded that the Border Patrol officers did not have probable cause to stop Almeida-Sanchez or to search his vehicle. The Court wrote that “the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Because the United States admitted that the officers did not have probable cause, the Court held that the Carroll exception was not applicable. [8]

Second, the administrative search doctrine did not apply to this case. In Camara v. Municipal Court , the Supreme Court permitted administrative inspections to enforce health and welfare regulations where the inspector did not have probable cause to inspect a particular dwelling. [9] The Court required inspectors performing administrative searches to obtain either consent or an area warrant describing the physical and demographic characteristics of the area to be searched. Here, Border Patrol did not have an area warrant that authorized stopping Almeida-Sanchez and searching his vehicle. The officials who stopped Almeida-Sanchez exercised “unfettered discretion.” The Court found that the officers' discretion was not sufficiently circumscribed by an area warrant to be a constitutionally permissible administrative search. [10]

Third, the doctrine permitting administrative inspection of heavily regulated industries without warrants or probable cause did not apply to this case. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States , the Court upheld warrantless inspections of a company for its liquor sales and manufacturing. [11] In United States v. Biswell , the Court upheld a warrantless inspection of a gun retailer. [12] For each of these, the Court noted that the businesses operated in heavily regulated industries with well-established licensing and compliance requirements. Entering into these industries entails knowledge that business records will be subject to inspection, which limits the owner's justifiable expectation of privacy. Because Almeida-Sanchez was not engaged in a heavily regulated business, this exception did not apply to the search of his vehicle. The Court further noted that in Colonnade and Biswell inspectors also had specific knowledge that the businesses did actually sell liquor and guns, respectively. In Almeida-Sanchez's case, the officers did not even have suspicion that a border crossing occurred. [13]

After finding that no warrant exceptions applied here, the Court considered validity of Section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [14] and its associated regulations authorizing warrantless searches of vehicles within 100 miles of the land border. [15] The Court did not declare the provision unconstitutional, but adopted an interpretation of the statute that would not authorize warrantless stops and searches like the one in Almeida-Sanchez's case. [16] In determining whether a warrantless, suspicionless stop is permitted under INA Section 287(a)(3), courts must consider context. Congress has the right to exclude individuals from entering the United States. Incident to this power, Congress may require searches of each individual seeking entry into the United States, as well as her vehicle. [13] This also applies to functional equivalents, like disembarking from an international flight in airports far from the land border. In the context here, where the roving patrol stopped Almeida-Sanchez over twenty miles from the land border on a road that does not lead to the border, the stop and search was not a functional equivalent of a border search. [17] The stop and search were therefore not permitted under the Court's interpretation of the statute.

Justice Powell's concurrence

Justice Powell agreed with the Court that the Border Patrol's stop and search of Almeida-Sanchez was not a border search or a functional equivalent that would eliminate the requirement for a warrant and/or probable cause. [18] Justice Powell also explains the government interest in having roving patrols: many individuals enter the United States unlawfully, avoiding designated points of entry, and meet with someone who will transport them in a vehicle. Justice Powell accepts that roving patrols are the only feasible way of apprehending someone who enters the United States this way. [19]

Justice Powell discusses the administrative search exception to a particularized warrant and writes that he finds the roving patrols to fit in the doctrine. Like in Camara , roving patrols lack particularized suspicion but often have general suspicion that a particular route is used to transport individuals who are in the United States without authorization. Also like in Camara , this use of roving patrols is not to enforce the criminal law, but is administrative in nature—to apprehend and remove individuals present without authorization. And in this case, although not a border search itself, the roving patrols perform searches incidental to protecting the land border. Vehicles are important tools in transporting individuals present without authorization. Justice Powell points out lower court approval of the searches, lack of reasonable alternatives to roving patrols, and the modest intrusion on individual interests of searching a vehicle. These considerations direct his finding that under limited circumstances, there could be a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to permit roving patrol searches in border areas. [20]

Justice Powell then makes similar findings to the Majority and notes that there is no exception to the warrant requirement in this case. Because the exceptions do not apply, Justice Powell notes that Border Patrol officers needed consent or a warrant to search Almeida-Sanchez's vehicle as they did. [21] Justice Powell goes on to note that this warrant requirement might be solved by getting an area warrant. He notes that this would bring the searches within the administrative search doctrine. [22] Justice Powell specifically finds that area warrants likely will not frustrate the purpose of the searches. [22] He also notes that it would not be infeasible for Border Patrol to get area warrants before commencing a roving patrol. Here, no area warrant meant the search of Almeida-Sanchez's vehicle was unconstitutional and his conviction must be reversed. [23]

Justice Powell concludes his opinion by proposing relevant factors to consider in evaluating whether there is probable cause (or a functional equivalent) for a roving patrol. His test intends to balance an individual's interest in her Fourth Amendment rights with legitimate governmental interests. [24]

Justice White's dissent

Justice White wrote the dissent, which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist joined. The dissenters would have held that neither probable cause nor a warrant was necessary in this case because the proper Fourth Amendment standard is reasonableness. [25]

Justice White notes the special context in this case due to the stop's proximity to the border. He notes that many cases permit unfettered searches at the border and at fixed checkpoints near the border. [25] Justice White then discusses cases in which something less than probable cause justified a search, noting that the search was still reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment. [26] Next, Justice White discusses the heavily regulated industry cases cited in the Majority. He notes that inspectors conducting the searches in those cases had neither a warrant nor probable cause but that the searches were lawful because they were reasonable. [27]

Justice White then notes that reasonableness should be interpreted broadly where there is a federal statute permitting the challenged conduct. [28] He writes that this respects “the considered judgment of Congress that proper enforcement of the immigration laws requires random searches of vehicles without warrant or probable cause within a reasonable distance of the international borders of the country.” [29] This is rooted in Congress's power to exclude, and Justice White finds that there should be deference to Congress's choice of enforcement mechanisms. [29]

Justice White then notes that INA Section 287(a)(3) only permits these warrantless, suspicionless searches for finding people. They do not permit warrantless, suspicionless searches of one's person or for contraband. [30] This is a limited invasion into a person's privacy interests.

Finding that the border is a zone and not a line, Justice White concludes that after balancing the government interest with the interests of the individual, the search of Almeida-Sanchez's vehicle was reasonable. [30] Justice White then cites circuit court opinions affirming the constitutionality of similar searches. [31] He would hold that both stopping the vehicle and searching it was reasonable and that INA Section 287(a)(3) was validly applied. [32]

Subsequent developments regarding roving patrols and border searches

In the years immediately following Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases regarding the implications of its holding. These cases further clarified the powers of law enforcement to search for undocumented people at and near the Mexican border.

Further reading

Related Research Articles

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. It is also the standard by which grand juries issue criminal indictments. The principle behind the standard is to limit the power of authorities to perform random or abusive searches, and to promote lawful evidence gathering and procedural form during criminal arrest and prosecution. The standard also applies to personal or property searches.

Search and seizure Police power to confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to a crime

Search and seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.

In criminal procedure law of the United States, an exigent circumstance allows law enforcement to enter a structure without a search warrant, or if they have a "knock and announce" warrant, allows them to enter without knocking and waiting for the owner's permission to enter. It must be a situation where people are in imminent danger, evidence faces imminent destruction, or a suspect's escape is imminent. Once entry is obtained, the plain view doctrine applies, allowing the seizure of any evidence or contraband discovered in the course of actions consequent upon the exigent circumstances.

Traffic stop Detention of a driver by police

A traffic stop, commonly referred to as being pulled over, is a temporary detention of a driver of a vehicle by police to investigate a possible crime or minor violation of law.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), was a search and seizure case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. The high court was asked to decide if a legal warrantless search of an automobile allows closed containers found in the vehicle to be searched as well. The appeals court had previously ruled that opening and searching the closed portable containers without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though the warrantless vehicle search was permissible due to existing precedent.

Motor vehicle exception United States legal rule allowing a police officer to search a motor vehicle without a warrant

The motor vehicle exception is a legal rule in the United States that modifies the normal probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, when applicable, allows a police officer to search a motor vehicle without a search warrant.

In United States criminal law, the border search exception is a doctrine that allows searches and seizures at international borders and their functional equivalent without a warrant or probable cause. The doctrine is not regarded as an exception to the Fourth Amendment, but rather to its requirement for a warrant or probable cause. Balanced against the sovereign's interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of entrants. Not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior, the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the government at the border. This balance at international borders means that routine searches are "reasonable" there, and therefore do not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures".

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), was a 1983 case before the US Supreme Court determining whether a warrantless arrest violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure.

United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevented Border Patrol officers from conducting warrantless, suspicionless searches of private vehicles removed from the border or its functional equivalent.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), was the case in which the Supreme Court determined it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. A roving patrol car must have articulable facts that allow for an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying illegal aliens beyond their ethnicity. The Court handed down a 9–0 decision that affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in the case.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that upheld the warrantless searches of an automobile, which is known as the automobile exception. The case has also been cited as widening the scope of warrantless search.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that allowed the United States Border Patrol to set up permanent or fixed checkpoints on public highways leading to or away from the Mexican border and that the checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that absent exigency, the warrantless search of a passenger's container capable of holding the object of a search for which there is probable cause is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it is justified under the automobile exception as an effect of the car.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent occupants have been arrested and secured.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case which involved the question of within what period of time must a suspect arrested without a warrant be brought into court to determine if there is probable cause for holding the suspect in custody. The majority held that suspects must generally be granted a probable cause determination within 48 hours of arrest. The dissent believed that probable cause hearings should generally be provided much sooner, as soon as the police complete the administrative steps incident to arrest.

Collins v. Virginia, No. 16-1027, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a case before the US Supreme Court involving search and seizure. At issue was whether the Fourth Amendment's motor vehicle exception permits a police officer uninvited and without a warrant to enter private property, approach a house, and search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house that is otherwise visible from off the property. In an 8–1 judgement, the Supreme Court ruled that the automobile exception does not apply to vehicles parked within the home or the curtilage of a private homeowner.

The "special needs" exception is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement that government searches be supported by a warrant and probable cause. The exception applies when (1) the government conducts programmatic searches that are primarily aimed at advancing some special need other than criminal law enforcement, and (2) the government’s search program is reasonable given the balance of public and private interests.

References

  1. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
  2. ↑ "Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 413 U.S. 266 (1973)". Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. Gale. 2000. Archived from the original on March 13, 2016. Retrieved August 14, 2012.
  3. 1 2 Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
  4. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 267-68.
  5. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
  6. ↑ United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452F.2d459 ( 9th Cir. 1971).
  7. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-75.
  8. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269-70.
  9. ↑ Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco , 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
  10. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270.
  11. ↑ Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
  12. ↑ United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
  13. 1 2 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270-71.
  14. ↑ See 8 U.S.C.   § 1357(a)(3) .
  15. ↑ See 8 CFR 287.1 .
  16. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272.
  17. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
  18. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 275-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
  19. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 276.
  20. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 277-79.
  21. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 279-282.
  22. 1 2 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 283.
  23. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 285.
  24. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 284-85.
  25. 1 2 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
  26. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 288-89.
  27. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 290.
  28. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 290-91.
  29. 1 2 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 291.
  30. 1 2 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 294.
  31. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 295-98.
  32. ↑ Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 299.
  33. ↑ United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
  34. ↑ United States v. Ortiz , 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
  35. ↑ United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.