Reasonable suspicion

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Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; [1] it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", [2] and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. [3] If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk (by feeling something that could be a weapon or contraband, for example), they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, [4] in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.

Contents

Precedent

In Terry v. Ohio , the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a person can be stopped and briefly detained by a police officer based on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in a punishable crime. If the officer has reasonable suspicion the detainee is armed, the officer may perform a "pat-down" of the person's outer garments for weapons. Such a detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizure, though it must be brief. Reasonable suspicion does not provide grounds for arrest; however, an arrest can be made if facts discovered during the detention provide probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime. (Note: Probable cause cannot be after the fact. Any added probable cause after the fact would be inadmissible in a court of law.)

In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada the Court further established that a state may require, by law, that a person verbally identify himself or herself to an officer during a stop; [5] some states (e.g., Colorado [6] ) require that a person detained provide additional information.

However, As of 2020, only 24 states have "stop and identify" statutes on the books. [7]

Other uses

Traffic stops

A brief, non-custodial traffic stop is considered a "seizure" for the purposes of the 4th Amendment and must therefore be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The investigating officer must weigh the totality of the circumstances to determine whether sufficient objective facts exist to create reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaged in criminal activity. [8] If the investigating officer witnesses the driver commit a traffic violation (even if they are mistaken about what constitutes a violation, see Heien v. North Carolina ), then said violation generally constitutes probable cause for the officer to stop the vehicle. The officer may detain the driver and any passengers of the vehicle for long enough to confirm and/or deny his or her suspicions.

If his or her suspicions are confirmed, then there may be probable cause to either search the vehicle and/or arrest its occupant(s), depending on the nature of the suspected violations. In Illinois v. Caballes , the Supreme Court held that a drug dog may sniff the exterior of a vehicle during a traffic stop so long as any delay in calling the dog to the scene does not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. The use of a drug dog is sui generis and a dog's sniff is not considered a search in and of itself under the 4th Amendment. [9]

Police may also set up roadblocks and stop drivers without particularized reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual is engaged in criminal activity, so long as the plan for the stop is applied neutrally, for instance, driving while intoxicated  so long as all vehicles are stopped or every third vehicle is stopped, or some other reasonably neutral policy is applied for stopping vehicles. [10] Note that some states also impose additional notice requirements for roadblocks, such as appropriate signage and/or flashing blue or red lights.

Schools

New Jersey has set the precedent that probable cause is not necessary to search a student on school grounds; reasonable suspicion is enough to search a student's belongings. [11] Overly intrusive searches, like a body cavity search, require probable cause.

Government workplaces

A few years after New Jersey v. T. L. O. , the Supreme Court held in O'Connor v. Ortega that while government employees do have Fourth Amendment rights in the workplace, administrative investigations conducted by supervisors looking for evidence of work-related misconduct or violations of an employee policy – unlike investigations by law enforcement looking for evidence of criminal offenses – only require reasonable suspicion to justify a search. [12]

Private workplaces

Many private employers also use reasonable suspicion in private workplaces to drug and alcohol test their employees. According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), employers must provide training to all persons who supervise drivers subject to the regulations, in accordance with §382.603. [13] The purpose of this training is to enable supervisors to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists to require a driver or other safety-sensitive employee to undergo testing described in §382.307. The consequences of not completing the mandated minimum training can, at the least, result in fines and penalties and at the worst serious injuries and liability. [14]

Borders

U.S. Customs can do routine suspicionless searches of people and effects crossing the border (including passing through airport customs) without establishing reasonable suspicion. This includes even complicated searches such as the disassembly of an automobile's gas tank. [15] However, there are some more intrusive types of searches, such as body cavity searches of a suspect balloon swallower, that require reasonable suspicion. [16] [17]

Different jurisdictions

Most powers applied by police officers in the United Kingdom are done on reasonable suspicion. Unlike in the United States, police officers in England and Wales can arrest on reasonable suspicion.

Child abuse

Most state child abuse reporting laws employ the "reasonable suspicion" standard as the threshold above which mandated reporters must report the case. However, the definition of this term is not widely understood. [18] [19] [20] As a result, there is large variation in the rates of child abuse reporting in different states. [21]

Examples

A police officer may briefly detain a person, without a warrant, if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime, [22] and an officer may use reasonable force to effect that detention. Courts have recognized that an officer's safety is paramount and have allowed for a "frisk" of the outermost garments from head to toe if the officer reasonably suspects that the detainee is armed, and for an officer to stop an individual at gunpoint if necessary. In the city of New York, once a person is released from a reasonable suspicion stop, a "stop, question and frisk report" is filled out and filed with the command in which the stop occurs.

U.S. courts have held that a stop on reasonable suspicion may be appropriate in the following cases: when a person possesses unusual items (like a wire hanger, which would be useful in a crime, and is looking into car windows at 2 am), when a person matches a description of a suspect given by another officer, or a person is seen fleeing from a home or business with a sounding alarm. However, reasonable suspicion does not apply merely because a person refuses to answer questions, declines to allow a voluntary search, or is of a particular race or ethnicity. [23]

See also

Notes

  1. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
  2. Terry, 392 U.S., at 21.
  3. Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
  4. Terry, 392 U.S., at 21–22.
  5. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada , 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
  6. Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-103(1).
  7. "...Oklahoma would have become the 25th state to require the public to identify themselves to police officers when requested during what would otherwise be a Terry stop..." Banner J.D., Adam R. (28, Feb. 2020) Constitutional Issues End Proposed Oklahoma Stop and Frisk Law. Pub. Oklahoma Legal Group. https://www.oklahomalegalgroup.com/news/constitutional-issues-end-proposed-oklahoma-stop-and-frisk-law
  8. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
  9. Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005).
  10. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz , 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
  11. New Jersey v. T. L. O. ,
  12. O'Connor v. Ortega , 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
  13. "Employer Solutions for Reasonable Suspicion and Post Accident Testing". Family Medicine for America's Health. Retrieved 2022-10-11.
  14. "SUPERVISOR REASONABLE SUSPICION TRAINING". www.drugtestingcourses.com. Retrieved 2018-06-15.
  15. United States v. Flores-Montano , 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
  16. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez , 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
  17. "Victory! Fourth Circuit rules that border officials can't subject electronic devices to suspicionless forensic searches". 10 May 2018.
  18. Levi, B.H. and S.G. Portwood, Reasonable suspicion of child abuse: finding a common language. J Law Med Ethics, 2011. 39(1): pp. 62–9.
  19. Levi, B.H. and K. Crowell, Child abuse experts disagree about the threshold for mandated reporting. 2011. 50(4): pp. 321–9.
  20. Flaherty, E.G. and R. Sege, Barriers to physician identification and reporting of child abuse. Pediatr Ann, 2005. 34(5): pp. 349–56.
  21. Kids Count Data. 2009.
  22. Terry, 392 U.S.
  23. Sheriff Rob Gordon (2008). "Search and Seizure Field Guide" (PDF). Washington County Sheriff's Office . Retrieved August 1, 2017.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a statute requiring suspects to disclose their names during a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first requires reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, and does not violate the Fifth Amendment if there is no allegation that their names could have caused an incrimination.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a trained police dog to sniff of a person's luggage or property in a public place.

Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that a person's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when the subject is arrested for driving without a seatbelt. The court ruled that such an arrest for a misdemeanor that is punishable only by a fine does not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stop and identify statutes</span> US state laws allowing police to require identification of those suspected of a crime

"Stop and identify" statutes are laws in several U.S. states that authorize police to lawfully order people whom they reasonably suspect of committing a crime to state their name. If there is not reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime, is committing a crime, or is about to commit a crime, the person is not required to identify himself or herself, even in these states.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing police dog during a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even if the initial infraction is unrelated to drug offenses.

Consent searches are searches conducted by United States law enforcement after obtaining the voluntary consent of the person being investigated. In some cases, consent may also be obtained from certain third-parties. Searches that are the product of consent are one of several recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was freely and voluntarily given.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Frisking</span> Act of searching a persons outer clothing to detect concealed objects

Frisking is a search of a person's outer clothing wherein a person runs their hands along the outer garments of another to detect any concealed weapons or objects.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of vague laws that allow police to demand that "loiterers" and "wanderers" provide "credible and reliable" identification.

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<i>United States v. Brignoni-Ponce</i> 1975 United States Supreme Court case

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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), is a United States Supreme Court criminal law decision holding that a police officer ordering a person out of a car following a traffic stop and conducting a pat-down to check for weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined "seizure" occurs when an officer uses displays of authority to detain a person.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case which analyzed whether police officers may extend the length of a traffic stop to conduct a search with a trained detection dog. In a 6–3 opinion, the Court held that officers may not extend the length of a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff unrelated to the original purpose of the stop. However, the Court remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to determine whether the officer's extension of the traffic stop was independently justified by reasonable suspicion. Some analysts have suggested that the Court's decision to limit police authority was influenced by ongoing protests in Ferguson, Missouri.

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when police officers may make arrests or conduct temporary detentions based on information provided by anonymous tips. In 2008, police in California received a 911 call that a pickup truck was driving recklessly along a rural highway. Officers spotted a truck matching the description provided in the 911 call and followed the truck for five minutes, but did not observe any suspicious behavior. Nevertheless, officers conducted a traffic stop and discovered 30 pounds (14 kg) of marijuana in the truck. At trial, the occupants of the car argued that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the tip was unreliable, and officers did not personally observe criminal activity. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that the 911 call was reliable, and that officers need not personally observe criminal activity when acting upon information provided by an anonymous 911 call.

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