In the United States, the plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement [1] that allows an officer to seize evidence and contraband that are found in plain view during a lawful observation. The doctrine is also regularly used by Transportation Security Administration officers while screening people and property at American airports. [2]
For the plain view doctrine to apply for discoveries, the three-prong Horton test requires that: [3]
The plain view doctrine was first articulated in the Supreme Court case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire . [4] The original formulation included three factors. First, the officer must be lawfully present when viewing the evidence or contraband. Second, the officer must immediately (without further search) have probable cause to believe that the item is either contraband or evidence of a crime. [5] Third, the observation must have been "inadvertent," not anticipated or intended by the officer before the sighting. [6]
In Horton v. California, [7] the court eliminated the requirement that the discovery of evidence in plain view be inadvertent, which had caused ambiguity. [8] [9] [10] The case involved the plain view seizure of weapons related to a robbery, even though the warrant was signed by a judge who had specifically denied permission to seize weapons as part of the search. [11] The Horton ruling also clarified that the officer must have a "lawful right of access" to the objects to seize them under the plain view doctrine. [12] For example, an officer who sees contraband in plain view in someone's home through the window but is not authorized to enter the home cannot rely on the plain view doctrine to enter the home and seize the contraband.
For a law-enforcement officer to legally seize an item, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the item is evidence of a crime or is contraband. The police may not move objects in order to obtain a better view, and the officer may not be in a location unlawfully. These limitations were detailed in the case of Arizona v. Hicks , 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
The plain view doctrine only eliminates the warrant requirement, not the probable cause requirement. Investigators must normally obtain a court-issued warrant before seizing property, by presenting enough evidence to a magistrate judge to meet the probable cause requirement. [13] When using the plain view doctrine, investigators must possess the evidence needed to meet the probable cause requirement, as they are only exempt from the step of obtaining a warrant from a judge. [14]
The doctrine only authorizes the seizure of contraband or evidence; it does not authorize a further search or additional investigation. [15] Therefore, if investigators do not have enough evidence to meet the probable cause requirement, they may not even conduct a relatively nonintrusive search to establish probable cause. The requirement is that the incriminating character of the object must be immediately apparent. In Arizona v. Hicks, police officers were in an apartment investigating a shooting and suspected that a record player in the apartment was stolen. The officers could not see the serial number, which was on the bottom of the record player, so they lifted the player and confirmed that its serial number matched that of one that had been reported stolen. However, the Supreme Court ruled that lifting the record player constituted an additional search (although a relatively nonintrusive one) because the serial number was not in plain view. This meant that the plain view doctrine did not apply, and the officers needed a warrant. The evidence of the stolen record player could not be used against the defendant because of the exclusionary rule, which is the remedy available when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [16]
The officer must be lawfully present where he or she sees the item. For example, an officer may not enter a suspect's home without a warrant and rely on the plain view doctrine. However, if an officer is inside a suspect's home under an unrelated warrant, he or she may rely on the plain view doctrine, subject to the doctrine's other requirements. [17] In Arizona v. Hicks, the police officers were in the apartment under another exception to the warrant requirement, exigent circumstances. This qualified as a lawful entry, and the plain view doctrine applied to items that the officers could see in the apartment and readily identify as contraband or evidence without further search.
The plain view doctrine has also been expanded to include the subdoctrines of plain feel, plain smell and plain hearing. [18] These doctrines are also limited to seizing an item when its nature as contraband or evidence of a crime is "immediately apparent." In Minnesota v. Dickerson , a police officer felt a lump in a suspect's pocket during a lawful frisk search. [19] He did not immediately have probable cause to believe that it was contraband, but he proceeded to inspect it further by squeezing it, and then had probable cause to believe that it was a piece of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court held that this additional inspection was not covered by the plain view doctrine, and as such, the contraband could not be used against the defendant. [20] However, the court's reasoning extended the plain view doctrine to other senses, such as the sense of touch. [21]
In the case of United States v. Wong , [22] police were searching the defendant's computer for evidence related to a murder when they discovered images of child pornography on the computer. Although the warrant was specific to evidence of the murder, the Ninth Circuit held that the plain view exception allowed them to seize the child pornography, as searching graphics files was valid under the warrant and the files were immediately identifiable as contraband. [23]
However, as with the application of this doctrine elsewhere, the plain view doctrine only justifies a seizure of evidence or contraband that is in plain view, and it does not justify a further search. In United States v. Carey , [24] a detective was searching a computer for evidence of drug trafficking. When he opened an image file that depicted child pornography, he proceeded to search for more images and found a total of 244 images of child pornography on the computer. The Tenth Circuit held that only the first image was covered by the plain view doctrine, and the rest of the images could not be used against the defendant in court. [25]
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A search warrant is a court order that a magistrate or judge issues to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct a search of a person, location, or vehicle for evidence of a crime and to confiscate any evidence they find. In most countries, a search warrant cannot be issued in aid of civil process.
In United States criminal law, probable cause is the legal standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal and for a court's issuing of a search warrant. One definition of the standard derives from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Beck v. Ohio (1964), that probable cause exists when “at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [the] knowledge [of the police], and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.”
Search and seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.
In criminal procedure law of the United States, an exigent circumstance allows law enforcement to enter a structure without a search warrant, or if they have a "knock and announce" warrant, allows them to enter without knocking and waiting for the owner's permission to enter. It must be a situation where people are in imminent danger, evidence faces imminent destruction, or a suspect's escape is imminent. Once entry is obtained, the plain view doctrine applies, allowing the seizure of any evidence or contraband discovered in the course of actions consequent upon the exigent circumstances.
Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof that in United States law is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk, they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), was a 1969 United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that police officers arresting a person at his home could not search the entire home without a search warrant, but that police may search the area within immediate reach of the person without a warrant. The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest within the home is now known as the Chimel rule.
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the constitutionality of "anticipatory" search warrants under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court ruled that such warrants, which are issued in advance of a "triggering condition" that makes them executable, are constitutional and do not need to describe that condition on their face.
Frisking is a search of a person's outer clothing wherein a person runs their hands along the outer garments of another to detect any concealed weapons or objects.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), held that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have probable cause to seize items in plain view.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), was a case before the United States Supreme Court, which incorporated the Fourth Amendment's protections against illegal search and seizure. The case was decided on June 10, 1963, by a vote of 5–4.
In United States criminal law, the border search exception is a doctrine that allows searches and seizures at international borders and their functional equivalent without a warrant or probable cause. Generally speaking, searches within 100 miles of the border are more permissible without a warrant than those conducted elsewhere in the U.S. The doctrine also allows federal agents to search people at border crossings without a warrant or probable cause. The government is allowed to use scanning devices and to search personal electronics. Invasive bodily searches, however, require reasonable suspicion.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court unanimously held that, when a police officer who is conducting a lawful patdown search for weapons feels something that plainly is contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not a weapon. By a 6-to-3 vote, however, the court held that the officer in this case had gone beyond the limits of a lawful patdown search before he could determine that the object was contraband, making the search and the subsequent seizure unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that upheld the warrantless searches of an automobile, which is known as the automobile exception. The case has also been cited as widening the scope of search.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence which is in plain view. The discovery of the evidence does not have to be inadvertent, although that is a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view seizures. The opinion clarified the plain view doctrine of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States handed down in 1990. In the case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980), is a U.S. Supreme Court case concerning the automobile exception to constitutional protections against searches and seizures.
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a seizure of property like that which occurs during an eviction, even absent a search or an arrest, implicates the Fourth Amendment. The Court also held that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy interests, in both criminal as well as civil contexts. Finally, saying that "certain wrongs affect more than a single right", the Court left open the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against deprivation of property without due process of law may also be implicated.
LaFave, Wayne (4 April 2005). "§ 7.5.Plain view, subterfuge and related matters". 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment. 5th ed.
Berkman, Bernard; Gold, Gerard (February 2019). "5 Am. Jur. Trials 331". American Jurisprudence.
Kerr, Orin (4 April 2005). "Searches and Seizures in a Digital World". Harvard Law Review. 119: 531. JSTOR 4093493. SSRN 697541.
Saylor, James (7 November 2011). "Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches". Fordham Law Review. 79 (6): 2809. Archived from the original on March 30, 2023. Retrieved 13 February 2019.
Agati, Andrew (1995). "The plain feel doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson: Creating an Illusion". Case Western Reserve Law Review. 43: 927. Archived from the original on March 14, 2022. Retrieved 13 February 2019.