Whren v. United States

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Whren v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 17, 1996
Decided June 10, 1996
Full case nameMichael A. Whren and James L. Brown, Petitioners, v. United States
Citations517 U.S. 806 ( more )
116 S. Ct. 1769; 135 L. Ed. 2d 89; 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3720
Case history
PriorConviction affirmed, United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1995); cert. granted, 516 U.S. 1036(1996).
SubsequentConviction affirmed on remand, United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119(1998).
Holding
Any traffic offense committed by a driver is a legitimate legal basis for a traffic stop.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinion
MajorityScalia, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision [1] that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop." [2]

Contents

In an opinion authored by Antonin Scalia, the court held that a search and seizure is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment in cases where the police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that a traffic violation has occurred. The personal, or subjective, motives of an officer are not a factor in the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis of whether the cause for a stop is sufficient. The standard for reasonable suspicion is purely an objective one. [3] [1]

A major concern with this case's ruling is that police conducting traffic stops may racially profile the stopped persons. [4] Similar to the controversy around New York City's Stop and Frisk program, some believe that the ruling in Whren will lead to an increase in racial profiling towards young African American males. [5]

Background

On June 10, 1993, Michael Whren and James L. Brown were driving around Washington D.C. in an SUV. Brown was the driver, and Whren sat in the passenger seat. They were driving in what was considered a "high drug area."

Meanwhile, two officers dressed in plainclothes were patrolling the area in an unmarked car. They were members of the District of Columbia's Vice Squad and were assigned to the area; they noticed the suspicious vehicle pulled over at a stop sign for about 20 seconds. The passenger was distracting the driver. As the officers approached the vehicle, the vehicle turned at an "unreasonable" speed without using their turning signal. For the traffic violation, the officers pulled over Whren and Brown.

Upon approaching the car, the officer noticed two plastic bags of crack cocaine in Whren's hands. Marijuana laced with PCP was also found in plain sight. The two were charged with possession with the intent to distribute around 50 g of crack cocaine. Also, Whren and Brown were pulled over in a school zone, which resulted in harsher federal drug violation sentences. [4]

Lower courts

Before trial, counsel for the defense moved to suppress the drug evidence by claiming that the traffic stop was only a pretext to investigate possible drug crimes, without probable cause. In other words, the officers used common traffic violations only to investigate other criminal activity to make an arrest. They tried to form the argument that this arrest was a breach of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [6]

The motion to suppress was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and both defendants were sentenced to 14 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the previous ruling. [7]

Question

"In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws." [4] In other words, did the officers breach the Fourth Amendment with an illegal search and seizure?

Decision

The court came to a unanimous decision, written by Justice Scalia:

The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. [4]

If officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they are allowed to stop a vehicle. Because the petitioners sped away at an "unreasonable" speed, the officers were given reasonable cause to stop the vehicle. A traffic violation occurred, which made the following search and seizure lawful. The officers did not ignore the danger of a pretextual stop but acted on a crime. [1]

The court also rejected the petitioners claim that the government's interest in traffic safety led to anxiety, confusion, and haste for Whren and Brown. There was nothing particularly harmful about the search and seizure. [1]

Scalia noted previous cases involving police stops. Using Delaware v. Prouse (1979) and other cases, Scalia claimed that because there was a traffic violation, the search and seizure did not violate constitutional rights: "such stops could be made regardless of an officer's true intentions." [4]

The Court agreed that race has no place in enforcement by pointing to the Equal Protection Clause. It claimed that as long as there was some probable cause of a traffic violation, the officer has the right to pull over a vehicle. [3]

Racial profiling

A major racial issue in this case is the concern surrounding pretext stops. David Harris argues that pretextual traffic stops "[deepen] distrust and cynicism by African Americans about police and the entire criminal justice system." [8]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Search and seizure</span> Police powers

Search and seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a trained police dog to sniff of a person's luggage or property in a public place.

Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk, they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.

Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that a person's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when the subject is arrested for driving without a seatbelt. The court ruled that such an arrest for a misdemeanor that is punishable only by a fine does not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing police dog during a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even if the initial infraction is unrelated to drug offenses.

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that all occupants of a car are "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop, not just the driver.

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the constitutionality of police sobriety checkpoints. The Court held 6-3 that these checkpoints met the Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonable search and seizure."

United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevented Border Patrol officers from conducting warrantless, suspicionless searches of private vehicles removed from the border or its functional equivalent.

<i>United States v. Brignoni-Ponce</i> 1975 United States Supreme Court case

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), was the case in which the Supreme Court determined it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. A roving patrol car must have articulable facts that allow for an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying illegal aliens beyond their ethnicity. The Court handed down a 9–0 decision that affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in the case.

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that allowed the United States Border Patrol to set up permanent or fixed checkpoints on public highways leading to or away from the Mexican border and that the checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that appellate courts should review probable cause determinations for warrantless searches de novo.

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that installing a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle and using the device to monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case which analyzed whether police officers may extend the length of a traffic stop to conduct a search with a trained detection dog. In a 6–3 opinion, the Court held that officers may not extend the length of a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff unrelated to the original purpose of the stop. However, the Court remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to determine whether the officer's extension of the traffic stop was independently justified by reasonable suspicion. Some analysts have suggested that the Court's decision to limit police authority was influenced by ongoing protests in Ferguson, Missouri.

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when police officers may make arrests or conduct temporary detentions based on information provided by anonymous tips. In 2008, police in California received a 911 call that a pickup truck was driving recklessly along a rural highway. Officers spotted a truck matching the description provided in the 911 call and followed the truck for five minutes, but did not observe any suspicious behavior. Nevertheless, officers conducted a traffic stop and discovered 30 pounds (14 kg) of marijuana in the truck. At trial, the occupants of the car argued that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the tip was unreliable, and officers did not personally observe criminal activity. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that the 911 call was reliable, and that officers need not personally observe criminal activity when acting upon information provided by an anonymous 911 call.

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with warrantless arrests and the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled that even if an officer wrongly arrests a suspect for one crime, the arrest may still be "reasonable" if there is objectively probable cause to believe that the suspect is involved in a different crime.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 "Whren v. United States | The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law". oyez.org. Retrieved April 17, 2014.
  2. ↑ "HR 118 Continued..." civilliberties.org. Retrieved April 17, 2014.
  3. 1 2 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 Greene, Helen; Gabbidon, Shaun (2009). SAGE Reference - Whren v. United States. doi:10.4135/9781412971928. ISBN   9781412950855 . Retrieved March 16, 2017.
  5. ↑ Olsen, Gunar (January 25, 2016). "How the Supreme Court Authorized Racial Profiling". Huffington Post. Retrieved March 6, 2019.
  6. ↑ "488 THE LAW OF PRETEXT STOPS SINCE WHREN v. UNITED STATES" (PDF). Retrieved October 18, 2023.
  7. ↑ United States v. Whren, 53F.3d371 ( D.C. Cir. 1995).
  8. ↑ M. K. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids , 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 109 (2009).
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