Stone v. Powell

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Stone v. Powell; Wolff v. Rice
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued February 24, 1976
Decided July 6, 1976
Full case nameStone, Warden, v. Powell; Wolff, Warden, v. Rice
Docket no. 74-1055
Citations428 U.S. 465 ( more )
96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorFor Stone v. Powell:

convicted (Superior Court of San Bernardino County); affirmed (California Court of Appeal, 1969); habeas corpus petition denied (California Supreme Court); habeas corpus petition denied (Northern District of California); reversed, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), certiorari granted, 422 U. S. 1055 (1975)

Contents

For Wolff v. Rice:

convicted, (District Court of Douglas County); affirmed, 199 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1972); habeas corpus petition granted, 388 F.Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974); affirmed, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975); certiorari granted, 422 U. S. 1055 (1975)
Holding
If a state prisoner's claim as to a violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has already been given a full and fair hearing by state courts, it may not be heard by federal courts in a habeas corpus petition.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityPowell, joined by Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens
ConcurrenceBurger
DissentBrennan, joined by Marshall
DissentWhite
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV, habeas corpus

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), [1] was decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that limited which claims of Fourth Amendment violations could be made by state prisoners in habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. Specifically, a claim that the exclusionary rule had been broken would be barred if state courts had already given it a full and fair hearing. The decision combined two cases that were argued before the Supreme Court on the same day with similar issues, one filed by Lloyd Powell (convicted of murder in California) and the other, titled Wolff v. Rice, filed by David Rice (convicted of murder in Nebraska). [2]

Procedural history of Stone v. Powell

Background

On the night of February 16, 1968, Lloyd Powell and three friends were at a liquor store in San Bernardino, California, when the store manager spotted Powell stealing a bottle of wine, and a gunfight broke out. During the fight, Powell shot and killed the manager's wife (Mary Parsons). [3] Around 10 AM the following morning, Powell was arrested in Henderson, Nevada for violating the local vagrancy ordinance. [3] The arresting officer found a revolver in his jacket that turned out to be the murder weapon, and he was extradited back to California. [1]

Trial, appeal, and habeas corpus petition

Powell was tried for second-degree murder. He tried to prevent the revolver from being used as evidence, on the grounds that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore his arrest and the officer's search were also unconstitutional, but the trial court found no problem with the ordinance. [1] Evidence against Powell also included testimony from his friends and the store manager, and Powell was convicted. [1]

He appealed to the California Court of Appeal over the use of the revolver as evidence, but his conviction was affirmed. The Court of Appeal did not make a ruling on the constitutionality of the vagrancy ordinance; instead, it held that, even if it were an error for the trial court to allow the revolver as evidence, the strength of the other evidence made it a "harmless error" under the standards of Chapman v. California . [3] Powell then filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court, which was denied. [3]

Next, Powell filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal Northern District of California, raising the same issue, but the district court agreed with the California Court of Appeal. [3] On appeal in 1974, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the error was not harmless, and that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, like the one invalidated in the 1972 Supreme Court case Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville . [3] The prison warden, W.T. Stone, appealed to the Supreme Court on behalf of the state of California, and certiorari was granted. [4]

Procedural history of Wolff v. Rice

Background

In the early hours of August 17, 1970, police in Omaha, Nebraska received a report of a woman screaming for help. [1] A suitcase was seen lying in the doorway at the reported location, and when an officer (Larry Minard, Sr.) approached, it exploded, killing him instantly and injuring other offices nearby. [5] The following investigation centered on Duane Peak, a 15-year-old member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF). [5] 27-year-old David Rice was one of the known members of NCCF that police investigated as part of their search for Peak. [5] The police went to Rice's home the night of August 22 to look for Peak. [1] When no one answered the door, some officers stayed to watch the premises, while other obtained a search warrant. [1] Once they had the warrant, the police entered and found a variety of explosive equipment. [5] Peak and Rice would be arrested within the following few days. [5] Peak admitted being the one to plant the bomb, and would testify that the masterminds had been Rice and another NCCF member, Edward Poindexter. [5]

Trial, appeal, and habeas corpus petition

Rice and Poindexter were jointly tried for first-degree murder in the Douglas County district court. Among its evidence, the prosecution introduced evidence of the explosives it had found at Rice's house, as well as chemical traces of explosives found on the clothing Rice was wearing when he was arrested. [5] Rice tried to exclude this evidence, arguing the warrant had been invalid, but the judge disagreed. [5] Rice and Poindexter were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. [5]

Rice and Poindexter appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court had made a variety of errors, including its decision not to exclude evidence from the search of Rice's house. [5] The Court rejected all of their arguments. In particular, the Court found that the search warrant had been based on an adequate affidavit. It noted that "[t]he confused and confusing state of the law of search and seizure is widely recognized," and that officers had been working 18-hour days following the bombing, and ultimately judged that the hearsay evidence used (e.g. that Rice was known to be a NCCF member, that he was known to have explosives in his house) was enough support to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. [5]

Rice then filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal District Court of Nebraska, focusing on the argument that the search warrant for his house had been invalid, and evidence stemming from it should have been excluded by the trial court. [6] The judge (Warren Urbom) disagreed with the Nebraska Supreme Court's ruling on the warrant, observing that "[i]n part the Supreme Court of Nebraska rested its finding of validity in the search warrant upon information which the police officers had but which was not revealed to the magistrate. In my opinion, such consideration is not acceptable under federal constitutional standards." [6] Judge Urbom then held an evidentiary hearing to assess other grounds for the search and seizure, and ultimately ruled that there were no other justifications that satisfied the Fourth Amendment. [6] As a result, the habeas corpus petition was granted, and was affirmed on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. [6] [7] The decision was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. [4]

Decision of the Supreme Court

Majority opinion

In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Justice Lewis Powell (not to be confused with Lloyd Powell, one of the plaintiffs), writing for the majority, started by reviewing the history of habeas corpus in U.S. federal courts, particularly observing that its scope had varied considerably over the years. [1] For example, even after authority was granted in 1867 for federal courts to hear petitions from state prisoners, it was not until 1915 (in Frankv.Mangum) [8] that issues other than the jurisdiction of the sentencing court could be considered. [1] The range of substantive issues allowing in habeas corpus proceedings expanded over the years through various Supreme Court decisions, including Kaufmanv.United States in 1969, which allowed claims under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. [1] [9]

However, the majority emphasized, the exclusionary rule was not part of the Constitution itself, but was a judicially-created prophylactic rule. [1] It was established in the early 20th century in cases such as Weeksv.United States (1914) and Gouled v. United States, (1921) and was not explicitly applied to state courts until Mapp v. Ohio (1961). [1] It also did not apply in all circumstances, with exceptions having been established, e.g., for grand juries or for impeaching a defendant who testified on their own behalf. [1] In general, the majority said, the benefits of the exclusionary rule had to weighed against its tendency to exclude "highly probative evidence." [1]

The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in his dissent in Kaufman:

"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."

Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490 (Justice Powell, writing for the majority)

Accordingly, the Court ruled that claims violations of the exclusionary rule in state-court proceedings simply could not be heard by federal courts via habeas corpus petitions. [1]

Burger's concurrence

Justice Burger concurred with the majority, but wanted the ruling to go much further. He argued in favor of abolishing the exclusionary rule entirely, calling it a "Draconian, discredited device," and asserting that "no empirical study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect" against unconstitutional police work. [1]

Brennan's dissent

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion—as long as the majority's (35 pages)—that accused the majority of really basing their decision on antagonism toward the exclusionary rule, rather than the legal issues actually involved in the case. Rather, he wrote, the case at hand depended on whether federal rights could be vindicated in federal courts pursuant to a statute written by the U.S. Congress (28 U.S.C. § 2254, governing habeas corpus petitions). [1] Brennan said it made no sense to separate the exclusionary rule from other aspects of the Fourth Amendment, and he also criticized the majority for characterizing habeas corpus laws only as judge-made laws, ignoring the fact that they had been given statutory form by Congress: [1]

Under Mapp, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state court must exclude evidence from the trial of an individual whose Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by a search or seizure that directly or indirectly resulted in the acquisition of that evidence. As United States v. Calandra reaffirmed, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." When a state court admits such evidence, it has committed a constitutional error. . .

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 509, (Justice Brennan, dissenting)

As long as the exclusionary rule remained part of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, he argued, the Court had no authority to exclude it from consideration in habeas corpus proceedings. [1]

White' dissent

Justice White dissented for much the same reasons as Brennan and Marshall. White particularly complained that cases would be treated differently if they were heard on direct appeal rather than on habeas corpus petitions. [1] However, he also expressed sympathy with the view of the majority (and Burger's concurrence) that the exclusionary rule was too often leading to guilty criminals going free, and there was too much second-guessing of police officers who were conducting searches and seizures in good faith. [1]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule, which prevents prosecutors from using evidence in court that was obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applies not only to the federal government but also to the state governments. The Supreme Court accomplished this by use of a principle known as selective incorporation. In Mapp this involved the incorporation of the provisions, as interpreted by the Court, of the Fourth Amendment which is applicable only to actions of the federal government into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which is applicable to actions of the states.

In the United States, the exclusionary rule is a legal rule, based on constitutional law, that prevents evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights from being used in a court of law. This may be considered an example of a prophylactic rule formulated by the judiciary in order to protect a constitutional right. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment's command that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held 6—3 that, while the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states, the exclusionary rule was not a necessary ingredient of the Fourth Amendment's right against warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that as a matter of judicial implication the exclusionary rule was enforceable in federal courts but not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The Wolf Court decided not to incorporate the exclusionary rule as part of the Fourteenth Amendment in large part because the states which had rejected the Weeks Doctrine had not left the right to privacy without other means of protection. However, because most of the states' rules proved to be ineffective in deterrence, the Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). That landmark case made history as the exclusionary rule enforceable against the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the same extent that it applied against the federal government.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless seizure of items from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It also prevented local officers from securing evidence by means prohibited under the federal exclusionary rule and giving it to their federal colleagues. It was not until the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule was deemed to apply to state courts as well.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.

David Rice and Edward Poindexter were charged and convicted of the murder of Omaha Police Officer Larry Minard. Minard died when a suitcase bomb containing dynamite exploded in a North Omaha home on August 17, 1970. Officer John Tess was also injured in the explosion. Rice died on March 11, 2016. He was 68 years old and had been in poor health.

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that police officers knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering a private residence does not require suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search.

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court instituted an exclusionary rule exception allowing evidence obtained through a warrantless search to be valid when a police record erroneously indicates the existence of an outstanding warrant due to negligent conduct of a Clerk of Court.

Suppression of evidence is a term used in the United States legal system to describe the lawful or unlawful act of preventing evidence from being shown in a trial. This could happen for several reasons. For example, if a judge believes that the evidence in question was obtained illegally, the judge can rule that it not be shown in court. It could also refer to a prosecutor improperly or intentionally hiding evidence that does not go with their case and could suggest or prove to the judge or jury that the defendant is not guilty or that (s)he is legally obligated to show the defense. In the latter case, this would be a violation of the 5th amendment to the United States Constitution. Also Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." This can result in a mistrial in the latter case and/or the dismissal of the prosecutor.

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 14, 2009. The court decided that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when a police officer makes an arrest based on an outstanding warrant in another jurisdiction, but the information regarding that warrant is later found to be incorrect because of a negligent error by that agency.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schmerber, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.

Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a murder conviction notwithstanding a challenge that the evidence upon which guilt was based was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court held that in view of the station-house detention upon probable cause, the very limited intrusion of scraping the defendant's fingernails for blood and other material, undertaken to preserve highly evanescent evidence, did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court reversed a district court's suppression of evidence in the criminal prosecution of an Ohio businessman charged with tax evasion. The case concerned both issues of criminal procedure and the application of the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment. By a 6–3 margin the Court both reaffirmed its earlier rulings' holding that only the party whose Fourth Amendment protections may have been violated has standing to challenge the evidence seized in the search, and barred lower courts from exercising their supervisory power to exclude such evidence at the trial of third parties.

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), was a Supreme Court Case that found Max Janis and Morris Levine guilty of illegal bookmaking activities in Los Angeles in a 5-3 ruling. The two were arrested for the crime in November 1968. Appealing on the grounds of unconstitutionally seized evidence, Janis and Levine were heard by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in 1973. The case was ultimately heard by the Supreme Court in 1975, and the two were found guilty in 1976. More importantly, the case established that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases where evidence is unconstitutionally seized by a state officer but used by a federal institution.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was a US Supreme Court decision that held the "silver platter doctrine", which allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally gathered by state police, to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that involuntary blood samples, taken by a skilled technician to determine intoxication, do not violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This case was only the second time the Court considered whether police could forcibly enter inside a suspect's body to extract evidence. Writing for a 6–3 majority, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that blood tests were necessary as a matter of public policy to ensure traffic safety on roads and highways, and that "modern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime detection." Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas both wrote dissenting opinions in which they argued that the involuntary blood sample taken in this case was "repulsive" and violated substantive due process.

Collins v. Virginia, No. 16-1027, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a case before the US Supreme Court involving search and seizure. At issue was whether the Fourth Amendment's motor vehicle exception permits a police officer uninvited and without a warrant to enter private property, approach a house, and search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house that is otherwise visible from off the property. In an 8–1 judgement, the Supreme Court ruled that the automobile exception does not apply to vehicles parked within the home or the curtilage of a private homeowner.

Dollree Mapp was the appellant in the Supreme Court case Mapp v. Ohio (1961). She argued that her right to privacy in her home, the Fourth Amendment, was violated by police officers who entered her house with what she thought to be a fake search warrant. Mapp also argued that the Exclusionary Rule was violated due to the collection of the evidence that was found after the police had entered her house without a convincing search warrant according to Mapp's experience. In the Supreme Court case, Mapp v. Ohio, the decision was made in favor of Mapp, in a 6–3 ruling. As a result of the ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, Mapp's conviction was voided. A few years after Mapp v. Ohio was ruled upon, Mapp was convicted again, but this time for the possession of narcotics. After her prison sentence had ended, she began working "for a non-profit that provided legal assistance to inmates."

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), was a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that clarified the relationship of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to other constitutional rights in criminal procedure. In this case, evidence against the defendant was probably seized illegally, violating the Fourth Amendment, but he lost the chance to argue that point due to his lawyer's ineffectiveness. The prosecution argued that the defendant's attempt to make a Sixth Amendment argument via a habeas corpus petition was really a way to sneak his Fourth Amendment argument in through the back door. The Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the Fourth Amendment issue and the Sixth Amendment issue represented different constitutional values, and had different requirements for prevailing in court, and therefore were to be treated separately by rules of procedure. Therefore, the habeas corpus petition could go forward. In its opinion, the Court also gave guidance on how to apply its decisions in Stone v. Powell and Strickland v. Washington.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
  2. "Stone v. Powell". Oyez . Retrieved July 26, 2021.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Lloyd Charles Powell v. W. T. Stone, Warden, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974)
  4. 1 2 422 U. S. 1055 (1975) (granting certiorari in Stone v. Powell and Wolff v. Rice)
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728 (1972)
  6. 1 2 3 4 Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974)
  7. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975)
  8. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915)
  9. Kaufmanv.United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969)