Florida v. Bostick | |
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Argued February 26, 1991 Decided June 20, 1991 | |
Full case name | State of Florida v. Terrance Bostick |
Citations | 501 U.S. 429 ( more ) 111 S. Ct. 2382; 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 |
Case history | |
Prior | Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989) |
Holding | |
A search of a passenger on a bus is not unreasonable simply because the search takes place on a bus. The search is reasonable if, under all the circumstances, the suspect felt free to decline the officers' request for a search and leave the scene. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter |
Dissent | Marshall, joined by Blackmun, Stevens |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. IV |
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case that overturned a per se rule imposed by the Florida Supreme Court that held consensual searches of passengers on buses were always unreasonable. The Court ruled that the fact that the search takes place on a bus is one factor in determining whether a suspect feels free to decline the search and walk away from the officers. [1]
The sheriff's department in Broward County, Florida, instituted a drug interdiction program. A bus bound from Miami to Atlanta made a stop in Fort Lauderdale, and two Broward County sheriff's department officers boarded. The two officers approached Bostick, who was a passenger on the bus, and asked for his ticket and his identification. They then explained that they were narcotics interdiction officers, and asked Bostick for permission to search his luggage. Whether or not Bostick was told that he was free to decline the search is a matter of dispute. The officers found cocaine in Bostick's luggage, and arrested him.
Bostick asked the trial court to suppress the cocaine. The trial court denied the motion, and Bostick pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine but specifically reserved the right to appeal against the denial of his suppression motion. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, [2] but the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because it took place on a bus.
The State of Florida petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Joan Fowler argued the case for the State of Florida, and Solicitor General Kenneth Starr also argued for reversing the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. Donald B. Ayer argued for Bostick, and the ACLU submitted an amicus curiae brief on Bostick's behalf.
The Fourth Amendment forbids "unreasonable" searches and seizures. When the police detain a person for any length of time, it is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has found not all seizures to be unreasonable, and much Fourth Amendment law consists of explaining what makes certain governmental actions "unreasonable."
Justice O'Connor began by reciting certain basic ideas about what does not make a seizure unreasonable. It is not unreasonable for the police to approach a citizen and ask him a few questions, as long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the questions and carry on with his business. For police activity to constitute a seizure, the Court had held in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that there must be a show of physical force or other authority. And in Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Court had remarked that the police could approach a suspect in a public place (there, an airport concourse) and ask him a few questions without violating the Fourth Amendment.
The question in Bostick was whether the fact that the police approached the defendant while he was a passenger on a bus, by itself, rendered the encounter "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice O'Connor held it did not. In Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567 (1988), the Court had suggested that a seizure occurs whenever a reasonable person does not feel "free to leave" an encounter with the police. Justice O'Connor suggested that the Florida court's error in Bostick was that it "focus[ed] on whether Bostick was 'free to leave' rather than on the principle those words were intended to capture."
Bostick claimed he was not "free to leave" because the bus was scheduled to depart soon, and if it were to depart without him he would be separated from his luggage. But Bostick "would not have felt free to leave the bus even if the police had not been present. Bostick's movements were 'confined' in a sense, but this was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue was coercive." Thus, it was not through any display of authority or show of force on the police's part that Bostick felt he was not free to leave the scene of the encounter with the police. In the absence of such a show of authority, there was no justification for the Florida court's per se rule that a seizure had occurred simply because the encounter had taken place on a bus. Because the Florida courts had not engaged in the correct legal analysis, the Supreme Court sent the case back so that they could do so in the first instance.
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun and Stevens, portraying the law enforcement technique at issue in Bostick as one more likely to affect poor and minority citizens. Citing the low yield of actual drug traffickers, the admittedly arbitrary nature of the search, and the intrusive and intimidating style in which the police carry them out, Justice Marshall disputed the points relied on by Justice O'Connor to reach her conclusion.
To Justice Marshall, the facts of the case "exhibit all of the elements of coercion associated with a typical bus sweep." The officers wore jackets displaying the logo of the Broward County Sheriff's Department and brandished their badges. One of them carried a gun. They cornered Bostick at the back of the bus, blocking the aisle so that Bostick could not leave. While Justice O'Connor relies on the fact that the officers reminded Bostick he could refuse consent to the search, Justice Marshall points out that if Bostick had been unreasonably seized before they posed that question to Bostick, his consent was irrelevant. And for Justice Marshall, it was obvious that Bostick was not, in fact, free to terminate the encounter with the police. "Rather than requiring the police to justify the coercive tactics employed here, [Justice O'Connor] blames respondent for his own sensation of constraint.... Thus..., because respondent's freedom of movement was restricted by a factor independent of police conduct - i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus - [Bostick] was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule, which prevents prosecutors from using evidence in court that was obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applies not only to the federal government but also to the states. The Supreme Court accomplished this by use of a principle known as selective incorporation; in Mapp this involved the incorporation of the provisions, as interpreted by the Court, of the Fourth Amendment which is applicable only to actions of the federal government into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which is applicable to actions of the states.
Search and seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.
A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court unanimously held that the sniff of one's personal property in a public place by a specially trained police dog was not a "search" under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court reasoned that the sniff of a dog is sui generis, or "uniquely pervasive", and thus police do not need probable cause for their police dog to sniff a person's luggage, belongings, or bags. Because this is such a limited test, the Court carved out this exception from the broad category of "searches" for which a warrant is generally required.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that without a search warrant, police had no constitutional right to search a house where one resident consents to the search while another resident objects. The Court distinguished this case from the "co-occupant consent rule" established in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), which permitted one resident to consent in absence of the co-occupant.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 6–2, that the use of a drug-sniffing police dog during a routine traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the use of the dog does not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. Chief Justice William Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of this case, and did not vote nor author an opinion. According to Justice John Paul Stevens, who authored the majority opinion, the Constitution does not require the police to have reasonable suspicion to use a police dog on a car during a legal traffic stop.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), elaborated on the community caretaking doctrine. Under the Fourth Amendment, "unreasonable" searches and seizures are forbidden. In addition to their law-enforcement duties, the police must engage in what the court has termed a community caretaking role, including such duties as removing obstructions from roadways to ensure the free flow of traffic. When the police act in this role, they may inventory cars they have seized without "unreasonably" searching those cars.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), was a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with issues involving the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the case establishes a firm line in cases where police conduct search and seizure without a warrant. The court ruled that, while it is legal for authorities to target and approach a person based on their behavior, absent more, they cannot detain or search such individual without a warrant.
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of protection from search and seizure. The case involved defendant Damasco Vincente Rodriguez against the State of Florida. After the Florida State Court and the District Court of Appeal of Florida both judged in favor of the defendant, the State of Florida appealed for a writ of Certiorari. The Supreme Court sided with the State of Florida, overturning the decision of the Florida state courts.
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Puerto Rico.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court decision on the limits of worksite enforcement by immigration agents. Specifically, the Court ruled that factory raids by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were not illegal seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined "seizure" occurs when an officer uses displays of authority to detain a person.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a seizure of property like that which occurs during an eviction, even absent a search or an arrest, implicates the Fourth Amendment. The Court also held that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy interests, in both criminal as well as civil contexts. Finally, saying that "certain wrongs affect more than a single right", the Court left open the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against deprivation of property without due process of law may also be implicated.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case which resulted in the decision that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore, without consent, requires both probable cause and a search warrant.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections to searches and seizures that occur on buses, as well as the function of consent during searches by law enforcement. During a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort and interviewed passengers. After talking to two of the passengers and asking if they could "check [their] person", officers discovered the two passengers had taped several packages of cocaine to their legs. At trial, the passengers argued that officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because the police engaged in coercive behavior and never informed them that their participation in the drug interdiction efforts was voluntary.
This article is a chronological list of United States criminal case law articles on Wikipedia that discuss the Fourth Amendment constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure in its relation to consent to search.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), was an important decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court explained how long police are permitted to stop vehicles as part of an investigatory stop before violating the Fourth Amendment. A seven-member majority of the Court determined the twenty minute stop in this case was legal, so the government won. However, the Court declined to adopt a bright line rule, deciding instead that "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." The Court announced that the rule for determining whether a detention is too long will depend on whether the police "diligently pursued" an investigation to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. The Court clarified that judges should avoid "unrealistic second-guessing" of police and should take into account "swiftly developing situation[s]." Sharpe has been frequently cited, and is the framework used to challenge unduly prolonged police stops in thousands of criminal cases.